MINDEF trying to deal with tough questions from abroad
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According to http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/singaporelocalnews/view/263407/1/.html today, an American soldier Sean Walsh published in the journal Armed Forces & Society an article critiquing S'pore's SAF.
His questions include - Are Singapore's top military commanders too young and inexperienced? Are they fast-tracked to the upper echelons because of their scholar credentials, while more experienced non-scholars or "farmers" — as they have been unceremoniously labelled — toil in vain? Are soldiers here soft because of the emphasis on safety during training at the expense of realism? And do officers lack professionalism and commitment because mandatory retirement at 45 means many see their time in uniform "as a stepping stone" to a second career in politics or business?
In reply (see the link above), I just sense that SAF is deing defensive about the tough questions. To me, being 'defensive' means that you are not flat-out denying the allegations but simply trying to justify those accusations.
MINDEF/SAF is the most expensive organ of our govt, and probably also one of the most secretive, male-oriented, hierachy-based minsitries. We don't really know much about how it works, because we hardly get to to hear anything but the 'good stuff' from mediated press releases. I do not want think of our SAF as the grooming ground for S'pore's leaders because to me, a professional soldier who is trained to kill enemies and sacrifice his own footsoldiers probably would not be on top of my list as minister-material. But think of how many of our current minsiters actually have a BG in front of their names...
In this case, isn't the SAF the most expensive minister-training school ever built? If S'pore is run like a giant company, wouldn't it make more sense to get our top leaders who have experience in top business corporations instead? -
these 'observations' are neither new nor are they not apparent to all....just because few are saying it doesn't mean they are not true....that's the reason why they do not believe in an open press, it irritates them like fleas in your pants....
the thing about short stints for the rotating generals does cast doubts on the ability to fight a war when called to.....if you allow me to draw a football analogy, arsenal comprises mainly of young skillful players with plenty of flair....in every game they play flawlessly but where true leadership is called for, they sorely lack it and lose out in the end...their cup final match against chelsea was proof, still good old ginger exudes better aroma...
most saf generals don't even last long enough to warm the seats....out of the 4 years, probably 1 or 2 years are spent in some overseas uni doing a post grad programme to prepare them for their next career..... -
Our youthful generals are certainly far more paper-trained than battle-hardened commanders.
But this is an unfair opinion, coming from an American soldier.
Our country does not 'seek' wars in Vietnam and Iraq, nor do we pursue aggressive stands and impose our democratic rights on other nations. Do the Americans ever wonder what drew the wraith of the Greeks and Macedonians during the Kosovo bombings?
No other superpower has instigated wars and bloodshed than USA. Take their critiques with a big teaspoon of salt. No reason to be agitated with ignorance. -
This is not a new problem, even in the US army.
If you read Generation Kill, you will realize that there was a lot of friction between the ground troops and the upper brass, which the grunts felt where not really in the fight and pushing papers and politics more of the time. This included one PC that tried to call in arty on his own men until the CSM and a few other guys stood up to him.
In war, I think I would trust my CSM more then my CO... that's for sure. I would take their orders with a large pinch of salt. -
Most militaries have the same problems as ours, but the real question when war comes along is whether the military can perform. I will go as far as say that ours can't. The Israelis got bushwhacked by Hezbollah and they also follow a conscription system.
Our generals are mostly trained to be administrators, for the obvious reasons for which aren't military in nature. I won't trust them to run a war, or even do anything effective. How many of them are even military historians who do analysis on past battles and attempt to come up with doctrine on how to avoid past mistakes? Doctrine wise, we aren't even as well developed as the US or even Russia or UK for that matter.
Let's not even touch the discrimination issue. Just visit any manpower dept and count the people in the minority races. -
What u mentioned has already played out in Vietnam.Originally posted by SingaporeTyrannosaur:This included one PC that tried to call in arty on his own men until the CSM and a few other guys stood up to him.
In war, I think I would trust my CSM more then my CO... that's for sure. I would take their orders with a large pinch of salt.
US grunt called it "Frag". No, its not about killing NVAs, but to murder an impotent-arrogant-sadistic officer.
This had happened many times in war.
Correct me if I am wrong, a US Army CSM can overide a lowerly Lt if he deems not fit for commanding position. I supposed could be the case with senior SAF WO?
Respect is earned on shoulders of trust and honour, not on the number of strips or crabs it has. -
In Iraq, and many parts of the world, many young americans soldiers died, many have died, and more will die, they must have produced many experienced junior commanders, but battle-hardened generals?
SAF is for the defence of Singapore, we don't need to sacrifice our young soldiers to produce battle-hardened generals.
The Chinese says: "yi jiang cheng gong wan gu gu". For every successful general, there are ten of thousands of dried bones (dead men)." -
But one thing is for sure, I will never die for a paper trained general here...
I'd rather trade in my passport for another elsewhere -
It is hard to find a general like Patton or Bradley these days. Most of our generals are of the Eisenhower variety; only know how to lead from the back and do politics, while the real generals are out in front fighting their hearts out.Originally posted by sgdiehard:In Iraq, and many parts of the world, many young americans soldiers died, many have died, and more will die, they must have produced many experienced junior commanders, but battle-hardened generals?
SAF is for the defence of Singapore, we don't need to sacrifice our young soldiers to produce battle-hardened generals.
The Chinese says: "yi jiang cheng gong wan gu gu". For every successful general, there are ten of thousands of dried bones (dead men)." -
Ah yes, the frontline generals. And Patton's model was...Rommel.Originally posted by Fingolfin_Noldor:It is hard to find a general like Patton or Bradley these days. Most of our generals are of the Eisenhower variety; only know how to lead from the back and do politics, while the real generals are out in front fighting their hearts out.
There were generals who led from the back but were highly respected by their men. Prussian Field Marshal Erich Von Manstein comes to mind. -
Patton was probably more a follower of Guderian I think, as the latter was the one who wrote the book on blitzkreig warfare. Guderian was also the frontline general variety and led entire armies initially, until violent disagreements with Hitler saw him removed from his post.
Anyhow, Patton saw the value of tank corps way ahead of any American general. It is unlikely any of our officers have his brand of ingenuity. -
Doubt the current adventure with Hezbollah is a neat example... given that the IDF after all fares a lot better in open conventional warfare against a conventional foe (the kind of warfare we prepare for) instead of a limited engagement with irregular forces along with dubious and vague political goals to the conflict to boot.Originally posted by Fingolfin_Noldor:Most militaries have the same problems as ours, but the real question when war comes along is whether the military can perform. I will go as far as say that ours can't. The Israelis got bushwhacked by Hezbollah and they also follow a conscription system.
And did they really get bushwacked? While they were surprised by the capabilities of Hezbollah, the Israelis still ultimately inflicted tremendous damage on Hezbollah and set them back quite far. Following the conflict, Hezbollah lacked the strength to do major mischief.
Unless you want to believe the Hezbollah tally of "oh only a couple dead on our side", the conflict was actually a military defeat for Hezbollah, but a decisive propangada and media victory as the Israelis were on the media defensive from the start and allowed them to spin the rather incredious pitch that they were inflicting massive losses on the IDF while the IDF were hitting everything but them. What actually happened on the ground was that they were getting pummeled, but the IDF was ultimately restrained by their own inability to decide what to do in the conflict. -
Yes, Erwin Rommel, the general I respect most, always in the front with his men, most notable during his campaign in North Africa.Originally posted by BillyBong:Ah yes, the frontline generals. And Patton's model was...Rommel.
There were generals who led from the back but were highly respected by their men. Prussian Field Marshal Erich Von Manstein comes to mind. -
The IDF practised a lot of restraint with regards to hitting Hezbollah. If need be, they could have levelled Beirut.
Don't ever forget that. -
Sorry to say this, but I think u had been purposely one-sided. The article did include the fact that this American soldier conceding the fact that our army is the best in SEA. Why didn't u put it in? Is it because u see no relevancy in this topic or discussion, or u just felt there's no point in putting it?Originally posted by blueheeler:According to http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/singaporelocalnews/view/263407/1/.html today, an American soldier Sean Walsh published in the journal Armed Forces & Society an article critiquing S'pore's SAF.
His questions include - Are Singapore's top military commanders too young and inexperienced? Are they fast-tracked to the upper echelons because of their scholar credentials, while more experienced non-scholars or "farmers" — as they have been unceremoniously labelled — toil in vain? Are soldiers here soft because of the emphasis on safety during training at the expense of realism? And do officers lack professionalism and commitment because mandatory retirement at 45 means many see their time in uniform "as a stepping stone" to a second career in politics or business?
In reply (see the link above), I just sense that SAF is deing defensive about the tough questions. To me, being 'defensive' means that you are not flat-out denying the allegations but simply trying to justify those accusations.
MINDEF/SAF is the most expensive organ of our govt, and probably also one of the most secretive, male-oriented, hierachy-based minsitries. We don't really know much about how it works, because we hardly get to to hear anything but the 'good stuff' from mediated press releases. I do not want think of our SAF as the grooming ground for S'pore's leaders because to me, a professional soldier who is trained to kill enemies and sacrifice his own footsoldiers probably would not be on top of my list as minister-material. But think of how many of our current minsiters actually have a BG in front of their names...
In this case, isn't the SAF the most expensive minister-training school ever built? If S'pore is run like a giant company, wouldn't it make more sense to get our top leaders who have experience in top business corporations instead? -
Hey, our PM was a BG when he was 33.
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*barfs*Originally posted by charlize:Hey, our PM was a BG when he was 33.
*Goes to watch videos of young Marines engaged in real battle; on Youtube* -
Yes, I've been one-sided for the sake of argument. Anyway, with S'pore's military budget vis-a-vis the other 9 SEAsian countries, it must be a GIVEN that it has the best army. So, what's the point of pointing something that we should not be surprised of? As a Sporean, I note that the SAF gets the lion's share of our annual budget. As such, I want to know that I'm getting the best deal for my money as a taxpayer. Yes, we may have the best army in SEAsia, but it's the flaws that I'm concerned with because I want the best bang for my S'pore buck.Originally posted by nanren4ever:Sorry to say this, but I think u had been purposely one-sided. The article did include the fact that this American soldier conceding the fact that our army is the best in SEA. Why didn't u put it in? Is it because u see no relevancy in this topic or discussion, or u just felt there's no point in putting it? -
It's not a problem that one can throw money at... if anything it seems that money is causing the problems at times.
With all the systems that look more to paper qualifications and the like, actual combat ability has taken a back seat. Just look at the amount of red tape in the SAF where everybody makes a point to C.C.
Not that we are the only army with this problem, but if we can fix it why not? Though I suspect some cash-farming upper brass might not be happy with having their iron rice bowl touched. -
The IDF underperformed in the war, and quite a few of their Merkava tanks were knocked out or disabled, and even a frigate got hit (it had its electronic countermeasures switched off for some damn reason) and had to be towed back. If by anything, the IDF did not achieve any of their objectives, short of bombing the hell out of South Lebanon.Originally posted by SingaporeTyrannosaur:Doubt the current adventure with Hezbollah is a neat example... given that the IDF after all fares a lot better in open conventional warfare against a conventional foe (the kind of warfare we prepare for) instead of a limited engagement with irregular forces along with dubious and vague political goals to the conflict to boot.
And did they really get bushwacked? While they were surprised by the capabilities of Hezbollah, the Israelis still ultimately inflicted tremendous damage on Hezbollah and set them back quite far. Following the conflict, Hezbollah lacked the strength to do major mischief.
Unless you want to believe the Hezbollah tally of "oh only a couple dead on our side", the conflict was actually a military defeat for Hezbollah, but a decisive propangada and media victory as the Israelis were on the media defensive from the start and allowed them to spin the rather incredious pitch that they were inflicting massive losses on the IDF while the IDF were hitting everything but them. What actually happened on the ground was that they were getting pummeled, but the IDF was ultimately restrained by their own inability to decide what to do in the conflict.
The damage was inflicted from the air, on the ground, they got ambushed, pushed back, and what not. It was in some of the western papers, not sure if ST bothered to publish any of it. Even if the Israelis went to Beirut, what would it have served? Politically, you would have every Arab country against them. As it is, the Hezbollah were able to hide their weapons, and struck the Israelis pretty badly. I remember there was some article in the NYT that said that only one unit performed well, whereas the other units did not, and they were the reservist units by the way.
The Israelis aren't what they were decades ago. More reliant on high tech weapons, and short on proper training. Couple that with an intelligence failure of significant magnitude, you have a war where the IDF achieved none of its objectives. -
this article probably was intended a few pointers aim at the leader of Singapore to reflect upon.
But what I read between the lines it SAID : that our military leader does not have actual war time experience to lead a battle. when it comes to fighting against an experience enemy. It makes a different in winning the battle.
SAF are more, and beyond capable of defending Singapore but we did not send any ground forces to both afghanistan and Iraq maybe its time to throw in some career officier to the firing line.
what are your thoughts? -
Has anyone thought about the fact that this article could have been directed to US policymakers to try and get more from us in terms of training soldiers to contribute more towards coalition operations?Originally posted by Arapahoe:this article probably was intended a few pointers aim at the leader of Singapore to reflect upon.
But what I read between the lines it SAID : that our military leader does not have actual war time experience to lead a battle. when it comes to fighting against an experience enemy. It makes a different in winning the battle.
SAF are more, and beyond capable of defending Singapore but we did not send any ground forces to both afghanistan and Iraq maybe its time to throw in some career officier to the firing line.
what are your thoughts? -
it is highly possible. but it is also undenied fact that i believe with all the excerise we held together with US military personnel our military leader probably demonstrate some level of unrealistics planning and decision regards to expectation. So this is an awkward position that mindef need to address.
Also if we look at the current environment MY and the chinese are sending troops to lebanon, the experience they gain on the ground are effectively beyond training. It is not unrealistics to assume that defending singapore maybe against a battle hardened fighting force. -
We have to play a more active role, and I think it will be inevitable, at least in the coming decades when the Security Community is formed, and SG may have to play a far more active coalition role too..
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Is it odd that only BGs make the grade as Ministers, while the SAF "retired" LGs and MGs are only good for Corporate Vice-Presidents in GLCs - with none yet to be appointed as CEO or Corporate President ?
Does it tell the complete picture of the quality of our generals - above the rank of BG - or what ?
It was great to see a 'farmer' BG to be the UN Military Force Commander in Timor Leste, and being well received, respected and commended by all the foreign Professional Military Officers under his command.
He is currently the Deputy Special Representative for the Secretary General (DSRSG) for Security Sector and Rule of Law for United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT).
What possibly could be the reason for this BG not being included into the Ministerial ranks ?
Perhaps the "farmer" origin remains the influencing factor.
Past CDF were mostly scholars - except for the first LG in the SAF. LG (Ret) Winston Choo.
LG (Ret) Winston Choo - Singapore Red Cross
LG (Ret) Ng Jui Ping
LG Bey Soo Khiang
LG Lim Neo Chian
MG Raymund Ng Teck Heng
BG Wesley D'Aranjo
BG Boey Tak Hap
RA Kwek Siew Jin
BG Michael Teo
BG Gary Yeo
BG Lee Fook Sun
BG Patrick Choy
BG Chin Chow Yoon
BG Low Yee Kah
The answer to the opening remark must be that the LGs are probably worn and trodden - reaching their run out date when they reached 45 after being stretched by the SAF; while the BGs still have more mileage to be taken, and with so many around, one can be picky.