63 years ago today
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1942 - The Beginning of the End: The Destruction of the Johore Causeway
On 31 Jan 42, the mournful skirls of bagpipes were heard in the vicinity of the Causeway separating Singapore from Malaya. The 2nd Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders were crossing the Causeway, the last British and Commonwealth troops to leave Malaya after covering the retreat of the rest of the British Army. When the last man, LTC Ian Stewart, the Commanding Officer of the Argylls, was across, the order to blow up the Causeway was given and at 0815hrs, Singapore's link with the Malay Peninsula was broken.
The destruction of the Causeway was the culmination of events that had begun on 8 Dec 41 with the Japanese landings in the North. The British and Commonwealth forces had fought a long, hard and courageous but losing campaign in mainland Malaya. The final decision to destroy the Causeway saw the retreat of the British Army into the "Fortress Singapore" with its large civilian population, limited resources and hastily prepared northern defences.
Like most cases throughout history with regards to water crossings, the destruction of the Causeway was intended to delay the enemy and give the defenders a chance to rest, regroup and prepare for the next battle. The Causeway's destruction did achieve this to an extent, as the Japanese themselves admitted. The Causeway with its 60 - 70 foot gap, although bridged to allow their tanks to cross to support the final assault, was only repaired on 14 Feb 42. Meanwhile the Japanese forces that had landed in Singapore on 8 Feb 42 were able to push the British back to the outskirts of the city, largely due to the way Singapore's pre-war defences had been constructed. On 15 Feb 42, the British surrendered.
The gap in the Causeway. (Courtesy of the Imperial War Museum)
Although Singapore was strongly defended in the south, there was no such defensive capability in the north of the island. The original mission of defending the Sembawang Naval Base meant that the enemy had to be prevented from shelling or besieging the base. As such, the British concentrated their defences in the south. Thus according to this thinking, having defences in the north 'would have been folly as this would not have stopped the enemy from bombing or shelling the base'1. This would negate the strategic benefits of the base. This coupled with the overconfidence of the British meant that defences weren't seriously begun until the Japanese entered Johor in mid-Jan 42. The defences were too little, too late.
The Japanese, on the other hand, were able to change their plans quickly to bypass the Causeway and launch an amphibious attack concentrated in the north-west of Singapore with the same thoroughness that had characterised their speedy campaign down the Peninsula.
A lesson that can be drawn from these events is of the danger of overconfidence and not knowing the capabilities of an enemy. In addition, one should always be operationally prepared and ready to adapt to any changing situation. Had the British gone ahead and built the defences in the north, the mere presence of prepared defences could have had an impact on the Japanese advance. -
The japanese had a secret weapon:: the BICYCLE.........
Rode their bikes all the way from up north.....easily ambushed, but even this the British defenders failed to do.........deserved to be defeated and humilated. -
Can't blame them. Most of them were too scared to carry out orders and not all of them were trained soldiers.
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By the way,the bicycle will be useless without British well build roads in Malaya.
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Percival even failed to recognise troop concentrations in the areas facing the northwestern shore of Singapore even though many reports have reached him. May not make any difference to the outcome (Singapore is no Malta) but at least the Japanese would get a real bloody nose in order to capture Singapore.
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I dare say it was good that such an event happened in the past so that we may learn something from it to ensure it never happens again.
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British then very what, thought that they could win... Act smart...
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All in all Percival should not command the troops
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How come? Just because he rejected the plans to build rearward defences in Johor and Singapore? Historians have chosen him as the scapegoat. He had his hands tied as Whitehall never gave him the resources for solid defence. Controversial of course.
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The British then were over confident, assumed that they are much more superior than the asian. They believe their imperative army is better than any other troops on the region. And many of chinese forefather fight much better & died tragically bcos of the british incompetence.
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The British even thought that tanks cannot pass by the 'thick' Malayan forest...
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And they were right. Most of the armoured battles in Malaya were fought on the axes of one of the finest road networks in the region
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Overall, the British neglected to cover their backside in Singapore even though the bulk of Malaya provided the bulk of buffer zone. The defences in Malaya are not sound enough to repel the attackers. Add to overconfidence and some say the failure of Operation Matador, the Brits face disaster. The Brits seem to forgot that even though the jungles are impassable to AFVs, the superb road network is not and the Japanese used little AFVs, no more than 15 tonnes which are useful in the terrain they face. There are anti-tank strongpoints with the excellent 6-pounder and 'fair' 2-pounders set up but during the battle of Jitra, the posts were unmanned as the crew were sheltering at the roadside because of a heavy downpour and the Japanese tanks simply brushed them aside.
As for the rear defences of Singapore, sure, the British neglected it as they thought the Japanese would mount a frontal assault (hence the batteries facing south). But when the invasion finally came at Singora, Pattani and Kota Bahru, a Brigadier Ivan Simpson (if I'm not msitaken, the Head of the Engineering Unit) asked for Percival's agreement to set up beach defences along the northern shore of the island. Percival was not in agreement with the idea until finally, when asked by Simpson why he refused the plan, he said that the proposed defences will be bad for morale! Even so, when finally the defences are erected, it could still give the Japanese a heavy price to pay for crossing the Straits (among the defence maechanisms are oil-filled pipes which discharge their contents into the Straits and then ignited - hello japanese barbeque). Unfortunately, the execution of the defence plan went astray during the attack. Also Percival still holds the idea that the Japanese would land in the Changi area hence he ordered massive quantities of materiel to be transferred east....when he finally realised that the Japs would land from West, he ordered that the materiel be transferred BACK! -
For your information, the supposed 15-inch guns of Singapore could and did fire northwards towards Johore. Why it was a failure was not because it pointed the wrong way, as the school textbooks would have you believe, but rather because they were armed with armor-piercing rounds rather than HE rounds. The reason for Percival's decision to base the bulk of his troops in the north-east sector was due to his belief that the terrain at Kranji and Sarimbun in the north-west were too swampy and inhospitable to be used as a landing zone. Thus, he left only the Australian 22nd Brigade and Dalforce to guard it. Furthermore, on the 7th Feb, the Japanese made an incursion into Pulau Ubin, further reinforcing Percival's opinion that the Japanese would indeed land in the north-eastern side. On that day itself, an Australian patrol had already discovered the landing craft of the Japanese in Johore but by the time the reports got back, it was too late for the invasion was underway. Operation Matador was a failure due to Percival's indecision to invade Thailand as a pre-emptive measure. Ironically, when Percival was still a staff officer in the 30's, he was sent to Malaya to scout for possible landing zones of the Japanese. The result - he predicted, uncannily, that they would land in the northeast (Singgora, Patani and Kota Bahru) and that they would engage the British in a land battle via Malaya.
In mitigation of General Percival, although he was indecisive and weak as a leader, there are other reasons why Singapore could never really become the "Gibralta of the East". One reason was the lack of the depth in defence. The moment Malaya fell, that signalled the end of the British. Secondly, the lack of planes. Brewster Buffaloes vs Zeroes? In his report while as a staff officer, he had recommended that the air power in Malaya be increased, only for the report to be filed away in Whitehall. Thirdly, the lack of a naval presence. The Royal Navy was supposed to send a large fleet to Singapore if she was ever in trouble. But the war in Europe and the need for a naval presence in the Mediterranean put paid to that and all Singapore got was the Prince of Wales, Repulse and 4 old destroyers.
Today is the 15th of February, the "Black Sunday" in Singapore history. The British surrendered this day at the Ford Factory to General Yamashita. Hope we can all learn a lesson here.