http://www.cdi.org/missile-defense/patriot-performance.cfmMarch 25, 2003 Printer-Friendly Version
Fourteen Iraqi missiles have been launched at U.S. forces in Kuwait since hostilities began Thursday. Of those, six have reportedly been intercepted by U.S. Patriot missiles. Is this track record validation for missile defense systems in general and boosters of the Patriot program in particular? Right now, it is too early to tell: only analysis months, if not years, after hostilities are over will provide an accurate assessment of the Patriot's performance. In the meantime, it is important to objectively note what has been reported of the missile defense program thus far.
There are four different kinds of missiles involved in the Patriot program. There is the old Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-2, the missile with a blast-fragmentation warhead that was used to almost no avail during the 1991 Gulf War. There is the PAC-2 Guided Enhanced Munition (GEM), a refurbished version of the PAC-2 whose new low noise seeker and modernized, faster fuze allow for an increased engagement area. There is the GEM+, where a GEM missile system has an enhanced acquisition and tracking system that attempts to monitor low radar cross-section targets in a cluttered environment. Finally, there is the PAC-3, which uses a hit-to-kill warhead to directly intercept short-range ballistic missiles. Apparently all four missiles have been used in Operation Iraqi Freedom, but the latest and most advanced version of the Patriot, the PAC-3, has only been involved in a few of the intercept attempts.
The Patriots are being launched against what seem to be Ababil-100s, a solid-fuel ballistic missile that is thought to have a range of around 100 miles. These missiles provide an entirely different tracking and intercepting challenge. Ababils, having shorter ranges, have a quicker booster burnout period and move at slower speeds than do Scuds. The Scuds used by Iraq during the first Gulf War had ranges of about 400 miles. Also, because they had been so shoddily maintained, they wobbled and fell apart mid-flight, making tracking them extremely difficult. The couple of dozen or so Scuds Iraq may still have in its arsenal - if, indeed, it even has any left - have been hidden in what must have been less-than-optimal chambers for well over a decade and no doubt would fly even more erratically than they did in 1991. The reports of the Patriot's performance against Ababils, while encouraging, do not necessarily indicate how reliable the missile defense system would be against Scuds.
Accounts from the field indicate that the Patriots are being used in a manner known as the ripple-fire, where multiple Patriots are launched against a single threat in the hopes that their lethality will be increased simply by sheer dint of numbers. The ripple-fire method is more or less how the Patriot was designed to be operated, so it is not unusual that it is being applied in Iraq. But it is important to note this doctrine, because otherwise the impression might be gained that the missiles were destroying their targets on a one-to-one basis. Also, some of the Iraqi missiles are simply being let to fly unmolested if U.S. forces deem that they will land in unpopulated areas. This would imply that Patriot missile battery commanders are reserving their limited number of missiles for the most pressing threats.
Finally, the weekend's friendly fire incident is a terrible reminder of the Patriot's limitations. Even if the operators do everything they are supposed to do, technical problems can and do crop up. Expectations of the Patriot's effectiveness must be reined in so that such tragedies can be side-stepped in the future.
By Victoria Samson
CDI Research Associate
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