Lessons from Iraq War : Applicable to SAF
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Hi All,
After every conflict, there will be lessons learnt and those progressive armed forces will try to apply such lessons to their own organisations. It could be in the form of doctrine, training, equipment and logistics.
I can think of some of the lessons that the SAF learnt (my own speculation) from past conflicts.
During my NS days in late 80s (you can see how old I am), there was a lot of focus on leadership in the section and platoon level. I think this is learnt from the Falklands War in '82 where the British prevailed although they are outnumbered and have similar equipment as the Argentines. Their Section Comd, PCs and OCs showed much bravery and initiative compared to their Argentine's counterparts. The Argentines have the 1st Gen NVGs whereas the British regular infantry are not equiped with any NVGs.
After the 1st Gulf War, there was focus on Chemical Defense and more focus on IT. Also emphasis on heli mobility (probably learned as a result of the 101st Airborne's left hook in GW I).
As for GW II, I think the lessons learned are:
a. Must safeguard rear areas as in a rapid advance, a lot of renegade enemy forces could be left behind. Maybe SAF should purchase those LAV type 6x6 amoured vehicles to safeguard rear areas.
b. if you have a modern MBT, it will be be invincible against a force without modern ATGWs
c. Target idenfitication (IFF) very important. Yet at the same time frontline troops must be allowed the initiative to use deadly force without hesitation.
d. It is useful to have a top notch MBT like the M1 which can be used to flush out targets in FIBUA.
e. Must probably rewrite our FIBUA manual to include Armour
f. Apaches are quite accident prone. Maybe should use other less capable attack copters to complement our Apache force.
Just my 2 cents. -
Critique by supposed russian experts from here:
http://www.aeronautics.ru/news/news002/news082.htm
"The first strategic lessons of the war
[ Lessons of the war in Iraq are discussed here with a focus on a possible similar war between Russia and the US ]
The main of such lessons is the ever-increasing significance of troop concealment as one of the primary methods of combat. Concealment and strict adherence to the requirements for secrecy and security become strategic goals of the defending forces in the view of the US reliance and that of its allies on precision-guided weapons, electronic and optical reconnaissance as well as due to their use of tactical weapons at the maximum possible range afforded by these reconnaissance methods. Importance of concealment is being seen in Iraq and was clearly demonstrated in Yugoslavia, where the Yugoslav Army preserved nearly 98% of its assets despite the three months of bombing. Within our [Russian/European] battle theater concealment methods will offer us [the Russian army] an enormous advantage over the US.
The second lesson of this war is the strategic role of the air defenses in modern warfare as the most important service of the armed forces. Only the complete air dominance of the coalition allows it to continue its advance toward Baghdad and to achieve the critical advantage in any engagement. Even the short interruption in air support caused by the sand storms put the US and British troops in a very difficult situation.
Elimination of the air defenses as a separate service branch of the [Russian] Armed Forces and its gradual dissipation in the Air Force can be called nothing else but a "crime". [This statement refers to the recent unification of the Russian Air Force (VVS) and the Air Defense Force (PVO) and the secondary role of the air defense force within this new structure.]
The third lesson of the war is the growing importance of combat reconnaissance and increased availability of anti-tank weapons capable of engaging the enemy at maximum range. There is a requirement on the battlefield for a new weapon system for small units that would allow for detection of the enemy at maximum distance during day or night; for effective engagement of modern tanks at a range of 800-1000 meters; for engagement of enemy infantry at a range of 300-500 meters even with the modern personal protection equipment possessed by the infantry." -
Sorry spencer but i have to disagree about the mbt and FIBUA part.
Our region is just not condusive for a sizable force of MBT to go marauding around freely much less conduct FIBUA. Combat range of MBT cannot be fully utilized because of our hills and jungles, and you can hardly find a place on our island with LOS of up to 1km or more. Furthermore, come rainy season a 60-65 ton mbt would be cumbersome, even a liability. In our context, i believe mobility takes a presidence over armour. -
The M1's range is limited in FIBUA, but it's armor allows it to weather most of the stuff the Iraqis could throw at it (except of course, when they get backstabbed) and not just survive but still carry out the mission. And their 120mm gun was useful in clearing out buildings. They didn't even bother to dismount infantry to support their Abrams incursions, they simply used the Bradleys' 25mm as support fire. Needless to say, the 70ton M1 had proven useful in FIBA so far.
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One more lesson is that it does not help to have a "information" minister who is a joke. (Iraqi)
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I respect a difference in opinion.Originally posted by redrooster79:Sorry spencer but i have to disagree about the mbt and FIBUA part.
Our region is just not condusive for a sizable force of MBT to go marauding around freely much less conduct FIBUA. Combat range of MBT cannot be fully utilized because of our hills and jungles, and you can hardly find a place on our island with LOS of up to 1km or more. Furthermore, come rainy season a 60-65 ton mbt would be cumbersome, even a liability. In our context, i believe mobility takes a presidence over armour.
I didn't expect MBTs to have a role in FIBUA at all. It is just that I didn't expect an MBT can be used as "bait" to trigger responses from the enemy. If you want to use an MBT this way, you have to make sure the MBT is extremely survivable (spelling). -
Armour in FIBUA would be APCs that can dismount infantry and support them with something like the 40/50 cupola, other forms of armour probably would be needed only if the enemy also places armour in the streets that can't be stopped with anti-tank missiles
Even the 25mm turret won't be as useful in FIBUA, 40/50 is best for FIBUA fire support in my opinion. . . -
Maybe Singapore should give the troops more survivability. Wheres the powered armour!?
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the best is the CEV's 165mm demo gun.Originally posted by laser51088:Armour in FIBUA would be APCs that can dismount infantry and support them with something like the 40/50 cupola, other forms of armour probably would be needed only if the enemy also places armour in the streets that can't be stopped with anti-tank missiles
Even the 25mm turret won't be as useful in FIBUA, 40/50 is best for FIBUA fire support in my opinion. . . -
double post
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i also LaoPeng - 87 to 90Originally posted by spencer99:During my NS days in late 80s (you can see how old I am),
a. Must safeguard rear areas as in a rapid advance, a lot of renegade enemy forces could be left behind. Maybe SAF should purchase those LAV type 6x6 amoured vehicles to safeguard rear areas.
if i'm not wrong, one of our formations has been tasked to secure LOCs and they are using V200, but I remain to be correctedb. if you have a modern MBT, it will be be invincible against a force without modern ATGWs
but our modern equipment need to be properly and diligently maintained and serviced. from the reports, it is more likely that the Apaches and M1s failed because of technical fault that enemy action, like the Apache purportedly shot down by the farmer (where are the bulletholes?) and at least one M1 the engine of which stalled and could not restart in the first few forays into Baghdad on Sat or Sunday. so the VM/technicians/ground crew very important in servicing and maintaining equipment in fwd ops.
c. Target idenfitication (IFF) very important. Yet at the same time frontline troops must be allowed the initiative to use deadly force without hesitation.
d. It is useful to have a top notch MBT like the M1 which can be used to flush out targets in FIBUA.
e. Must probably rewrite our FIBUA manual to include Armour
f. Apaches are quite accident prone. Maybe should use other less capable attack copters to complement our Apache force.
2ndly, i think the troops need to be well rested. all of us know that after three four days of continuous exercise where we can only zzz during 'tactical silence' we all like zombies. mistakes and accidents become more frequent. these US soldier have been in continuous ops, and they are not using blanks or 'bang bang bang' and the enemy are not simulated. they must really be v tired. so mistakes happening can only be expected. while IFF is important, i think this also needs to be remembered.
Personally, I have two observations about this. At the end of the day, the Clausewitzian maxim on concentration of force is still important. An attacking force still needs at least 3:1 ratio, with at least sufficient strategic and tactical reserve not only to exploit opportunities but to secure LOCs. Troops fwd deployed also need to be rotated with fresh troops so that soldiers could be well rested, though the rotation of troops at the wrong time and wrong place could be at the expense of momentum of attack.
2ndly, this operation is not typical in that there's not much contest for the air. coalition forces were able to secure the airspace very quickly thereby granting CAS to ground troops fairly quickly. this, however, may not always be a given and air defence against enemy aircraft needs to be emphasised.Just my 2 cents.[/b]
my one only worth 1 cent -
The V200s are used mostly for local defense, re-enforcement and internal security duties by second line units.
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yeap..the Airforce have taken up most of the V200..u c them every in most AirBasesOriginally posted by bcoy:The V200s are used mostly for local defense, re-enforcement and internal security duties by second line units. -
Hi all, here are some observations that might be useful for SAF:
1) Infantry section tactics are important. Leap-frogging is better than expending tank rds and Javelin missiles against a house which could have been stormed easily by a section of troops with GPMG support. Use CS gas to lower enemy reaction...
2) Realistic combat loads are important. Would recommend that SAF soldiers train constantly with simulated load on training exercise (the blue condensed rubber things)
3) Would need to equip each and every line troop with body armour. Coalition casualties have been thankfully low, thanks to body armour in more than one occasion.
4) Our GPMGs are good. Its pretty much the same type employed by the Brits and the Americans. But would suggest a bandolier box like what U.K. has. About 100-150 rds would suffice. Its better than having to have the gunner flip the belt over the MG, and unflip it when the need arises...also, have a MG gunner SBO, and equip each gunner with a pistol.
5) Combat optical gunsights are highly important. At present, we only have it on the SAR-21s. Would recommend having it for SAWs and GPMGs.
6) Grenadier vests are important. I dunno how grenadiers carry their rds presently, but I think its by using bandoliers. This limits the amount of 40mm grenades a grenadier can carry. Also, it'll be difficult to move with bandoliers flipping around your chest or waist.
7) NVGs are highly important. Should have every line troop issued with one and train in night exercises with it. Modifying existing helmet so that it can mount the NVG.
8. Sharpshooters and snipers are important. However, we should give the shaprshooter a dedicated weapon instead of the SAR-21 or M-16S1 with Avimo scope. Would recommend a 7.62 auto-loader rifle like the SR-25.
Okay, I think that's all I can think of for now. I'll get off the soapbox now...please feel free to comment...
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Agree with some of Tango1's observation..
1) at times tank rds and ATGMs are quite an overkill when use against a house/ building. however, if its a high threat or if there is heavy firepower coming from it, it may seems "suitable". FIBUA is primary an infantry's battle ground, it would be good if there were some fire support vehicle attached to the unit. A tank may not be too useful, maybe an IFV/APC fitted with OWS, with 7.62/25mm and AGL.
4&6) Good idea on the MG gunner's SBO, on the whole we should have SBO tt is suited to the needs of the individual role in a section.
No need for MG gunner to carry 8 mags of 5.56 when he's using belts of 7.62. Same should apply to the grenadier & SAW gunner. Their SBO should cater to their needs of carrying their ammo, grenades for the grenadier and drum mags for the SAW. -
Some very good suggestions I see here. Tango1, I think you did not serve your NS in the infantry or you'd realize a lot of the things you suggest are already being done. The only thing I do not agree with is the need for sharpshooters. The terrain we are likely to face is very different from the desert, with much shorter ranges. We already have a weapon system that fulfills the need for mid-range (400m-1000m) fire at the platoon level -- the GPMG (though this is volume rather than point fire). I do not think we need something like that at the section level.
The main issue I have is the seeming vulnerability of the Apache to ground fire and dust. Although it is armored and difficult to shoot down, it seems to be quite easy to render combat ineffective even by 7.62 fire. It now seems that our investment in Apaches is not a silver bullet against Malaysia's PT-91 MBT and ASTROS MLRS. Tactics need to be adapted. The Apaches will need to operate as part of a team, with ground troops or supporting fires to clear out enemy infantry. That would be a little dicey if the Apaches are performing long range strike. So this means we should rely on fixed wing strike aircraft for long range strike and give Apaches a CAS role, operating with the ground troops at the front.
Rear area protection has also been demonstrated to be very important. Guerilla and commando attacks are an even greater problem in our local terrain. Our development of the armed and armored Bronco ATTC is now shown to be prescient. However, we need to increase our use of this platform and learn how to tactically employ it. The SAF needs to practice rear area protection, with more emphasis given to anti-guerilla and counter-insurgency scenarios in our exercises. Adding wheeled armored vehicles like the Terrex to our inventory for convoy protection might also be a good idea.
Bypassing cities to strike at vital objectives was one of the main themes of the campaign and is likely to be what the SAF would do in a conflict since we lack the manpower to storm cities. It has been proven to be sound in modern warfare with a few caveats. Encirclement of the city must be complete and thorough, or the defenders can stage strikes from the cities, escape and appear elsewhere, or be reinforced. This is what happened in Basra, which was never encircled from the north. Humanitarian aid to the city must be ensured, even if that means handing supplies to the defenders. Checkpoint manning is a more involved skill than many expected and is extremely important for proper military security, aid provision and media perception of the war. Again, it should be given greater emphasis in SAF training.
The use of artillery and mortars for probing, baiting and harrassment fire by the militarily weaker force needs to be studied. The Iraqis seemingly managed to bait the Americans into striking civilian targets with mortar fire, or drive them into prepared positions with artillery. We need to learn how to do that too, and how to counter it. Unit leaders need to be disciplined under fire and not allow it to cloud their judgement and do what the enemy wants them to do. This is hard to train for, since you cannot bombard a unit with real artillery in training. The best we can do is mental preparation.
That's all I can think of for now. -
Hey dkhoo, thanks for your comments on this issue. You're right, I didn't stay long enuff in AIT to find out what's new and what's not...got posted to 7 SIB later on in the BRC. That was nearly 6 years ago already. As you should know, being far away from the main force gives one a different perspective. But I do remember that 6 yrs back, there wasn't any of those things that I suggested...so I guess I might be outdated.Originally posted by dkhoo:Some very good suggestions I see here. Tango1, I think you did not serve your NS in the infantry or you'd realize a lot of the things you suggest are already being done. The only thing I do not agree with is the need for sharpshooters. The terrain we are likely to face is very different from the desert, with much shorter ranges. We already have a weapon system that fulfills the need for mid-range (400m-1000m) fire at the platoon level -- the GPMG (though this is volume rather than point fire). I do not think we need something like that at the section level.
Rear area protection has also been demonstrated to be very important. Guerilla and commando attacks are an even greater problem in our local terrain. Our development of the armed and armored Bronco ATTC is now shown to be prescient. However, we need to increase our use of this platform and learn how to tactically employ it. The SAF needs to practice rear area protection, with more emphasis given to anti-guerilla and counter-insurgency scenarios in our exercises. Adding wheeled armored vehicles like the Terrex to our inventory for convoy protection might also be a good idea.
That's all I can think of for now.
Sharpshooter do exist. If I do remember, there are always 2 of them in line platoons, in each section. They also carry the LAW if I'm not wrong...even so, comparing MG rds expenditure and sharpshooter rds expenditure, it is obvious that the latter is a cheaper alternative right? The terrain we face is vastly different from the desert. But I would argue even strongly that it is better for sharpshooters to operate. Using Vietnam as a comparative example, automatic weapon ammo expenditure worked out to about 50'000 per enemy casualty. On the other hand, marksman/sniper rds expenditure to kill ratio worked out to 1.7 : 1.
Secondly, I pointed to a dedicated sharpshooter rifle is simply becasue of wound ballistics. The normal 5.56mm round would bounce off tree branches and the like. It has been proven in Vietnam and even as recent as in Somalia, where specialized 5.56mm rounds weren't enough to stop Habr Gidr gunmen. 7.62mm rounds would penetrate...that's because of the stopping power. Again, its been proven in many conflicts.
I like your point on rear-area protection. To add on to that, we should conduct combined arms exercise more frequently with Logistics, simulating both ground delivery and airdrop. Have that rear-area reality factored in and emphasize on convoy protection. Funny thing is, you would have thought that the U.S. learned its lessons about convoy protection in Vietnam; convoy ambushes were commonplace back then...and armoured vehicles, especially Wheeled ones, were highly effective in dealing with that threat...so yeah, the Terrex might be a viable option.
hmm...alright..that's all for now... -
Agreed, Singapore infantry must become the most zhai around! If not even got super tanks or APCs also no use one.....