if lky cannot accept citicism, neither can you.Originally posted by robertteh:Of course, we do not expect our self-centred govenment to support such good citizens who feel strongly about something who want to express their views on those something for the larger good of nation building.
The government will continue to portray such active citizens as people who are out to cause problems and will openly slam them as people who are whiners or anti-government without basis.
They will no doubt sent their crazy monkeys to curb such expressions. Such citizens must have the extra quality of believing in their personal convictions to stand and endure all the insults of the crazy monkeys.
You are generalising again. If you put it that way, everyone is guilty to some lesser or greater extent. Here we are discussing many issues and problems facing the people which were caused by wrong government policies and we are not even being personal in offering criticisms and constructive alternatives in many cases.Originally posted by crazy monkey:if lky cannot accept citicism, neither can you.
issit ? so your posting are very logical ? you dun make personnal attacks against other forummers ?Originally posted by robertteh:You are generalising again. If you put it that way, everyone is guilty to some lesser or greater extent. Here we are discussing many issues and problems facing the people which were caused by wrong government policies and we are not even being personal in offering criticisms and constructive alternatives in many cases.
You have changed the topic of discussion again and there is simply no purpose or logic in your posts.
No, I don't get personal unless provoked.Originally posted by crazy monkey:issit ? so your posting are very logical ? you dun make personnal attacks against other forummers ?
To think you would have the gall to post challenges when you have nothing constructive to offer Speaker's Corner thus far.Originally posted by crazy monkey:issit ? so your posting are very logical ? you dun make personnal attacks against other forummers ?
There can be objective criteria to judge fairness.Of couse,the conscience of a speaker knows whether he speaks fairly.Originally posted by snow leopard:i don't think the issue is about fair or unfair. who is to judge what is fair or unfair?
i think the issue is about how strongly you feel about our society and how it works.
most people do not care or give a damn. it is because they do not have a strong opinion about anything that they do not write much or even bother to read forums. it is not because they are fair. it is because they do not feel strongly enough about something to really take a stand.
when you feel strongly enough about something, more likely than not, your stance will appear loud and clear to everyone.
if there's something you want to offer to speaker's corner or sgforums go sign up as p-member.Originally posted by Rock^Star:To think you would have the gall to post challenges when you have nothing constructive to offer Speaker's Corner thus far.
Of course, no one is perfect. Show how is robertteh's viewpoint illogical.
In the first place, a Fair-minded person wouldnt be affected by how many people are on his side or whether or not he is accepted by the group he opposes or whether he is holding a popular opinion or not. Who cares whether people think you are a govt 'agent' or anti-pap. A fair minded person would take sides based on what he think is right and be swayed by nothing else.Originally posted by PRP:When a fair-minded person criticses the govt,of course PAP won't think he is a friend of PAP.When he agrees or praises the govt, the anti-govt ppl think he is a govt 'agent'.So neither sides would accept him.So one seems have to be in one side so he can be accepted by at least one side.
There are people who are simply too self-centred and every action or behavior is based on face. Such people would not be concerned with what is right or wrong and or what is good for the majority but will relentlessly work towards fulfilling their own narrow-minded interest based on fallacious look-good packages and presentations.Originally posted by ulquiorra87:In the first place, a Fair-minded person wouldnt be affected by how many people are on his side or whether or not he is accepted by the group he opposes or whether he is holding a popular opinion or not. Who cares whether people think you are a govt 'agent' or anti-pap. A fair minded person would take sides based on what he think is right and be swayed by nothing else
ya rite let records speak for themselves.Originally posted by robertteh:There are people who are simply too self-centred and every action or behavior is based on face. Such people would not be concerned with what is right or wrong and or what is good for the majority but will relentlessly work towards fulfilling their own narrow-minded interest based on fallacious look-good packages and presentations.
The test is seen in recessions when people are suffering and needing help and we could all see their reactions like whether they would put the blame on the people or try to do something to help them overcome difficulties.
Let the records speak for themselves so that citizens could decide whether there are such people around and whether they could trust their future to such people.
Will such people save the country or manage any business enterprises objectively for the good of the entity.
read somewhere before that even the most diehard criminals are convinced that they had been right, up to their very last breath before they're hanged. for if they had any doubts at all that they might be wrong, they wouldn't have committed the crimes in the first place.Originally posted by PRP:There can be objective criteria to judge fairness.Of couse,the conscience of a speaker knows whether he speaks fairly.
Just because people can have different opinions about the absolute truth does not mean that the absolute truth is in itself, not absolute.Originally posted by snow leopard:read somewhere before that even the most diehard criminals are convinced that they had been right, up to their very last breath before they're hanged. for if they had any doubts at all that they might be wrong, they wouldn't have committed the crimes in the first place.
what is conscientiously fair to the extremists, jihadists may not be conscientiously fair to us.
so conscience at the end of the day, is a complex amalgamation of beliefs, norms, upbringing, societal values and so on. that which is objectively fair, is objective and fair only to the person having those notions ...
the moment we have an opinion about something, we are making a subjective interpretation or judgement about that something.
Originally posted by SingaporeTyrannosaur:
Just because people can have different opinions about the absolute truth does not mean that the absolute truth is in itself, not absolute.
depends on what you call absolute truth. description of a fact or matter can be absolute but expressing an opinion abt something is not.
Just because I and you can have differing opinions on the existence of a wall does not mean that I can walk through the wall if I believe it does not exist.
when you refer to the existence of a wall, you are describing a fact. when you say that the wall is clean or dirty, you are expressing an opinion. what is clean to you may be dirty to me and vice versa.
When it comes to morality and right and wrong, our beliefs and conditional factors may play a part in determining how we perceive it, however as long as we accept that we are bound to the rules of morality we must be forced to accept that it is NOT subjective but absolute- just that some people are closer to this absolute then others.
but the morality that binds us is different from the morality that binds the al kaeda. if their morality differs from ours, how can morality form a basis for the so called absolute?
the existence of rules governing our lives doesn't imply that those rules are the absolute truth or right.
The only path in which the true relativist must take by virtue of his beliefs is that there is no right or wrong, just the ability to carry out your convictions. If a murderer has the ability to carry out his crime without getting caught that there is really no law or power in the world that can, or shall stop him. In a relativist/subjective universe the only law is the law of power to carry out personal convictions which binds this subjective worldview together that makes it possible.
in other words conviction is what really matters because right or wrong is subjective and depends on other people's judgement. and we really shouldn't live our lives based on what other people thinks of us as long as we conscientiously do no harm to others.
Hence no matter if you or I think this thing or that thing is unfair or fair, it is an observation on the absolute, but the absolute in itself does not change. Also, this means that one person can indeed be more correct on what is fair or unfair then another.
when you pass judgement on fairness, you are making a subjective judgement about an issue. this should not be confused with the description of objects or events which should not contain any opinion.
hence, you cannot be more correct or more fair unless the person passing judgement abt you happens to agree with you.
when you refer to the existence of a wall, you are describing a fact. when you say that the wall is clean or dirty, you are expressing an opinion. what is clean to you may be dirty to me and vice versa.Incorrect, the wall can indeed be absolutely clean or dirty. If the concept of clean and dirty were completely subjective, then people would have nothing to argue about at all.
but the morality that binds us is different from the morality that binds the al kaeda. if their morality differs from ours, how can morality form a basis for the so called absolute?The morality that binds us is a set of values and rules that we have derived from what we perceive to be the absolute that all men have to answer to. The terrorists have also perceived a different set of rules from the same absolute.
the existence of rules governing our lives doesn't imply that those rules are the absolute truth or right.I did not say the rules governing our lives are the absolute, but they are a reflection of a belief in the absolute.
in other words conviction is what really matters because right or wrong is subjective and depends on other people's judgement. and we really shouldn't live our lives based on what other people thinks of us as long as we conscientiously do no harm to others.Why do no harm to others? If everything is subjective why should doing harm to others be excluded?
when you pass judgement on fairness, you are making a subjective judgement about an issue. this should not be confused with the description of objects or events which should not contain any opinion.Just because a judgement is subjective does not mean it is incorrect or invalid by the mere virtue of it coming from an observer. What matters is how close this subjective argument is to the absolute.
hence, you cannot be more correct or more fair unless the person passing judgement abt you happens to agree with you.
Originally posted by SingaporeTyrannosaur:
Please use proper quotes instead of bold/unbold, it makes your post easier to read to others.
i write the way i write, there's no absolute easier or not. i find my way easier.
Incorrect, the wall can indeed be absolutely clean or dirty. If the concept of clean and dirty were completely subjective, then people would have nothing to argue about at all.
how then do you judge absolutely clean? washed with soap twice? clean room standards? using the microscope? under normal circumstances, you and i would judge the wall to be clean by simply looking at it or touching it. your look and your touch is a function of your perception of cleanliness that cannot be absolutely right or wrong.
likewise for absolutely dirty. what is absolutely dirty? smudges? faeces? how much faeces? a whole wall of faeces? how thick the faeces?
it is precisely because clean and dirty are subjective that people can argue about it.
As it turns out to have an argument about clean or dirty both parties must have accepted that there was an absolute yardstick of clean and dirty that ought to be debated over in the first place. And that one man's opinion is indeed better then the other.
you don't need an absolute yardstick to argue about clean and dirty, just different yardsticks that's all.
Indeed this applies to all arguments on things subjective, that they reveal a belief in the absolute that binds all.
don't agree. i think singapore ladies are the prettiest on this planet. that opinion cannot possibly rest on any absolute belief other than my own subjective appreciation of ladies from various countries.
The morality that binds us is a set of values and rules that we have derived from what we perceive to be the absolute that all men have to answer to. The terrorists have also perceived a different set of rules from the same absolute.
just imagine you were born and raised in iraq as an al kaeda. suddenly what is absolutely wrong to you now becomes absolutely right. where is the absoluteness? even if morality is a function of societal norms and values, those norms and values are not absolute and are always evolving. casinos were wrong and now they are not ...
No matter our differences, we both admit an absolute that both parties have to be under, just that we disagree on who is more correct in their own system reflecting the absolute.
no, i don't agree that opinions should be anchored on something absolute. it is always in relation to one another. what is more correct or less correct is always in relation to differing opinions not anchored to anything absolute.
If we believe that the terrorists are excluded from or morality, then indeed we have no moral right to judge or capture them at all, nor would they believe they have the right to bomb us.
you do not understand. bombing and terrorising are morally correct to the terrorists. they're not being excluded from their own morality. just that their morality is different from our morality. when we capture or judge them, we are capturing or judging them based on our morality. when they bomb us they are bombing us based on their morality. it is precisely because we operate on two different sets of morality that two opposite actions are carried out in antagonism to each other.
I did not say the rules governing our lives are the absolute, but they are a reflection of a belief in the absolute.
don't agree. they are a reflection of a set of beliefs that's all.
Why do no harm to others? If everything is subjective why should doing harm to others be excluded?
harm is not excluded, it is subjectively included in my own philosophy of life.
If we donÂ’t care what people think of us and what we should do, and there is no right or wrong. Doing harm to others is not more inherently evil or good then anything else.
if what we believe is right or wrong depends on what other people thought of what we did, then it merely shows we do not have our own sense of right and wrong and we're merely looking for affirmation.
whether or not our actions have harmed others may be judged by others. but it doesn't matter as much as what we ourselves think what is harmful and what is not.
when the airplane lands and the person right at the back is the first to shoot up from his seat and walks quickly up the aisle so that he gets to get off the plane first. most people would find his action kiasu and wrong. but i find his action completely good and right. if he is fast, why should he wait for others who are taking their own sweet time to get off their seats?
Save 1000 children or kill them, it makes no difference. There is no good or evil.
let's say that 1000 children carries incurable diseases and are suffering extreme pain. is killing them absolutely evil? is euthanasia absolutely good or evil?
What matters is what you have convinced yourself to believe and have the power to carry out. If indeed I derive pleasure from robbing and killing others, and believe it is a good thing, as well as having the means to carry it out without getting caught. I can toss all notions of right and wrong and what others think of my actions by the very virtue that I can.
is robbing necessarily wrong? then robin hood of sherwood forest who takes pleasure in robbing the rich to help the poor must surely be wrong. but i support robin hood and i think he is right. that is my subjective belief which i'm sure the sheriff wouldn't agree.
the action itself maybe absolute - robbing. but the judgement of whether or not robbing is right has to be seen in the context of the circumstances surrounding it and also depends on where you stand - on the sheriff's side or on the side of the poor.
thus, as i've said before, judgement is subjective, condition upon many factors like character, upbringing and societal norms. in the case of killing for pleasure, most people would find the act deplorable and wrong. the fact that most people find it wrong, doesn't imply that this is the absolute truth. given another time and in another society, say the time of the aztecs or the incas, most people would actually find it right to sacrifice humans to gods for good crops. it may be hard for us to fathom now, but there and then, it is the right thing to do.
so what is right is a function of many things including the time you were born. 200 years ago in america, slavery would have been right. 1000 years ago in Tang dynasty China, fat would be the epitome of beauty and not slim.
Just because a judgement is subjective does not mean it is incorrect or invalid by the mere virtue of it coming from an observer. What matters is how close this subjective argument is to the absolute.
the very fact that a judgement is subjective means that its correctness or validity is also subjective depending on the person making the judgement. subjectiveness doesn't imply that there must be an objective against which it can be measured or evaluated.
If you and I were in a plane at 20,000 feet and we both make observations on our height. You guess 15,000 and I guess 3,000 and argue about itÂ… while both our observations are based on our subjective experience we have both admitted that a true height (20,000) exists, and that one of us are closer to that truthÂ… which is in that case, you.
the altitude of a plane is a measurable fact that can be easily read off the plane's TV screen as 20,000 feet. i see no purpose arguing over a fact when that fact has already been quantified and made known to us.
even when that fact is not made known to us, for example, whether a bed can fit into a particular corner of the room. would any reasonable person bother to argue endlessly over it? no, he or she would simply take measurements and be assured of the answer.
what we do argue over are matters that are subjective in nature. for example, you and i are sitting in a hot spring bath that is say 40 degrees celcius. this temperature may be too hot for you but not hot enough for me. so even for the same temperature, what is hot to you may not be hot enough for me. and there's no absolute right or wrong, just what you prefer and what i prefer.
let's say that 1000 children carries incurable diseases and are suffering extreme pain. is killing them absolutely evil? is euthanasia absolutely good or evil?
is robbing necessarily wrong? then robin hood of sherwood forest who takes pleasure in robbing the rich to help the poor must surely be wrong. but i support robin hood and i think he is right. that is my subjective belief which i'm sure the sheriff wouldn't agree.
the action itself maybe absolute - robbing. but the judgement of whether or not robbing is right has to be seen in the context of the circumstances surrounding it and also depends on where you stand - on the sheriff's side or on the side of the poor.
thus, as i've said before, judgement is subjective, condition upon many factors like character, upbringing and societal norms. in the case of killing for pleasure, most people would find the act deplorable and wrong. the fact that most people find it wrong, doesn't imply that this is the absolute truth. given another time and in another society, say the time of the aztecs or the incas, most people would actually find it right to sacrifice humans to gods for good crops. it may be hard for us to fathom now, but there and then, it is the right thing to do.
so what is right is a function of many things including the time you were born. 200 years ago in america, slavery would have been right. 1000 years ago in Tang dynasty China, fat would be the epitome of beauty and not slim.
The Chinese also speak of a great thing (the greatest thing) called the Tao. It is the reality beyond all predicates, the abyss that was before the Creator Himself. It is Nature, it is the Way, the Road. It is the Way in which the universe goes on, the Way in which things everlastingly emerge, stilly and tranquilly, into space and time. It is also the Way which every man should tread in imitation of that cosmic and supercosmic progression, conforming all activities to that great exemplar.17 'In ritual', say the Analects, 'it is harmony with Nature that is prized.'18 The ancient Jews likewise praise the Law as being 'true'.19
This conception in all its forms, Platonic, Aristotelian, Stoic, Christian, and Oriental alike, I shall henceforth refer to for brevity simply as 'the Tao'. Some of the accounts of it which I have quoted will seem, perhaps, to many of you merely quaint or even magical. But what is common to them all is something we cannot neglect. It is the doctrine of objective value, the belief that certain attitudes are really true, and others really false, to the kind of thing the universe is and the kind of things we are. Those who know the Tao can hold that to call children delightful or old men venerable is not simply to record a psychological fact about our own parental or filial emotions at the moment, but to recognize a quality which demands a certain response from us whether we make it or not. I myself do not enjoy the society of small children: because I speak from within the Tao I recognize this as a defect in myself—just as a man may have to recognize that he is tone deaf or colour blind. And because our approvals and disapprovals are thus recognitions of objective value or responses to an objective order, therefore emotional states can be in harmony with reason (when we feel liking for what ought to be approved) or out of harmony with reason (when we perceive that liking is due but cannot feel it). No emotion is, in itself, a judgement; in that sense all emotions and sentiments are alogical. But they can be reasonable or unreasonable as they conform to Reason or fail to conform. The heart never takes the place of the head: but it can, and should, obey it.
Over against this stands the world of The Green Book. In it the very possibility of a sentiment being reasonable—or even unreasonable—has been excluded from the outset. It can be reasonable or unreasonable only if it conforms or fails to conform to something else. To say that the cataract is sublime means saying that our emotion of humility is appropriate or ordinate to the reality, and thus to speak of something else besides the emotion; just as to say that a shoe fits is to speak not only of shoes but of feet. But this reference to something beyond the emotion is what Gaius and Titius exclude from every sentence containing a predicate of value. Such statements, for them, refer solely to the emotion. Now the emotion, thus considered by itself, cannot be either in agreement or disagreement with Reason. It is irrational not as a paralogism is irrational, but as a physical event is irrational: it does not rise even to the dignity of error. On this view, the world of facts, without one trace of value, and the world of feelings, without one trace of truth or falsehood, justice or injustice, confront one another, and no rapprochement is possible.
Hence the educational problem is wholly different according as you stand within or without the Tao. For those within, the task is to train in the pupil those responses which are in themselves appropriate, whether anyone is making them or not, and in making which the very nature of man consists. Those without, if they are logical, must regard all sentiments as equally non-rational, as mere mists between us and the real objects. As a result, they must either decide to remove all sentiments, as far as possible, from the pupil's mind; or else to encourage some sentiments for reasons that have nothing to do with their intrinsic 'justness' or 'ordinacy'. The latter course involves them in the questionable process of creating in others by 'suggestion' or incantation a mirage which their own reason has successfully dissipated.
Perhaps this will become clearer if we take a concrete instance. When a Roman father told his son that it was a sweet and seemly thing to die for his country, he believed what he said. He was communicating to the son an emotion which he himself shared and which he believed to be in accord with the value which his judgement discerned in noble death. He was giving the boy the best he had, giving of his spirit to humanize him as he had given of his body to beget him. But Gaius and Titius cannot believe that in calling such a death sweet and seemly they would be saying 'something important about something'. Their own method of debunking would cry out against them if they attempted to do so. For death is not something to eat and therefore cannot be dulce in the literal sense, and it is unlikely that the real sensations preceding it will be dulce even by analogy. And as for decorum—that is only a word describing how some other people will feel about your death when they happen to think of it, which won't be often, and will certainly do you no good. There are only two courses open to Gaius and Titius. Either they must go the whole way and debunk this sentiment like any other, or must set themselves to work to produce, from outside, a sentiment which they believe to be of no value to the pupil and which may cost him his life, because it is useful to us (the survivors) that our young men should feel it. If they embark on this course the difference between the old and the new education will be an important one. Where the old initiated, the new merely 'conditions'. The old dealt with its pupils as grown birds deal with young birds when they teach them to fly; the new deals with them more as the poultry-keeper deals with young birds— making them thus or thus for purposes of which the birds know nothing. In a word, the old was a kind of propagation—men transmitting manhood to men; the new is merely propaganda.
It is to their credit that Gaius and Titius embrace the first alternative. Propaganda is their abomination: not because their own philosophy gives a ground for condemning it (or anything else) but because they are better than their principles. They probably have some vague notion (I will examine it in my next lecture) that valour and good faith and justice could be sufficiently commended to the pupil on what they would call 'rational' or 'biological' or 'modern' grounds, if it should ever become necessary. In the meantime, they leave the matter alone and get on with the business of debunking. But this course, though less inhuman, is not less disastrous than the opposite alternative of cynical propaganda. Let us suppose for a moment that the harder virtues could really be theoretically justified with no appeal to objective value. It still remains true that no justification of virtue will enable a man to be virtuous. Without the aid of trained emotions the intellect is powerless against the animal organism. I had sooner play cards against a man who was quite sceptical about ethics, but bred to believe that 'a gentleman does not cheat', than against an irreproachable moral philosopher who had been brought up among sharpers. In battle it is not syllogisms that will keep the reluctant nerves and muscles to their post in the third hour of the bombardment. The crudest sentimentalism (such as Gaius and Titius would wince at) about a flag or a country or a regiment will be of more use. We were told it all long ago by Plato. As the king governs by his executive, so Reason in man must rule the mere appetites by means of the 'spirited element'.20 The head rules the belly through the chest—the seat, as Alanus tells us, of Magnanimity,21 of emotions organized by trained habit into stable sentiments. The Chest-Magnanimity-Sentiment—these are the indispensable liaison officers between cerebral man and visceral man. It may even be said that it is by this middle element that man is man: for by his intellect he is mere spirit and by his appetite mere animal.
The operation of The Green Book and its kind is to produce what may be called Men without Chests. It is an outrage that they should be commonly spoken of as Intellectuals. This gives them the chance to say that he who attacks them attacks Intelligence. It is not so. They are not distinguished from other men by any unusual skill in finding truth nor any virginal ardour to pursue her. Indeed it would be strange if they were: a persevering devotion to truth, a nice sense of intellectual honour, cannot be long maintained without the aid of a sentiment which Gaius and Titius could debunk as easily as any other. It is not excess of thought but defect of fertile and generous emotion that marks them out. Their heads are no bigger than the ordinary: it is the atrophy of the chest beneath that makes them seem so.
And all the time—such is the tragi-comedy of our situation—we continue to clamour for those very qualities we are rendering impossible. You can hardly open a periodical without coming across the statement that what our civilization needs is more 'drive', or dynamism, or self-sacrifice, or 'creativity'. In a sort of ghastly simplicity we remove the organ and demand the function. We make men without chests and expect of them virtue and enterprise. We laugh at honour and are shocked to find traitors in our midst. We castrate and bid the geldings be fruitful.
The second difference is even more important. In the older systems both the kind of man the teachers wished to produce and their motives for producing him were prescribed by the Tao—a norm to which the teachers themselves were subject and from which they claimed no liberty to depart. They did not cut men to some pattern they had chosen. They handed on what they had received: they initiated the young neophyte into the mystery of humanity which over-arched him and them alike. It was but old birds teaching young birds to fly. This will be changed. Values are now mere natural phenomena. Judgements of value are to be produced in the pupil as part of the conditioning. Whatever Tao there is will be the product, not the motive, of education. The conditioners have been emancipated from all that. It is one more part of Nature which they have conquered. The ultimate springs of human action are no longer, for them, something given. They have surrendered—like electricity: it is the function of the Conditioners to control, not to obey them. They know how to produce conscience and decide what kind of conscience they will produce. They themselves are outside, above. For we are assuming the last stage of Man's struggle with Nature. The final victory has been won. Human nature has been conquered—and, of course, has conquered, in whatever sense those words may now bear.
The Conditioners, then, are to choose what kind of artificial Tao they will, for their own good reasons, produce in the Human race. They are the motivators, the creators of motives. But how are they going to be motivated themselves?
For a time, perhaps, by survivals, within their own minds, of the old `natural' Tao. Thus at first they may look upon themselves as servants and guardians of humanity and conceive that they have a `duty' to do it `good'. But it is only by confusion that they can remain in this state. They recognize the concept of duty as the result of certain processes which they can now control. Their victory has consisted precisely in emerging from the state in which they were acted upon by those processes to the state in which they use them as tools. One of the things they now have to decide is whether they will, or will not, so condition the rest of us that we can go on having the old idea of duty and the old reactions to it. How can duty help them to decide that? Duty itself is up for trial: it cannot also be the judge. And `good' fares no better. They know quite well how to produce a dozen different conceptions of good in us. The question is which, if any, they should produce. No conception of good can help them to decide. It is absurd to fix on one of the things they are comparing and make it the standard of comparison.
To some it will appear that I am inventing a factitious difficulty for my Conditioners. Other, more simple-minded, critics may ask, `Why should you suppose they will be such bad men?' But I am not supposing them to be bad men. They are, rather, not men (in the old sense) at all. They are, if you like, men who have sacrificed their own share in traditional humanity in order to devote themselves to the task of deciding what `Humanity' shall henceforth mean. `Good' and `bad', applied to them, are words without content: for it is from them that the content of these words is henceforward to be derived. Nor is their difficulty factitious, "We might suppose that it was possible to say `After all, most of us want more or less the same things—food and drink and sexual intercourse, amusement, art, science, and the longest possible life for individuals and for the species. Let them simply say, This is what we happen to like, and go on to condition men in the way most likely to produce it. Where's the trouble?' But this will not answer. In the first place, it is false that we all really like the same things. But even if we did, what motive is to impel the Conditioners to scorn delights and live laborious days in order that we, and posterity, may have what we like? Their duty? But that is only the Tao, which they may decide to impose on us, but which cannot be valid for them. If they accept it, then they are no longer the makers of conscience but still its subjects, and their final conquest over Nature has not really happened. The preservation of the species? But why should the species be preserved? One of the questions before them is whether this feeling for posterity (they know well how it is produced) shall be continued or not. However far they go back, or down, they can find no ground to stand on. Every motive they try to act on becomes at once petitio. It is not that they are bad men. They are not men at all. Stepping outside the Tao, they have stepped into the void. Nor are their subjects necessarily unhappy men. They are not men at all: they are artefacts. Man's final conquest has proved to be the abolition of Man.
Yet the Conditioners will act. When I said just now that all motives fail them, I should have said all motives except one. All motives that claim any validity other than that of their felt emotional weight at a given moment have failed them. Everything except the sic volo, sic jubeo has been explained away. But what never claimed objectivity cannot be destroyed by subjectivism. The impulse to scratch when I itch or to pull to pieces when I am inquisitive is immune from the solvent which is fatal to my justice, or honour, or care for posterity. When all that says It is good' has been debunked, what says 1 want' remains. It cannot be exploded or `seen through' because it never had any pretentions. The Conditioners, therefore, must come to be motivated simply by their own pleasure. I am not here speaking of the corrupting influence of power nor expressing the fear that under it our Conditioners will degenerate. The very words corrupt and degenerate imply a doctrine of value and are therefore meaningless in this context. My point is that those who stand outside all judgements of value cannot have any ground for preferring one of their own impulses to another except the emotional strength of that impulse.
We may legitimately hope that among the impulses which arise in minds thus emptied of all `rational' or `spiritual' motives, some will be benevolent. I am very doubtful myself whether the benevolent impulses, stripped of that preference and encouragement which the Tao teaches us to give them and left to their merely natural strength and frequency as psychological events, will have much influence. I am very doubtful whether history shows us one example of a man who, having stepped outside traditional morality and attained power, has used that power benevolently. I am inclined to think that the Conditioners will hate the conditioned. Though regarding as an illusion the artificial conscience which they produce in us their subjects, they will yet perceive that it creates in us an illusion of meaning for our lives which compares favourably with the futility of their own: and they will envy us as eunuchs envy men. But I do not insist on this, for it is a mere conjecture. What is not conjecture is that our hope even of a `conditioned' happiness rests on what is ordinarily called `chance'—the chance that benevolent impulses may on the whole predominate in our Conditioners. For without the judgement `Benevolence is good'—that is, without re-entering the Tao—they can have no ground for promoting or stabilizing these impulses rather than any others. By the logic of their position they must just take their impulses as they come, from chance. And Chance here means Nature. It is from heredity, digestion, the weather, and the association of ideas, that the motives of the Conditioners will spring. Their extreme rationalism, by `seeing through' all `rational' motives, leaves them creatures of wholly irrational behaviour. If you will not obey the Tao, or else commit suicide, obedience to impulse (and therefore, in the long run, to mere `nature') is the only course left open.
At the moment, then, of Man's victory over Nature, we find the whole human race subjected to some individual men, and those individuals subjected to that in themselves which is purely `natural'—to their irrational impulses. Nature, untrammelled by values, rules the Conditioners and, through them, all humanity. Man's conquest of Nature turns out, in the moment of its consummation, to be Nature's conquest of Man. Every victory we seemed to win has led us, step by step, to this conclusion. All Nature's apparent reverses have been but tactical withdrawals. We thought we were beating her back when she was luring us on. What looked to us like hands held up in surrender was really the opening of arms to enfold us for ever. If the fully planned and conditioned world (with its Tao a mere product of the planning) comes into existence, Nature will be troubled no more by the restive species that rose in revolt against her so many millions of years ago, will be vexed no longer by its chatter of truth and mercy and beauty and happiness. Ferum victorem cepit: and if the eugenics are efficient enough there will be no second revolt, but all snug beneath the Conditioners, and the Conditioners beneath her, till the moon falls or the sun grows cold.
Is it, then, possible to imagine a new Natural Philosophy, continually conscious that the `natural object' produced by analysis and abstraction is not reality but only a view, and always correcting the abstraction? I hardly know what I am asking for. I hear rumours that Goethe's approach to nature deserves fuller consideration—that even Dr Steiner may have seen something that orthodox researchers have missed. The regenerate science which I have in mind would not do even to minerals and vegetables what modern science threatens to do to man himself. When it explained it would not explain away. When it spoke of the parts it would remember the whole. While studying the It it would not lose what Martin Buber calls the Thou-situation. The analogy between the Tao of Man and the instincts of an animal species would mean for it new light cast on the unknown thing, Instinct, by the only known reality of conscience and not a reduction of conscience to the category of Instinct. Its followers would not be free with the words only and merely. In a word, it would conquer Nature without being at the same time conquered by her and buy knowledge at a lower cost than that of life.
Perhaps I am asking impossibilities. Perhaps, in the nature of things, analytical understanding must always be a basilisk which kills what it sees and only sees by killing. But if the scientists themselves cannot arrest this process before it reaches the common Reason and kills that too, then someone else must arrest it. What I most fear is the reply that I am `only one more' obscurantist, that this barrier, like all previous barriers set up against the advance of science, can be safely passed. Such a reply springs from the fatal serialism of the modern imagination—the image of infinite unilinear progression which so haunts our minds. Because we have to use numbers so much we tend to think of every process as if it must be like the numeral series, where every step, to all eternity, is the same kind of step as the one before. I implore you to remember the Irishman and his two stoves. There are progressions in which the last step is sui generis—incommensurable with the others—and in which to go the whole way is to undo all the labour of your previous journey. To reduce the Tao to a mere natural product is a step of that kind. Up to that point, the kind of explanation which explains things away may give us something, though at a heavy cost. But you cannot go on `explaining away' for ever: you will find that you have explained explanation itself away. You cannot go on `seeing through5 things for ever. The whole point of seeing through something is to see something through it. It is good that the window should be transparent, because the street or garden beyond it is opaque. How if you saw through the garden too? It is no use trying to `see through' first principles. If you see through everything, then everything is transparent. But a wholly transparent world is an invisible world. To `see through' all things is the same as not to see.
The practical result of education in the spirit of The Green Book must be the destruction of the society which accepts it. But this is not necessarily a refutation of subjectivism about values as a theory. The true doctrine might be a doctrine which if we accept we die. No one who speaks from within the Tao could reject it on that account: 'åà äå öáåé êáé 'äëåóóïõ. But it has not yet come to that. There are theoretical difficulties in the philosophy of Gaius and Titius.
However subjective they may be about some traditional values, Gaius and Titius have shown by the very act of writing The Green Book that there must be some other values about which they are not subjective at all. They write in order to produce certain states of mind in the rising generation, if not because they think those states of mind intrinsically just or good, yet certainly because they think them to be the means to some state of society which they regard as desirable. It would not be difficult to collect from various passages in The Green Book what their ideal is. But we need not. The important point is not the precise nature of their end, but the fact that they have an end at all. They must have, or their book (being purely practical in intention) is written to no purpose. And this end must have real value in their eyes. To abstain from calling it good and to use, instead, such predicates as 'necessary' or 'progressive' or 'efficient' would be a subterfuge. They could be forced by argument to answer the questions 'necessary for what?', 'progressing towards what?', 'effecting what?'; in the last resort they would have to admit that some state of affairs was in their opinion good for its own sake. And this time they could not maintain that 'good' simply described their own emotion about it. For the whole purpose of their book is so to condition theyoung reader that he will share their approval, and this would be either a fool's or a villain's undertaking unless they held that their approval was in some way valid or correct.
In actual fact Gaius and Titius will be found to hold, with complete uncritical dogmatism, the whole system of values which happened to be in vogue among moderately educated young men of the professional classes during the period between the two wars.1 Their scepticism about values is on the surface: it is for use on other people's values; about the values current in their own set they are not nearly sceptical enough. And this phenomenon is very usual. A great many of those who 'debunk' traditional or (as they would say) 'sentimental' values have in the background values of their own which they believe to be immune from the debunking process. They claim to be cutting away the parasitic growth of emotion, religious sanction, and inherited taboos, in order that 'real' or 'basic' values may emerge. I will now try to find out what happens if this is seriously attempted.
Let us continue to use the previous example—that of death for a good cause—not, of course, because virtue is the only value or martyrdom the only virtue, but because this is the experimentum crucis which shows different systems of thought in the clearest light. Let us suppose that an Innovator in values regards dulce et decorum and greater love hath no man as mere irrational sentiments which are to be stripped off in order that we may get down to the 'realistic' or 'basic' ground of this value. Where will he find such a ground?
First of all, he might say that the real value lay in the utility of such sacrifice to the community. 'Good', he might say, 'means what is useful to the community.' But of course the death of the community is not useful to the community—only the death of some of its members. What is really meant is that the death of some men is useful to other men. That is very true. But on what ground are some men being asked to die for the benefit of others? Every appeal to pride, honour, shame, or love is excluded by hypothesis. To use these would be to return to sentiment and the Innovator's task is, having cut all that away, to explain to men, in terms of pure reasoning, why they will be well advised to die that others may live. He may say 'Unless some of us risk death all of us are certain to die.' But that will be true only in a limited number of cases; and even when it is true it provokes the very reasonable counter question 'Why should I be one of those who take the risk?'
At this point the Innovator may ask why, after all, selfishness should be more 'rational' or 'intelligent' than altruism. The question is welcome. If by Reason we mean the process actually employed by Gaius and Titius when engaged in debunking (that is, the connecting by inference of propositions, ultimately derived from sense data, with further propositions), then the answer must be that a refusal to sacrifice oneself is no more rational than a consent to do so. And no less rational. Neither choice is rational—or irrational—at all. From propositions about fact alone no practical conclusion can ever be drawn. This will preserve society cannot lead to do this except by the mediation of society ought to be preserved. This will cost you your life cannot lead directly to do not do this: it can lead to it only through a felt desire or an acknowledged duty of self-preservation. The Innovator is trying to get a conclusion in the imperative mood out of premisses in the indicative mood: and though he continues trying to all eternity he cannot succeed, for the thing is impossible. We must therefore either extend the word Reason to include what our ancestors called Practical Reason and confess that judgements such as society ought to be preserved (though they can support themselves by no reason of the sort that Gaius and Titius demand) are not mere sentiments but are rationality itself; or else we must give up at once, and for ever, the attempt to find a core of 'rational' value behind all the sentiments we have debunked. The Innovator will not take the first alternative, for practical principles known to all men by Reason are simply the Tao which he has set out to supersede. He is more likely to give up the quest for a 'rational' core and to hunt for some other ground even more 'basic' and 'realistic'.
This he will probably feel that he has found in Instinct. The preservation of society, and of the species itself, are ends that do not hang on the precarious thread of Reason: they are given by Instinct. That is why there is no need to argue against the man who does not acknowledge them. We have an instinctive urge to preserve our own species. That is why men ought to work for posterity. We have no instinctive urge to keep promises or to respect individual life: that is why scruples of justice and humanity—in fact the Tao—can be properly swept away when they conflict with our real end, the preservation of the species. That, again, is why the modern situation permits and demands a new sexual morality: the old taboos served some real purpose in helping to preserve the species, but contraceptives have modified this and we can now abandon many of the taboos. For of course sexual desire, being instinctive, is to be gratified whenever it does not conflict with the preservation of the species. It looks, in fact, as if an ethics based on instinct will give the Innovator all he wants and nothing that he does not want.
In reality we have not advanced one step. I will not insist on the point that Instinct is a name for we know not what (to say that migratory birds find their way by instinct is only to say that we do not know how migratory birds find their way), for I think it is here being used in a fairly definite sense, to mean an unreflective or spontaneous impulse widely felt by the members of a given species. In what way does Instinct, thus conceived, help us to find 'real' values? Is it maintained that we must obey Instinct, that we cannot do otherwise? But if so, why are Green Books and the like written? Why this stream of exhortation to drive us where we cannot help going? Why such praise for those who have submitted to the inevitable? Or is it maintained that if we do obey Instinct we shall be happy and satisfied? But the very question we are considering was that of facing death which (so far as the Innovator knows) cuts off every possible satisfaction: and if we have an instinctive desire for the good of posterity then this desire, by the very nature of the case, can never be satisfied, since its aim is achieved, if at all, when we are dead. It looks very much as if the Innovator would have to say not that we must obey Instinct, nor that it will satisfy us to do so, but that we ought to obey it.2
But why ought we to obey Instinct? Is there another instinct of a higher order directing us to do so, and a third of a still higher order directing us to obey it?—an infinite regress of instincts? This is presumably impossible, but nothing else will serve. From the statement about psychological fact 'I have an impulse to do so and so' we cannot by any ingenuity derive the practical principle 'I ought to obey this impulse'. Even if it were true that men had a spontaneous, unreflective impulse to sacrifice their own lives for the preservation of their fellows, it remains a quite separate question whether this is an impulse they should control or one they should indulge. For even the Innovator admits that many impulses (those which conflict with the preservation of the species) have to be controlled. And this admission surely introduces us to a yet more fundamental difficulty.
Telling us to obey Instinct is like telling us to obey 'people'. People say different things: so do instincts. Our instincts are at war. If it is held that the instinct for preserving the species should always be obeyed at the expense of other instincts, whence do we derive this rule of precedence? To listen to that instinct speaking in its own cause and deciding it in its own favour would be rather simple-minded. Each instinct, if you listen to it, will claim to be gratified at the expense of all the rest. By the very act of listening to one rather than to others we have already prejudged the case. If we did not bring to the examination of our instincts a knowledge of their comparative dignity we could never learn it from them. And that knowledge cannot itself be instinctive: the judge cannot be one of the parties judged; or, if he is, the decision is worthless and there is no ground for placing the preservation of the species above self-preservation or sexual appetite.
The idea that, without appealing to any court higher than the instincts themselves, we can yet find grounds for preferring one instinct above its fellows dies very hard. We grasp at useless words: we call it the 'basic', or 'fundamental', or 'primal', or 'deepest' instinct. It is of no avail. Either these words conceal a value judgement passed upon the instinct and therefore not derivable from it, or else they merely record its felt intensity, the frequency of its operation and its wide distribution. If the former, the whole attempt to base value upon instinct has been abandoned: if the latter, these observations about the quantitative aspects of a psychological event lead to no practical conclusion. It is the old dilemma. Either the premisses already concealed an imperative or the conclusion remains merely in the indicative.3
Finally, it is worth inquiry whether there is any instinct to care for posterity or preserve the species. I do not discover it in myself: and yet I am a man rather prone to think of remote futurity—a man who can read Mr Olaf Stapledon with delight. Much less do I find it easy to believe that the majority of people who have sat opposite me in buses or stood with me in queues feel an unreflective impulse to do anything at all about the species, or posterity. Only people educated in a particular way have ever had the idea 'posterity' before their minds at all. It is difficult to assign to instinct our attitude towards an object which exists only for reflective men. What we have by nature is an impulse to preserve our own children and grandchildren; an impulse which grows progressively feebler as the imagination looks forward and finally dies out in the 'deserts of vast futurity'. No parents who were guided by this instinct would dream for a moment of setting up the claims of their hypothetical descendants against those of the baby actually crowing and kicking in the room. Those of us who accept the Tao may, perhaps, say that they ought to do so: but that is not open to those who treat instinct as the source of value. As we pass from mother love to rational planning for the future we are passing away from the realm of instinct into that of choice and reflection: and if instinct is the source of value, planning for the future ought to be less respectable and less obligatory than the baby language and cuddling of the fondest mother or the most fatuous nursery anecdotes of a doting father. If we are to base ourselves upon instinct, these things are the substance, and care for posterity the shadow—the huge, flickering shadow of the nursery happiness cast upon the screen of the unknown future. I do not say this projection is a bad thing: but then I do not believe that instinct is the ground of value judgements. What is absurd is to claim that your care for posterity finds its justification in instinct and then flout at every turn the only instinct on which it could be supposed to rest, tearing the child almost from the breast to creche and kindergarten in the interests of progress and the coming race.