From -
http://straitstimes.asia1.com.sg/commentary/story/0,4386,179612,00.html?Fighting terrorism: SAF's secret edge
DAVID BOEY
THE hijacking of Singapore Airlines (SIA) flight SQ 117 by four Pakistanis was resolved by Special Operations Force (SOF) commandos 12 years ago today.
At the time of the crisis, few people could have imagined how airliner hijacks would one day take on the more deadly form of suicide attacks, and spur defence planners the world over to devise extensive measures against these threats.
In the post-911 era, defence planners grapple with twin challenges. One is to minimise the loss of life of passengers and aircrew. The other is to devise policies and procedures to ensure terrorist pilots cannot turn compromised airliners into guided missiles.
Decisive force is a last line of defence. Preventive measures are equally important and this explains why Singapore has tightened airport security and introduced air marshals on selected flights. Alongside these efforts is ongoing work done by the intelligence services to find and root out terrorist elements.
It does not take a great intellect to sense the sort of ethical issues security planners must deal with when contemplating decisive force to resolve copycat 911-style strikes.
Before anti-terrorist teams are deployed, the executive group of key civil servants tasked to handle the crisis work through multiple scenarios that could complicate its speedy resolution.
Threat scenarios differ according to whether the compromised aircraft belongs to a Singapore carrier or a foreign one. Under international law, other things being equal, an airline falls under the jurisdiction of its flag. There is also a big difference between the hijack occurring on the ground of the home country, in international air space, or at a foreign airport.
While the Defence Ministry has been coy about discussing its counter-terrorist options, the SQ 117 hijack crisis 12 years ago provides telling indicators of how Singapore might respond to such incidents.
FACE-OFF WITH TERROR
THE SIA Airbus A310 was hijacked on March 26, 1991, en route from Kuala Lumpur to Singapore. It was later learnt that the foursome were armed with nothing more dangerous than fireworks and inflight cutlery.
Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) commandos stormed the Airbus at 6.50 am on March 27. The operation was over in 30 seconds and 123 passengers and crew were freed. All four terrorists were killed by gunfire.
Twelve years ago, Singaporeans at large were not prepared for the gravity of the SQ 117 situation. For instance, when word of the crisis first broke, some thought it was a hoax. And after the incident was resolved, there were comments on whether the knife-wielding terrorists could have been subdued peacefully.
The operation was unique on two accounts. First, it marked the first time Singapore had resolved an airliner hijacking through force of arms. Second, it was the first time that an SAF unit had been sent on operations even before its existence had been officially acknowledged.
The commando unit that stormed SQ 117 was the SOF. This unit was formed secretly in 1984 and has trained with crack foreign anti-terrorist teams from the British Special Air Service, German GSG-9 and various American hostage rescue teams.
Mindef/SAF did not take the wraps off the SOF even after the black-clad commandos were photographed storming the SIA plane. It consistently referred to them as having come from Headquarters Commando. Mindef only acknowledged the SOF's existence on Feb 20, 1997. This was 13 years after they were formed and six years after they first went into action.
The unveiling this January of the SAF's Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Explosives (CBRE) Defence Group shows that Mindef has not changed its practice of keeping secret various special capabilities in the SAF's arsenal.
The sudden emergence of the CBRE group reflects the proactive stance taken by defence planners here in ensuring a well-balanced force structure for the SAF.
As Singapore guards against catastrophic terrorism, it's reasonable to assume that there are other aspects in the SAF's order of battle Mindef is not ready to talk about. These special weapons and elite units will be tasked with delivering Mindef's 'swift and decisive' response should deterrence and diplomacy fail.
FIRST THREAT
TO UNDERSTAND the challenges that airplane hijacks pose to security planners, consider this scenario: Singapore authorities are told that an airliner has been hijacked en route to Paya Lebar Airport. To complicate matters, the commercial flight is a foreign aircraft that took off from a regional country.
The airliner flies a steady course for Singapore and is due to arrive in local air space in about eight hours. As there's no practical way of forcing a hijacked aircraft to land, should decisive force be used against this flight?
Lest you think this is a far-fetched scenario, it should be mentioned that authorities here faced just such an incident more than 30 years ago.
The day was Sept 27, 1972. A flight engineer aboard a Boeing 707 operated by Greek airline Olympic Airways accidentally flipped a 'hijack alarm'. The plane, Flight 472, took off from Sydney bound for Paya Lebar Airport with 31 passengers and 11 crew at 10.30 am, Singapore time.
Authorities here were not informed of the situation till four hours later. Following a flurry of conflicting reports, Australia's Department of Civil Aviation warned Singapore's airport 'to be ready for a possible hijacking'.
Flight 472 landed at Paya Lebar at 6:25 pm and was immediately ringed by police. But after the plane touched down, there was no indication a hijacking was in progress. A Straits Times report said the control tower at Paya Lebar was asked by Flight 472's baffled pilots 'to send the gangway and a bus to pick up the passengers'. So, Singapore's first hijack drama turned out to be a false alarm.
The young Republic was lucky it was a false alarm as the absence of hostage-rescue commandos and civil defence measures would have severely crimped its policy options.
Faced with a similar situation today, Singapore's authorities have a ready range of arms and procedures to deal with aircraft hijackers. One should appreciate the thought processes that have gone into drawing up these defences - and hope that the secret-edge capabilities the SAF has in its arsenal are never used.
The writer is a correspondent with the Business Times. He contributed this article toThe Straits Times.