Singapore Swing
The island's economy is booming. So why are so many citizens worse off than they were 10 years ago?
Jan. 29, 2007 issue - Tiny Singapore, with its population of 4.3 million, is often lauded for the way it has embraced globalization to maximum advantage. In the last decade, the city-state has opened its doors wide to foreign investment and talent, slashed corporate taxes, offered incentives to nurture strategic industries (such as biotech, pharmaceuticals and financial services) and cut free-trade deals with a host of other countries. The payoff has seemed clear: over the past three years, Singapore's economy has averaged 7.6 percent growth—a staggering pace for an industrialized state—and created new jobs at a rate any European government would envy.
There's only one problem: average citizens have yet to reap the benefits. New statistics reveal that middle-class households have tasted none of Singapore's spectacular growth, and that the island's poorest 30 percent are worse off than they were five years ago. "Although we have seen very strong growth, we're experiencing this new phenomenon of median real-wage stagnation and low-income decline," says Yeoh Lam Keong, vice president of the Economic Society of Singapore.
This predicament is hardly unique. Wages and salaries are stagnating across the industrial world. What's surprising is that even a country famous for its smart and transparent leadership has been unable to prevent the gains of globalization from flowing mostly to rich individuals and multinational corporations.
In its bid to adapt Singapore's economy to international competition, the government has tried hard to reduce business costs. This has meant slashing labor prices, which has helped push wages down. According to official figures, over the past five years Singapore's wealthiest 10 percent have seen their income rise by 2.3 percent annually (and that doesn't include nonwage earnings such as capital gains or dividends). At the same time, the poorest 10 percent have suffered a staggering 4.3 percent drop in their salaries each year. The government has also allowed employers to cut their contributions to Singapore's Central Provident Fund, which pays for pensions, public housing, medical expenses and education.
Together, these factors have led to lower-than-expected private consumption, which has risen by just 3 percent in the past two years. "Private consumer spending has been the weak link in this current expansion," says Chua Hak Bin, an economist at Citigroup Global Markets in Singapore. This has, in turn, stung Singapore's large retail sector. "It is evident that [they] are not the big winners from high growth," says Manu Bhaskaran, a director of the U.S.-based Centennial Group.
Foreign competition is also hurting. Contractor Tan Boon Soo is one of many Singaporeans feeling the pinch. He installs windows for a living but laments "cutthroat competition" from contract laborers, who have flooded the island from places such as Indonesia and Bangladesh. Unskilled workers like street sweepers and security guards are also finding themselves undercut by immigrants willing to work for less. This is forcing native Singaporeans to change occupations or work harder for less money. "They talk about growth, but I don't see it," says Tan. "Maybe the bankers are doing well, but construction has not been. I'm worse off now than I was in 1997."
All this could spell big trouble. "If these trends continue unchecked," warns Yeoh, "we could begin to get the formation of an underclass [and] the makings of social instability." Such an underclass was never part of Singapore's grand plan. Now its leaders must figure out how to prevent one from emerging without relying on the kind of welfare programs they often deride. Last year the government launched an experimental workfare program that gave low-wage earners bonus pay of up to $780. Now Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong's government is con- sidering making the program permanent in an effort to thin the ranks of the working poor.
"We will try out different forms, but the principle will be the same—help yourself [and] we will help you," the prime minister told lawmakers last November. "It's essential for us to tilt the balance in favor of lower-income Singaporeans because globalization is going to strain our social compact."
Lee has already announced that he'll make Singapore's rich-poor divide a major focus of his annual budget speech next month.
If knowing is half the battle, it could be an important first step.
Monday June 18, 11:17 PM
Singapore is 14th most expensive city to live in: survey
SINGAPORE: Singapore has jumped three places to become the 14th most expensive city in the world for expatriates.
This is according to a Cost of Living Survey conducted by Mercer Human Resource Consulting.
The survey covers 143 cities across six continents and measures the comparative costs of over 200 items.
These include housing, transport, food, household goods and entertainment.
The cost of living Index for Singapore rose from 92 points in March 2006 to 100.4 points this year.
Mercer says the spike in house prices and climbing transportation prices have contributed to the higher ranking on the global list.
Moscow remained as the world's most expensive city for the second year running while Asuncion in Paraguay ranks as the cheapest for the fifth consecutive year.
London is second on the worldwide list, scaling three places compared to 2006.
This is due to the stronger British pound against the US dollar and steep property rental costs.
Mercer added that the strengthening of the Euro has resulted in some European cities moving significantly up the chart this year.
Four of the world's top 10 costliest cities are in Asia and they are Seoul, Tokyo, Hong Kong and Osaka.
Within Asia-Pacific, Singapore moved up one spot to be the fifth most expensive city. - CNA/yy
But it did made it onto Zaobao which is under the same press holding if I'm not mistaken. A while back, I saw a China's program which focuses on Southeast Asia countries and it intro Singapore's widening income gap problem and many of it sources were quotated from zaobao which features articles on the plight of poorer Singaporeans.Originally posted by Jontst78:I think what the thread starter is trying to show is that, articles worded with the same flavour as the above article, will not see the light of day on a SPH publication?
So we just post articles found elsewhere onto this thread? K. Do the articles have to take a particular stand? Or anything goes?Originally posted by bigmouthjoe:Do feel free to contribute to this topic. Please don't post articles insulting Singapore. PAP is not Singapore!
Anything goes, as long as you feel that it would be of interest to Singaporeans and unlikely to be published in the ST. It's time for alternative views instead of accepting what is being published by the generally pro-PAP media.Originally posted by wisefool83:So we just post articles found elsewhere onto this thread? K. Do the articles have to take a particular stand? Or anything goes?
Wall Street Journal
June 21, 2007
By Garry Rodan
SINGAPORE'S state-owned investment companies - Temasek and the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC) - have long been information black holes for outsiders. But that hasn't stopped many governments, including those in China and Malaysia, from copying the Singaporean model. As these funds expand in size and scope, they may want to pay close attention to a lesson that Singapore is learning: You can't export opacity even if you can maintain it at home.
Take the experience of Temasek, which for over three decades has acted as a holding company for Singapore's state-owned companies. But as it expanded, Temasek started to invest heavily in neighboring countries, such as Indonesia and Malaysia. This process gathered momentum following the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis when there were bargains to be had in the region - often involving politically sensitive sectors such as telecommunications and finance, hitherto dominated by locals. However, until recently, poorly developed governance regimes in such countries meant little scrutiny of these investments.
No more. Last month, Indonesia's Business Competition Supervisory Commission declared it had uncovered prima facie evidence of monopoly practices by Temasek in the telecom industry. Temasek owns 56% of the SingTel Group, which in turn holds a 35% stake in Telkomsel, an Indonesian cellular telecommunications company. Singapore Technologies Telemedia, wholly owned by Temasek, also has a 41% share in Indosat. Together, Telekomsel and Indosat account for around 80% of the GSM cellular phone market in Indonesia.
Commission chairman Muhammad Iqbal says the watchdog has already discovered "signs of a lack of competition between Telkomsel and Indosat," including comparable prices for mobile phone products. The University of Indonesia's Institute for Economic and Social Research reported findings in late May suggesting price fixing between Telkomsel and Indosat. Shortly afterward, the Post and Telecommunications Directorate General announced its own investigation. Responding to the announcement by Indonesian authorities earlier this month that the probe into Temasek would now enter an advanced stage - meaning a hearing and three months' further investigation - Temasek's lawyer, Todung Mulya Lubis, asserted that the "claims and complaint filed against Temasek are totally without merit."
Temasek is not accustomed at home to critical attention by university research centers, let alone such work being followed up by regulatory authorities. Not only are Singapore universities less inclined to probe the inner workings of state companies, but regulation of anti-competitive practices is a work in progress in the city-state. The Competition Act didn't come into effect until 2005, following the signing of the U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement and American persistence on competition and transparency issues aimed squarely at monopolies and cartels.
Then there's Temasek's January 2006 deal with Shin Corp. - the family company of Thailand's former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra - which by most accounts has been a disaster. In addition to a current investigation by Thai authorities into alleged foreign investment law violations that Temasek rejects, the deal precipitated widespread anti-Temasek and anti-Singapore street protests in Thailand, soured relations between the two countries and prompted the post-Thaksin junta to announce that it would seek to regain control from Temasek of ShinSat's satellites, which it regards as having national security implications. On top of that, the deal represents a paper loss of around $2 billion in the wake of the nosedive in Shin Corp. share prices following the coup. It remains to be seen whether Temasek can ride through the political and regulatory storms in Thailand to return a profit in the long term.
These international episodes are starting to succeed, at least a little, where domestic political pressures have failed in enhancing transparency. In 2004, Temasek voluntarily produced its first annual report since it was incorporated in 1974, and has continued doing so since. The International Monetary Fund applauded this improvement, but also called for the Singaporean government to provide more information about the activities of Temasek and GIC, whose assets and liabilities are audited but reported only to the President and the Ministry of Finance. GIC Chairman Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew has repeatedly scotched ideas to detail publicly the assets and financial returns of the GIC - established in 1981 to invest Singapore's foreign exchange reserves abroad. Doing so, he's said, is not in the national interest. The standard reply prescribed for Temasek officials in response to questions about government involvement in business is: "The Singapore government, as a shareholder, is not involved in our investment decisions, much less in the businesses of our portfolio companies."
Behind the highly selective concessions to greater transparency reform lies a fundamental issue with wide implications, not least for what we can expect of China's new investment fund, reported to be many times larger than Temasek. While the Singapore government can be pragmatic in providing information where it sees economic benefits, it rejects the notion that Singaporeans have intrinsic rights to detailed information about how public money is invested. Transparency to improve the economy is one thing. Transparency grounded in notions of Singaporeans' right to know and as a way of holding political elites and those acting under their administration to account is another.
Yet the value of information that does get released on economic grounds will remain limited without other domestic institutional changes rooted in respect for the public's right to know. In the absence of strong and independent domestic media, well-resourced civil society watchdog groups and opposition parties with a strong presence in parliament, there is no capacity by the public to scrutinize official information, let alone the chance of exerting pressure to enforce the release of further information than authorities originally intended.
Without mutually reinforcing institutions of economic and political transparency at home, then, there is a serious limit to what governance regimes abroad can achieve in opening up state-owned investment funds. Therefore, while China's new fund will find that global expansion comes with new information pressures, this might only steel the resolve of Chinese authorities to keep domestic transparency reforms within tight limits. Certainly that is the Singapore experience thus far.
Mr Rodan is director of the Asia Research Centre and professor of politics and international studies at Murdoch University in Perth, Australia.