An extract from the Economist, 12 August 2004
http://www.singapore-window.org/sw04/040812e1.htmTEMASEK : First Singapore, next the WorldFollowing the appointment of Ms Ho, Temasek has been rapidly building up its "external wing". Ms Ho sees banking, telecoms, transport, education and healthcare as areas ripe for consolidation.
Since her arrival, Temasek has spent $1.5 billion buying stakes in banks in Indonesia, South Korea and India, a 5% holding in Telekom Malaysia, a controlling 62% stake in Global Crossing, an American telecoms firm, and a chunk of Quintiles, an American clinical-drug trial company.
But there may be less to Temasek's track record than meets the eye.
A study earlier this year by LEK, a consultancy, found that Temasek's 22 major listed companies had made an average return of only 1.7% a year since their respective listings. And Ms Ho herself has admitted that
Temasek's return had dropped to 13% a year over the past decade.
By contrast GE, which does not receive the same favourable treatment from a friendly government, managed 27% a year over the same period.
Moreover, many of Temasek's best-performing investments are either monopolies or operate in protected markets with favourable regulation.
The capital costs of the city's metro system, for example, have been borne directly by the government, allowing SMRT, the operator, to undercut its private-sector rival ComfortDelgro.
Chartered Semiconductor, Singapore's attempt to get into making microchips, has been given lots of tax breaks.
Given such support, the crown jewels in its portfolio, the zealousness with which they have been protected, and the rapidity with which Singapore grew in the 1970s and 1980s, it should have made much more money.
Worse, when Temasek or its subsidiaries have ventured overseas or had serious competition, they have often flopped.
DBS overpaid for its purchase of Hong Kong's Dao Heng Bank, argue analysts, while SingTel's acquisition of Optus, an Australian telecoms company, and NOL's of American President Lines, a rival shipping company, have taken years to come right.
Singapore Airlines's investment in Air New Zealand was a disaster and had to be written off after the latter went bankrupt, as was SingTel's in C2C, an underwater-cable operator.
The biggest lossmaker, however, has been Chartered Semiconductor which, with inferior technology to Taiwanese rivals, has bled money for much of the past three years and had to be bailed out by Temasek in 2002.
Fed up with complaints from outside shareholders, and concerned that her chastened executives would no longer seize opportunities, Ms Ho has started using 100%-owned subsidiaries to expand.
The NOL bid is the latest example.
The container-shipping industry is consolidating and NOL, as the seventh largest, is too small to survive on its own. Owning the whole company will make it easier for Temasek to control its destiny.
But buying out other shareholders and delisting companies' shares fly in the face of the privatisation strategy espoused a few years ago. They also sit oddly with Temasek's talk of becoming more open.
Buying up entire companies rather than investing in listed ones will, if anything, make Temasek more opaque, not less. And even the rating agencies are struggling to understand what goes on at the company, which will not obviously reassure outside investors nor, indeed, Singapore's taxpayers.
Temasek says it is becoming a competitive and transparent global investment company. But at heart it is still a prime example of Asia's paternalistic capitalism: a government-owned collection of assets that operate largely in protected markets with a whiff of nepotism, and one that will find its addiction to secrecy very hard to break.