Re-think Our National Service Conscription
-
Hardly imo. You just have to look at the US and the way the terrorists use non-direct confrontation with their mighty forces during 911. Did the terrorists fear and give a shit about deterrence? Hardly.
now you agree SAF has served its purpose as a deterrant force.
It'll be too late when we have a 911 repeat on our soil and we start to talk about it.
learning from 911? a bit too late to talk about this isn't it? -
I think you didnt really get sgdiehard,and confuse the nature of conventional warfare and terrorism(considered unconventional warfare,though in strict sense it is not a military strategy by itself).Originally posted by macjoe:Hardly imo. You just have to look at the US and the way the terrorists use non-direct confrontation with their mighty forces during 911. Did the terrorists fear and give a $$%@ about deterrence? Hardly.
Deterrance policy is mainly to deter a state from conducting conventional warfare,limited or unlimited,against another. In fact it is due to the deterrance that "aggressors are not planning to go into a direct head-on war with our Armed Forces"(to coin your phrase) as conventional warfare cease to be a viable option for success.
In the case of terrorism,defence against it is under counter-terrorism in which small tactical units like CQB units & Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Explosive Defence Group(together with public awareness,strict security checks and intelligence), even then you still need manpowers to fill up these roles~~~
Just became one tool doesnt help you solve all the task doesnt mean it is useless and you should discard it,in fact different tools are for different purposes. A verse in "The Prince" by Niccolo Machiavelli aptly sums it up:
"A 'Prince' should imitate the fox and the lion, because the lion cannot defend himself from traps and the fox cannot defend himself from wolves. Therefore, it is important to be a fox in order to discover the traps and a lion in order to terrify the wolves." -
double postings,sorry~
-
Taking the issue conversely, can you imagine a country without an army. Other countries can simply march their military into our defenceless country without any form of conventional resistance.Originally posted by macjoe:Hardly imo. You just have to look at the US and the way the terrorists use non-direct confrontation with their mighty forces during 911. Did the terrorists fear and give a #*^# about deterrence? Hardly.
As for terrorist threats, its somewhat more difficult. Investigative and spying agencies work hard to detect and weed out terrorists and their plots. Police keep watch, investigate and arrest any parties suspected of terrorism and the such, while the military would offer enforcement and other forms of support before and during a teror attack.
Although I know my previous para barely scratches the surface, but the point I was making is that all the armed services have a role to play. Not all is obvious. -
thank you very much, liuzg150181, you got my point and you have presented it clearer.Originally posted by liuzg150181:I think you didnt really get sgdiehard,and confuse the nature of conventional warfare and terrorism(considered unconventional warfare,though in strict sense it is not a military strategy by itself).
Deterrance policy is mainly to deter a state from conducting conventional warfare,limited or unlimited,against another. In fact it is due to the deterrance that "aggressors are not planning to go into a direct head-on war with our Armed Forces"(to coin your phrase) as conventional warfare cease to be a viable option for success.
In the case of terrorism,defence against it is under counter-terrorism in which small tactical units like CQB units & Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Explosive Defence Group(together with public awareness,strict security checks and intelligence), even then you still need manpowers to fill up these roles~~~
Just became one tool doesnt help you solve all the task doesnt mean it is useless and you should discard it,in fact different tools are for different purposes. A verse in "The Prince" by Niccolo Machiavelli aptly sums it up:
"A 'Prince' should imitate the fox and the lion, because the lion cannot defend himself from traps and the fox cannot defend himself from wolves. Therefore, it is important to be a fox in order to discover the traps and a lion in order to terrify the wolves." -
My thought is main threat is from terrorism is more real compared to invasion from another country.Originally posted by SilverPal:Taking the issue conversely, can you imagine a country without an army. Other countries can simply march their military into our defenceless country without any form of conventional resistance.
As for terrorist threats, its somewhat more difficult. Investigative and spying agencies work hard to detect and weed out terrorists and their plots. Police keep watch, investigate and arrest any parties suspected of terrorism and the such, while the military would offer enforcement and other forms of support before and during a teror attack.
Although I know my previous para barely scratches the surface, but the point I was making is that all the armed services have a role to play. Not all is obvious. -
Hi, I do not claim to know a lot but I do believe that we already have various armed and govt services in place to tackle the ever increasing threat of terrorism.Originally posted by will4:My thought is main threat is from terrorism is more real compared to invasion from another country.
In this case, the military plays a slightly smaller role than other investigative and armed agencies. -
Then in that case, we should be fighting terrorism with counter-terrorist forces. As the others have said, the SAF has functioned in its role as a deterrence against conventional warfare. So we adapt our military to fight against a more unconventional type of warfare, i.e. counterterrorism warfare. We've already taken steps to doing so, such as training 3 SIR in specialised FIBUA ops and training 6 SIR in specialised POI skills (all these are in the public domain - nothing classified).Originally posted by will4:My thought is main threat is from terrorism is more real compared to invasion from another country.
Yeah sure, I agree the terrorists don't give a damn about what kind of forces we have to stop them. However, I vehemently object at the notion dismantling our armed forces and arming ourselves with WMDs as an alternative, as what macjoe suggested. While what we have isn't perfect, it's still better than nothing. -
In fact, many countries in S.E Asia never expected JI is to be so powerful n hadOriginally posted by fudgester:Then in that case, we should be fighting terrorism with counter-terrorist forces. As the others have said, the SAF has functioned in its role as a deterrence against conventional warfare. So we adapt our military to fight against a more unconventional type of warfare, i.e. counterterrorism warfare. We've already taken steps to doing so, such as training 3 SIR in specialised FIBUA ops and training 6 SIR in specialised POI skills (all these are in the public domain - nothing classified).
Yeah sure, I agree the terrorists don't give a damn about what kind of forces we have to stop them. However, I vehemently object at the notion dismantling our armed forces and arming ourselves with WMDs as an alternative, as what macjoe suggested. While what we have isn't perfect, it's still better than nothing.
many educated people inside it. The bomber, Azahari is a university lecturer.
The post 9/11 incident had created a lot of tension.
Look at the US forces in Iraq n they decided to pull out also.
Al Qaeda is already happy. -
Sorry for the digression but, why do you think that terrorism is a big threat? I'm a little uninformed about these things.
-
I am a Spore PR n had served NS in 2 PDF Comd, a low intensity conflict unit designed to counter terrorist threat. Spore has enjoyed peace due to its army hardware most important is the air force.Originally posted by SilverPal:Sorry for the digression but, why do you think that terrorism is a big threat? I'm a little uninformed about these things.
Singapore in fact has the most mordern equipment in S. E Asia.
The threat from terrorism came mainly from JI which almost send its operatives to bomb US embassy n Australian High Commission. Remember the they kena caught? If they never managed to succeed, there is always a next time. JI is funded by Al Qaeda n is in charge of S. E Asian operation. -
Well, I know many people who migrate to Australia so that their sons need not serve NS. For me, I think that whether we are patriotic or not, we can't deny that the friends you make in NS would be close to you due to the tortures you go through together. And NS is a good place to mix with men of other races.
-
If there is going to be a war in spore....I think the ministers and top guns of GIC,GLC will be the first to send their families to other countries. Foreign talents will be also chicken out first. Left behind we the desperate ones to fight the war.Originally posted by Deen Lee:National service conscription was introduced in 1967 to basically produce a military defence force for the country. Later it was expanded to include the police and civil defence force. In the Enlistment Act, all male Singaporean citizens, upon reaching the age of 18, are required to serve two years of full-time national service in one of these forces. Which forces one is conscripted to is decided solely by the government without any recourse. Females are not required to do national service. I shall focus maily on military conscription.
Recently, draft dodger Melvin Tan, created a furore among ex and current national servicemen for the light punishment he received from the authorities. Unhappiness also started to surface about male foreigners who had obtained their PR and/or citizenship without having to serve a day of national service. Questions were raised about the value of citizenship, and the inconsistencies of national service liability.
National service is suppose to bond the nation, but instead it has inadvertently created divisions and frictions between citizens who are liable to be conscripted, and those who are not. Such division is compounded by the latter's lack of understanding and respect for national servicemen. Last year, a senior bureacrat and an ASTAR's female scholar passed unsavoury remarks on national servicemen, which causes much outrage and condemnation from ex and current national servicemen. This shows the underlying tension between both groups.
One of the most serious implication of national service conscription is that we are actually putting Singapore at risk. With conscription, we are just producing "reluctant soldiers". Many Singaporean male do not have the opportunity or finance to do what Melvin Tan did. They have no choice but to serve out their "liability", wishing for their 2 years of military service to be over as soon as possible. Realistically, in time of war, do you think these reluctant soldiers will actually carry their guns and put their life at stake for the country? Or do they readily offer to surrender to enemy forces battling in. During the US-Iraqi war, we witnessed conscripted Iraqi soldiers readily surrendering to the US army and chose to be POWs to preserve their lives. Will our NSmen do that? Yes if they are reluctant soldiers being conscripted to fight a war. Further, these reluctant soldiers could inevitably led to this problem of desertion. Our operational readiness in defence is dependent on the X number of soldiers that we have. During peace time, these X numbers are reassuring to our defensive needs. However in times of war, it could be much more lesser, crippling our defensive capability. This is because many reluctant NSmen and his family would have gone out of the country at the first sign of trouble. The government can closed all immigration point, but it wouldn't be of much use if soldiers are not willing to fight.
National service conscription for all its' noble purposes and objectives, is in fact counterproductive. It does not make our nation's defence stronger as previously thought. Instead of better bonding, it has divided our nation between those who are liable and those who are not. Conscription has put our male citizens at a disadvantage in the employment market as compared to the woman folks and incoming foreigners. This led to anguish and resentment. Conscription had also dented the creativeness of one-third of the nation's population. It has caused talents like Melvin Tan to migrate. NSmens' yearly duties has blunted the competitiveness of our companies and the economy. Resources committed to training conscripted reluctant soldiers are wasted and could be put to better use.
Therfore after 39 years, a re-think of our national service conscription is necessary, and not a moment too soon.
Think about it
Deen Lee -
Why is everyone painting a picture of desperate last-ditch defending on Singapore soil if we ever go to war?
That's got to be the most unlikely scenario for us to draw arms. -
Yeah i wouldn't mind fighting for this place.. But i'd be doing it for blood lust... combat and FOR MEDALS!!! Tee hee. Plus i wouldn't mind gutting some invaders =)
-
Gentlemen..
Actually in terms of strength of military force Singapore is ranked 10th for East Asian Nations~ ^_-
Armed Forces of the World
Data current to 2002-2003
These charts give evaluations of the quantity and quality of each nation's armed forces. The quantity of each combat unit has been derived from various open sources. Quality has been determined by evaluating historical performance. All armed forces are not equal, and this inequality has been expressed numerically. In calculating the numerical value of total strength it is important to differentiate between what floats and what doesn't. Aircraft carriers and tank divisions are very different instruments of destruction. Both cost about the same, but a carrier cannot march on Moscow, nor can a tank division hunt submarines in the Atlantic. For this reason, land and naval force capabilities are listed separately. In reality, they are not entirely separate. Naval forces, particularly carriers, can support ground combat. Tank divisions can seize ports needed by naval forces for their sustenance. Destructive effect was the main consideration in assigning values. This was modified by the mobility and flexibility of the system. Tank divisions can move over a wide area to fight while most air defense forces are limited in their capabilities and mobility. While the numbers of men and weapons are fairly accurate, estimates of quality factors are subjective. Readers may impose their own evaluations. The assessments given are based on current conditions and historical experience. Don't underestimate the historical trends.
Naval forces are shown in detail on their own charts, while on the armed forces chart they are shown as a component of total nation power. Naval power is difficult to compare to land power, as it is with land power that you ultimately defend yourself or overwhelm an opponent. For nations that are not dependent on seaborne trade, naval power is less important than those that are. For most industrial nations, and many third world countries that have periodic food shortages, loss of sea trade is a serious problem. Fortunately for the nations dependent on seaborne trade, they have a substantial naval advantage over less dependent nations. In other words, Western navies are collectively considerably larger than those controlled by continental powers.
European Nations | Middle East Nations | American Nations
East Asian Nations | African Nations | South Asian Nations
COLUMN KEY
COUNTRY lists every nation with a combat value of one or more. Nations with a combat value of less than 1 have little more than national police capability. Many smaller countries, especially those that lack a threatening neighbor, use their forces primarily for internal security. These lesser military powers often repel an invasion most effectively simply by arming the population. Nations are grouped into four regions: Europe; Middle East and North Africa; Asia and the Pacific; and the Americas.
RNK is the ranking of each nation within its region
COMBAT POWER LAND is the total combat capability of the nation's armed forces except for their navies. Certain nations like Israel, Sweden and Switzerland have a rapid mobilization capability which achieves the combat value shown within three days of mobilization. Their normal, unmobilized, combat value is less than one third of the value shown. As explained elsewhere, combat value is modified by geographical, climate and political factors. The value given here is a combination of the quantity and quality of manpower, equipment and weapons. This raw combat value is then multiplied by the force multiplier (see below) to combat value shown in this column.
NAVAL capability is separate from land value and is found on the Naval Forces chart.
TOT QUAL (total force quality) is a fraction by which raw (theoretical) combat power should be multiplied to account for imperfect leadership, component of force quality, support, training and other "soft" factors. Think of it as an efficiency rating, with "100" being perfect and "55" being a more common 55 percent efficiency.
TOT POP (population in millions) indicates the nation's relative military manpower resources. Population is also a more meaningful indicator of a nation's size than territory.
GDP (Gross Domestic Product) is a rough gage of the nation's economic power. This does not translate immediately into military power because of the time needed to convert industry from civilian to military production. Mobilization of some types of military equipment takes years. Other types of weapons, especially those using electronics, can be brought to bear in months.
ACT MEN (active military manpower in thousands) is the total uniformed, paid manpower organized into combat and support units. Because of the widely varying systems of organizing military manpower, this figure is at best a good indicator of the personnel devoted to the military. Industrialized nations hire many civilians to perform support duties, while other nations flesh out skeleton units with ill-prepared reserves, uncertain effect on wartime strength. The use of reserve troops varies considerably.
MIL BUD (Military Budget in millions of dollars) is the current annual armed forces spending of that nation. All nations use somewhat different accounting systems for defense spending. Efforts are made to eliminate some of the more gross attempts at hiding arms expenditures. Some of the figures, particularly for smaller nations, may be off by 10 percent either way.
BUD MAN is the annual cost per man for armed forces in dollars. This is an excellent indicator of the quantity and, to a lesser extent, the quality of weapons and equipment. Some adjustments should be made for different levels of personnel costs, research and development, strategic weapons and waste. The United States, in particular, is prone to all four afflictions. The precise adjustments for these factors are highly debatable. One possible adjustment would be to cut the US cost per man by at least one third. Other nations with strategic programs and large R&D establishments (Russia, Britain, France, China, etc.) should be adjusted with deductions of no more than 15 percent. Britain could also take another 5 or 10 percent cut because of its all-volunteer forces higher payroll. At the other extreme, many nations produce a credible defense force using far less wealth. Low paid conscripts, good leadership and the sheer need to improvise enables many of these poorer nations to overcome their low budgets. However, most nations end up with what they pay for.
AFV (Armored Fighting Vehicles). These include tanks, armored personnel carriers and most other armored combat and support vehicles. AFV are the primary components of a ground offensive, and greatly enhance chances of success.
AIRCRAFT CMBT are the number of combat aircraft devoted to land operations. This, like AFV, is a good indicator of raw power. The quality of the aircraft, their pilots, ground crew and leadership, air force are the most important factors in the air power's overall value.
The Total Quality is calculated by assigning 0 (lowest) to 9 (highest) values for the following components of combat capability.
Ldrs is leadership. The quality of officers and NCOs.
Eqp is equipment. The quantity and quality of military equipment.
Exp is experience. Not just combat experience, but the quality of training.
Spt is support. This is logistics, the ability to get military supplies to the troops.
Mob is mobilization. The ability to mobilize the national resources for combat.
Trad is tradition. Military tradition, good military habits, based on practical experience.
http://www.strategypage.com/fyeo/howtomakewar/databases/armies/default.asp -
The Pentagon's Fuzzy Math
Does anyone know how many soldiers we really need?
By Phillip Carter
Updated Wednesday, June 23, 2004, at 5:11 PM ET
The occupation has forced the Pentagon into ever more elaborate, Rube Goldberg-like arrangements to maintain troop strength in Iraq. It has issued "stop-loss" orders preventing soldiers from retiring when they're supposed to. It has called up members of the Individual Ready Reserve who've completed their active service obligations. The next Iraq rotation is slated to include "opposing force" units from the Army's premier training centers in California and Louisiana—a move some have likened to eating the Army's seed corn because these units play a key role in training the rest of the force to fight—as well as tens of thousands of reservists, because the active-duty force has been all but tapped. The situation has gotten bad enough that both houses of Congress have sped through bills to permanently boost the size of the 482,000-man Army and 175,000-man Marine Corps.
But adding more troops for their own sake may not be the right answer, despite the current strains on the military from the Iraq and Afghanistan missions. So far, no one is asking the most fundamental question of all: How many troops does the United States really need? Those who want to make the Army bigger assume that adding more troops will magically solve the military's overstretch problems, but that's not necessarily the case. Without an honest assessment of U.S. military requirements, we have no way of knowing how many troops to add (and what kind) or whether drastic measures (like a draft) might be necessary. More important, an honest study of U.S. military requirements may tell us that added manpower is not the answer and that other solutions will buy more bang for our taxpayer buck.
Calculating optimum troop strength is not a new problem, but it has become a lot harder in the past 15 years. During the Cold War, U.S. planners could look at Warsaw Pact strength, do some fuzzy math to adjust for technology and skill differentials, and predict how many troops the United States needed to block a Soviet march through West Germany's Fulda Gap. Erroneous assumptions and interservice rivalries sometimes corrupted the process. (In one famous example from the late 1970s, a set of Navy war games consistently projected that the Navy needed 13 aircraft carrier battle groups—regardless of the scenario that was played.) But despite those flaws, the process had fidelity because we could accurately calculate the Soviet threat and measure our forces in comparison to theirs.
Continue Article
Click Here!
But now the military has to prepare for myriad threats, from aggressive states like Saddam's Iraq to failed states like Somalia to non-state terrorist groups like al-Qaida. In the early 1990s, the Pentagon developed the "2 Major Regional Conflict" doctrine, which held that the United States should be capable of fighting two major regional wars at once. Elaborate war games were conducted to figure out how many forces would be necessary to meet this paradigm, and the results drove subsequent requests for personnel, equipment, and force structure. The 2MRC model quickly proved insufficient for real life. In the '90s, smaller deployments to Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo stripped the Army's capability to fight two wars at once. These deployments also highlighted the disconnect between the wars the Army planned to fight and those missions it was actually given.
On June 21, 2001, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld presciently told the Senate Armed Services Committee that this two-war construct needed to be reexamined. He was right then, and he's even more right now after the cataclysmic events of Sept. 11 and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Yet despite the obvious need for change, the Pentagon maintains a doctrine only incrementally different from the old 2MRC model. Today's National Military Strategy is a "1-4-2-1" model, meaning:
1) Defend the United States;
4) Maintain forces capable of deterring aggression and coercion in four critical regions: Europe, Northeast Asia, Southwest Asia, the Middle East;
2) Maintain a capability to combat aggression in two of these regions simultaneously;
1) Maintain a capability to "win decisively"—up to and including forcing regime change and occupation—in one of those two conflicts "at a time and place of our choosing."
But this model is failing spectacularly when it comes to dealing with the reality of Iraq. The 1-4-2-1 paradigm effectively commits us to holding everywhere else in the world for as long as it takes to extricate U.S. forces from Iraq. If the North Koreans attack South Korea, or more likely, if North Korea implodes, the United States will be hard-pressed to dispatch ground troops to help, although we still have a formidable air and naval response capability not tied down in Iraq.
The 1-4-2-1 model also provides very little help in predicting a force size because the range of possible post-9/11 missions is so vast—everything from formal major regional conflicts to small special forces and civil affairs deployments (as in the Philippines) to ongoing peacekeeping (as in the Balkans) to special ops works all over the world. The 1-4-2-1 model still sees military requirements through the prism of state-based warfare. But as the post-9/11 deployments show, that prism may be anachronistic. Tomorrow's major military deployment might not be for combat at all—it might require the deployment of an expeditionary nation-building force to stave off a humanitarian crisis. A new military planning model ought to take these kinds of missions into account, too.
In many of these places, firepower might not be the answer, and the 1-4-2-1 model also fails to predict the other kinds of forces which might be necessary for a given situation. If America decides to intervene somewhere like Sudan, it will need a mix of civil affairs troops, military police, engineers, and medical personnel, not just pure combat forces. Furthermore, military forces alone may not be sufficient; we may need to create units with the Treasury Department capable of managing the economic aspects of nation-building, or within the Department of Justice to manage the legal parts of the job. The 1-4-2-1 model also assumes the mission will end when major combat operations end—something which has proved to be wildly off the mark.
Finally, the 1-4-2-1 model is opaque. War planners may know how this model gets translated into personnel requirements, but congressional staffs and the public do not. Thus, politicians have a tendency to throw out arbitrary numbers, like the 20,000- and 30,000-man troop increases now being weighed on Capitol Hill without having any precise idea of what the Army really needs.
Which brings us to the Army expansion proposals now being floated in Washington. At best, these proposals take the current size of the Army and adjust from that point based on some conception of what the Army needs to get its job done; at worst, they represent a potentially dangerous wartime diversion of taxpayer dollars from places where the force really needs the money.
The House and Senate have both approved increases to the "end strength" of the active-duty Army, the number of actual soldiers authorized each year in the annual National Defense Authorization Act. So far, the Army opposes these additions because they don't come with added funding. (The Army says it costs $3.6 billion per year to train, pay, and equip a cohort of 10,000 soldiers.) Congress may have the best of intentions in giving these additional troops to the Army, but the Army's right that it can't afford another unfunded mandate. (In this article, Fred Kaplan suggests some defense programs that could be cut to pay for more troops.)
The White House has supported the Army and Pentagon in their opposition to these "end strength" increases. But lest it appear unpatriotic, the White House has also endorsed an emergency measure taken by Secretary Rumsfeld in January to temporarily exceed the Army's end strength by 30,000. And despite its stance on end-strength increases, the White House has authorized the mobilization of more than 300,000 reservists since Sept. 11 (131,342 Army reservists were on active duty as of this week.) Based on these seemingly contradictory positions, it appears the White House has nothing more than an ad hoc approach to military manpower and no real plan for how many troops the U.S. military really needs.
Sen. John Kerry says he wants to add 40,000 troops to the entire 1.4 million man military, with an emphasis on Army special forces, military police, and civil affairs—jobs heavily in demand since Sept. 11. The presumptive Democratic nominee has also criticized the Bush administration's emergency measures (like "stop loss" orders) as a "backdoor draft." However, Sen. Kerry doesn't say how the country should pay for these troops, and it's not clear where he got his numbers, either.
It would be very easy to throw more money at the troop-strength problem by hiring more infantrymen. But doing so won't fix the deeper structural issues which make today's military inefficient—like the decades-old decisions to concentrate critical support functions like military police and logistics in the reserves. Nor will throwing more troops at the problem take into account the revolutionary changes in warfare that have taken place just in the past 15 years. We may need more ground troops today to win wars and decisively manage the postwar aftermath, but we may not need more support personnel, sailors, and airmen. The only way to find out is through an intellectually honest assessment of America's military requirements. This is an assignment the next president—whoever he is—should give his Secretary of Defense immediately.
Phillip Carter is a former Army officer who writes on legal and military affairs from Los Angeles.
http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_377_National%20Military%20Strategy%2013%20May%2004.pdf -
I am fine with national service, but not reservist! A waste of time.....
-
How to produce more willing soldiers?
Make the SAF an informal and a less hierarchical army. With fewer ah bengs serving NS, every well educated man should go through the demands and rigors of army life on a totally egalitarian basis.Officers should sleep and eat with their soldiers and make scant use of saluting and parades.
A soldier should work his way up through the ranks, from enlisted man to NCO, then base on his leadership and command capabilities selected to be trained as officer, not base solely on their paper qualifications,( although senior officers would have to have a higher degree). This not only helps reduce elitism in the SAF, but also fosters a close bond between enlisted men, NCOs and officers.
Senior officers must lead by example. Senior officers taking front line combat positions means SAF will suffer proportionately a higher officer to soldier casualty rate in a war. However, leading by example increases respect for the officers and instills greater motivation among soldiers. Soldiers should also be trained to take over command in a situation where an officer is killed or injured.
Then, there is the concept of comradeship. A soldier is expected to risk his life for his fellow soldier by not deserting wounded on the battlefield. This is a vital principle to instill trust among soldiers and strengthen the sense of mission and team.
Last by not least, the government must make Singapore a fine place to live and worth fighting for. I'm not talking about upgrading of precincts or distributing goodies. Locally born Citizens, young and old, want full employment with well paying jobs to feed their families, and then got some left to adopt a stray animal as pet too. -
[quote]Originally posted by googoomuck:
[b]How to produce more willing soldiers?
That's simple, just pay us 5k per mth for 2 yr then we are all willing to serve the national service and pay us 200 dollar per day for 2 weeks of reservist. -
Originally posted by Anti-RuleSS:[quote]Originally posted by googoomuck:
[b]How to produce more willing soldiers?
That's simple, just pay us 5k per mth for 2 yr then we are all willing to serve the national service. Pay us a business of 200 dollar per day for 2 weeks for reservist. -
NS extended to 4 yrs?
SGporean has he worldÂ’s 3rd lowest birth rate (out of 226 countries) @ 1.05 /woman lifetime (http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/rankorder/2127rank.html),
This means, our army enlistment will probably shrink by at least ½ within the next 18 yrs.
Women soldiers or do the men serve longerÂ…?
Does it mean 4 yrs NS for a newborn male of today???
Just wonderingÂ…or shall the SG gov pay for robots/ Gurkahs to defend our country? -
By implementing harsher punishment such as caning for evading NS willOriginally posted by oxford mushroom:Keep NS but expand it's scope. Women must serve NS too...in the civil service and hospitals as nursing assistants, etc. Those who dodge NS must be given severe punishments that include mandatory costodial sentences and caning for men.
create more resentment n end of the day, the soldier will not fight.
I think NS is fine except like some of the training esp mono intake very tough training. Sincerely believe there is case serviceman escaped to Malaysia. -
Soldiers will fight when they face the bullets...it's either fight or they die...Originally posted by will4:By implementing harsher punishment such as caning for evading NS will
create more resentment n end of the day, the soldier will not fight.
I think NS is fine except like some of the training esp mono intake very tough training. Sincerely believe there is case serviceman escaped to Malaysia.
If the punishment for evading NS is not harsh enough, lots of people will evade.. -
This meaned Sporean need to pay more tax if we want this kind of payment.Originally posted by Anti-RuleSS:[quote]Originally posted by googoomuck:
[b]How to produce more willing soldiers?
That's simple, just pay us 5k per mth for 2 yr then we are all willing to serve the national service and pay us 200 dollar per day for 2 weeks of reservist.