THE CHINESE OF MALAYSIA
July 15, 2000
(The following excerpts were taken from the book, THE CHINESE OF SOUTH-EAST ASIA, by Chin Ung Ho and published recently by Minority Rights Group, London.)
MALAYSIA
The federation of Malaysia was created in 1963, comprising peninsular Malaya, Singapore, and the states of Sabah and Sarawak. Sabah and Sarawak are located on Borneo Island. In 1965, Singapore was ejected from the federation after its leader, Lee Kuan Yew, challenged the notion of Malay political supremacy.
Malaysia is where, proportionately, the ethnic Chinese constitute the largest minority group in the whole of South-East Asia. Ethnic Chinese constitute about 27 per cent of Malaysia's 20 million population. The ethnic Malays and other bumiputera make up about 59 per cent, Indians 8 per cent and others 6 per cent.
The demography of Sabah and Sarawak are significantly different from the peninsula. In the peninsula, the main local ethnic group is the Malays while in Sabah it is the Kadazan-Dusun, and in Sarawak it is the Iban Dayak.
SETTLEMENTS
A small number of Chinese traders probably first settled in Malaya during the fifteenth century. Large-scale Chinese immigration, however, only occurred during the British colonial administration in the nineteenth century. The majority of the new settlers were Hokkien, Hakka, Cantonese, Teochiu and Hainanese.
The British policy of 'divide and rule' meant that the community had little contact with the local Malay population. The Chinese formed their own associations and built their own schools, temples and even townships. More than 50 per cent of Chinese lived in urban areas, a pattern that persists today.
In the 1950s, large numbers of Chinese were resettled by the British into camps (called 'new villages') throughout the northern part of the peninsula when an armed insurrection was launched by the Malayan Communist Party (MCP). The MCP was led mostly by pro-Beijing Chinese.
The insurrection was put down by the British after more than a decade of fighting but it left an impression among the Malay community that some Chinese were loyal to communist China, creating a barrier between the Malay and Chinese. The signing of a peace agreement between the MCP and the Malaysian government in 1989 and economic reforms in China in the past decade have erased this perception.
The Chinese in Sabah and Sarawak have distinct histories. The Chinese in Sarawak first arrived in large numbers in mid-eighteenth century from what is now West Kalimantan, Indonesia. These were mainly Hakka gold miners who settled in the gold-rich areas of Bau.
There was no new migration until the early twentieth century, when large-scale migration began directly from China. This was organized by the Brooke family, the rulers of Sarawak, for the purpose of economic expansion. The first large group from China was made up mostly of Fuzhou Methodists led by a missionary.
Agents were later appointed in Singapore to recruit labourers directly from southern China and Hong Kong. The biggest dialect group in Sarawak today is the Fuzhous followed closely by the Hakkas and Hokkiens. The Chinese make up about 29 per cent of Sarawak's 2.1 million population.
Sabah was ceded to a private company, the British North Borneo Company, in 1881. To develop the state, the company engaged agents in China to recruit labourers. The first arrivals were mostly Hakka Christians led by a missionary from Hong Kong. The Hakkas were followed by Cantonese and Hokkiens. At present, the largest dialect grouping in Sabah is still the Hakkas, followed by the Cantonese and Hokkiens. The Sabah Chinese account for only 12 per cent of Sabah's 1.8m population today.
POLITICAL FRAMEWORK
The most important political distinction in Malaysia is the bumiputera/non-bumiputera dichotomy. 'Bumiputera' (literally 'son of the soil') is a legal term meaning that the state recognizes the indigenous status of the citzen. 'Non-bumiputera' signifies that the citizen is not indigenous.
According to the Constitution, the bumiputera category consists of ethnic Malays and other indigenous ethnic groups in the peninsula, and the many indigenous ethnic groupings in Sabah and Sarawak. All other ethnic groups are deemed 'immigrants' and classified as non-bumiputera. Thus the Chinese, and the Indians, are non-bumiputera.
The bumiputera/non-bumiputera dichotomy has important legal, economic and political implications. Under the Constitution, a bumiputera is entitled to 'special rights', meaning that the government may make special provisions to protect the economic, social and cultural interests of the bumiputera.
Under the New Economic Policy (NEP), which ran from 1971 to 1990, and its successor, the New Development Policy (NDP), a 30 per cent quota for bumiputera was imposed on all economic and social spheres. The official discriminatory system was justified on the grounds that the non-bumiputera (read Chinese) were more commercially advanced than the bumiputera (read Malay). The argument was that the wealth gap, between the Malay and the Chinese would lead to political instability, especially in light of the riots between Chinese and Malays in the capital Kuala Lumpur of 13 May 1969, after the mainly Chinese opposition made impressive gains at the general elections.
Malaysia is a peaceful multi-ethnic society.
The discriminatory system is also justified on the grounds that the Chinese had made a 'constitutional bargain' prior to independence. The Chinese community allegedly accepted the notion of Malay 'special rights' in exchange for citizenship based on jus soli (place of birth). This 'bargain', if it ever existed formally, was negotiated by the Malay and Chinese political elite without any consultation with their respective communities.
Some Chinese leaders claimed that their acceptance of Malay 'special rights' was conditional on the understanding that the 'special rights' would be removed once the Malay/bumiputera community was on par economically with the Chinese community. The Malay elite, on the other hand, claim that acceptance of 'special rights' was forever.
The problem for the Chinese community is that they cannot re-visit the issue of the 'constitutional bargain'. Under the Constitution, matters of citizenship and Malay 'special rights' cannot be questioned or discussed, even in parliament. Ethnic relations are officially deemed 'sensitive issues' and cannot be discussed openly without contravening the Sedition Act or the Internal Security Act (ISA).
Chinese activists and opposition politicians have been jailed or detained for questioning Malay special rights and discrimination against the Chinese community.
ETHNIC POLITICS AND MALAY POLITICAL HEGEMONY
All the major political parties in Malaysia are mobilized along ethnic lines. The Barisan Nasional (National Front) coalition has ruled since independence, turning the country into virtually a one-party state. It claims to be a multi-ethnic coalition government, but in reality is controlled by the United Malays National Organization (UMNO).
UMNO's raison d'être is Malay nationalism, political supremacy and Islam. UMNO's political strength lies in its ability to manipulate the electoral system. More than two-thirds of the seats in Malaysia are located in the rural areas, where ethnic Malays predominate. This has ensured that UMNO (or Malays) always win the largest number of seats in elections, often slightly more than half of the seats in parliament.
Since independence, all Malaysian prime ministers, deputy prime ministers and key cabinet posts have been held by UMNO. This means that the Chinese-based parties in Malaysia cannot advance Chinese interests. Even the Chinese parties in the ruling coalition, at most, can only protest quietly to UMNO about anti-Chinese policies.
UMNO cannot afford to soften its position on Malay 'special rights' because its major political opponent is the Islamic fundamentalist, Parti Islam Malaysia (PAS), that has vowed to establish an Islamic state with no political or cultural rights for non-Muslims when it comes to power. UMNO fears that any concessions to the Chinese community would mean a loss of support among its core constituents to PAS.
EMPLOYMENT, EDUCATION AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES
The Chinese suffer discrimination in relation to employment, education and economic opportunities. The private sector is the main source of employment for almost the whole Chinese population. The public service is effectively closed to them due to the bumiputera-first policy. Recruitment in the public service has traditionally been set at one non-Malay (read Chinese or Indian) for every four Malay recruits. This rule, however, has never been strictly observed and anecdotal evidence suggests that the ratio is closer to one non-Malay to every ten Malay. In the upper echelons of the civil service, non-Malays definitely constitute less than 10 per cent of the elite administrative service.
The education problem centres on two issues: access to tertiary education and vernacular education. A quota system has severely restricted the entry of non-bumiputera into state-funded universities. Officially the intake quota for universities was set at 55 per cent bumiputera and 45 per cent non-bumiputera, but in reality, bumiputera students constitute more than 70 per cent of tertiary students.
Every year, thousands of Chinese students are thus denied a place at university solely on the basis of their ethnicity, while many Malay students who performed much worse than Chinese students in public examinations are given a place. This has forced thousands of Chinese students to go abroad for their tertiary education, creating deep resentment due to the high costs involved.
From the 1970s to the 1990s, Chinese Malaysian students consistently ranked in the top five among international students in the US, Australia and the United Kingdom. Often the cost of an overseas tertiary education has meant that a typical Chinese family could only afford to send one of its children, usually the eldest, overseas. Government scholarships are also openly biased towards the Malay. More than 95 per cent of government scholarships for overseas tertiary education are awarded to bumiputera students.
On top of the quota restrictions, the government established MARA (Majlis Amanah Rakyat/Council of Indigenous Trust) institutes and colleges throughout the country. These colleges offer employment-related courses such as accountancy and only admit bumiputera students. In other words, Malay students who failed to get a place in the public university will still get a post-secondary education through the MARA institutes. The costs of tuition and lodgings are met by the government.
In the mid-1990s the government decided to let foreign universities set up branches in Malaysia to give more non-bumiputera students access to tertiary education inside the country. This policy was not driven by the need to accommodate non-bumiputera needs in higher education but rather was an attempt to stop the massive outflow of funds from Chinese parents for their children's foreign education. The 50 per cent devaluation of the Malaysian currency, the ringgit, caused by the 1997 Asian currency crisis, helped to force the government's hand. Despite the government's motives, the setting up of private universities and other tertiary institutions has given the Chinese community more opportunities for education at the post-secondary level.
Since the arrival of Chinese migrants on a large scale during the colonial era, the community have established Chinese schools to serve the needs of their children. There is a strong belief that in order for Chinese culture to survive and flourish in Malaysia, Chinese schools are essential. Over the years, an extensive network of vernacular schools throughout the country was established.
After independence, for political reasons, the Malay language, renamed Bahasa Malaysia (Malaysian language), was made the official language and became the medium of teaching in all government schools. This meant that certificates from the independent Chinese and other vernacular schools were not recognized by the government. It also meant that Chinese school leavers could not apply to universities or any government-funded institutions, and they could not apply for employment in the public service, statutory bodies and state-owned enterprises.
The vernacular schools are not eligible for any form of government funding and their existence depends totally on community support. The government sees them as a hindrance to national unity and assimilation. Currently, many independent Chinese schools teach a dual curriculum to prepare their students to sit for both the government public examinations and those sanctioned by the Dong Jiao Dong, an umbrella group representing all Chinese schools in Malaysia. Although the government has refused to recognize any certificates issued by the Chinese schools, many universities around the world accept them as meeting matriculation requirements.
Another area of concern to the Chinese community relates to its share of the economy and opportunities for expansion. Under the NEP, the target for the Malay share of the economy was set at 30 per cent by 1990. In 1971 when the NEP was promulgated, the Malay share was estimated to be only around 2 per cent. To fast-track the Malay share, the government, first, aggressively promoted selected Malay businessmen. They were given multi-million government infrastructure contracts without going through a tender process.
Second, the government discriminated in favour of bumiputera businessmen across the whole spectrum of the economy. Bumiputera businessmen were given first preference for all government projects, supply tenders and trade licences. Certain government contracts could only be awarded to bumiputera companies. All financial institutions had to set aside a set percentage of their loans for bumiputera businesses.
Public listed companies and large companies were legally obliged to set aside 30 per cent of their shares for bumiputera investors. These shares often had to be sold at below market value simply to conform to the shareholding rule. The government's aim was to create a 'Bumiputera Industrial and Commercial Community' that was on a par with that of the Chinese. While the aims were noble, the outcome so far has been the creation of a rentier bumiputera business class more interested in using the government's discriminatory policies for quick gains than in becoming genuine entrepreneurs.
While the larger Chinese business concerns can withstand the government's discriminatory policies, and in some cases thrive by using Malay fronts for their business activities, small to medium Chinese traders have been seriously hurt by the NEP and the NDP. Many believe that Chinese business would have expanded much faster if the policies had not been in place. Overall, Chinese business has suffered because of the government's bias towards Malay businesses.
Despite the restrictions, the Chinese share of the economy was estimated at 40-50 per cent at the end of the NEP in 1990. Presently, the Malay share of the economy is estimated to be in the region of 20-30 per cent. The rest is owned by foreign interests.
One area where the Chinese community was seriously hurt was employment. Large companies were required to have a minimum of 30 per cent of their staff from the bumiputera community. This rule was not applied in reverse. Malay companies could have a 100 per cent bumiputera staff. Many government-owned companies and statutory bodies have bumiputera-first hiring policies resulting in more than 90 per cent of their staff being bumiputera.
ISLAMIZATION AND CULTURAL POLICIES
Almost all Malaysian Chinese are non-Muslims while the official religion of the country is Islam. The majority of Chinese are Taoists, Confucians, Buddhists and Christians. Although religious freedom is guaranteed in the Malaysian Constitution, serious restrictions are placed on non-Islamic faiths. These include a legal ban on proselytizing to Muslims, restrictions on the building of new temples and churches and the use of certain terms deemed 'Islamic'.
Government policy is to promote 'Islamic values' in all areas of public life. This policy started in the 1970s but was only implemented aggressively from the 1980s onwards. An International Islamic University was established, Islamic banking and finance was introduced and the rapid expansion of Islamic schools and a mosque-building programme were generously funded by the state. A course dealing with the basics of the Islamic religion, history and culture was made a compulsory for all tertiary students, regardless of their religious affiliation, in government-funded universities.
There are state-sanctioned Dakwah (missionary) groups who target the Chinese for conversion to Islam. In recent years, there have been several high-profile cases of teenage Chinese girls converting to Islam without the knowledge or consent of their parents. There are credible reports of peer pressure to convert being applied to non-Muslim students studying in local universities and government boarding schools.
Controversy also surfaced in the mid-1990s when a Chinese Muslim preacher attacked the Christian religion and traditional Chinese faiths on a weekly Mandarin-language Islamic programme on state television. In Sabah and Sarawak, there were reports of indigenous peoples such as the Kadazan-Dusuns and Ibans being converted to Islam with promises of material aid or money.
Conversion to Islam is controversial in Malaysia because it implies a switch in ethnic identity. Under the Constitution, a Malay is defined as a Muslim, and therefore converting to Islam in Malaysia is often referred to as 'masuk Melayu' (becoming a Malay). Chinese converts are not only expected to adopt a Malay name, but are also expected to cut all cultural and linguistic links with their Chinese backgrounds and there are many cases of Chinese converts who do this. Conversion to Islam is non-reversible under the law.
In 1971, the government announced a National Cultural Policy (NCP). The Chinese and the non-Malay community were unaware that a NCP was being drafted, and the policy totally ignored the fact that almost half of the Malaysian population were non-Malay and non-Muslim. The NCP declared that the core of the NCP must 'reflect indigenous society' and thus only Malay and Islamic culture. This policy means that the official mass media ignore non-Malay and non-Islamic cultures. Movies that promote Christianity or any other non-Islamic faiths are banned.
PROSPECTS
In summary, the Malaysian Chinese suffer significant discrimination in the political, social, cultural and economic spheres. This is due to a deliberate government policy of discrimination in favour of the Malay and bumiputera community, and Islam. Despite the gains made by the bumiputera in the economy, the Malay-led government is unlikely to change the system.
The Malay population is so used to privilege that a subsidy mentality has developed. Many younger Malays believe that the benefits accorded to them are their birthright. The political system is also unlikely to be liberalized. The Malays know that their privileged position is tied directly to their dominance of the political system. While the Chinese share of the economy will probably remain stable in the coming years, the Malay and government share of the economy will increase. This takes away any leverage, political or economic, the Chinese community might have in trying to extract concessions from the government.
The positive side of this is that with significant Malay holdings in the economy, the Indonesian scenario, where the local people can easily blame the Chinese for any economic ills, is unlikely in Malaysia.
Another problem facing the Chinese is that their share of the population is expected to fall to between 22-5 per cent in the coming two decades. This is because the largely urban Chinese are having fewer children as society industrializes, and because of immigration from Indonesia and the southern Philippines. Politics plays a role here as most Indonesians and Filipinos accepted for residency are ethnic Malays and Muslims.
The likely outcome is a political, social and cultural system that is dominated by the Malays and Islam. The prospects for minority rights for the Chinese in Malaysia in the long term are therefore not promising.
Chin Ung Ho, PhD, is a Malaysian-born academic currently teaching overseas. He has published extensively on Malaysian politics. He can be contacted at
[email protected]. The above article reflects the personal views of the writer.