Found an interesting article:
Modifying the Abrams Tank
For Fighting in Urban Areasby Sergeant First Class Ira L. Partridge
The regimental commander was discussing the problems tanks might encounter in urban situations: “If we found ourselves in action in Bosnia, or in a new Somalia or Chechen-like scenario, how fast could we deploy a few M1 tanks that were specially modified for MOUT? A few of the right vehicles could make a big difference....”
He then suggested some features that would not cost much to add to the M1-series:
• A precision mounted .50 caliber capable of taking out a sniper at long range
• Grenade launchers that fire high explosive rounds
• Fiber-optic cameras to provide a buttoned-up crew a full range of view
• An automatic 7.62mm gun turret for the TC or loader’s hatch, capable of being aimed and fired from under armor
• Additional spaced armor on the turret
roof
• A new canister round in the basic
load
“These improvements could be accomplished fast in an emergency deployment,” he said. “If we work on the prototype now, and put some ideas to
work, we can make this a real option if
it is needed.”
Armor leaders have long acknowledged that the Abrams main battle tank (MBT) may have to fight in an urban environment, a mission commonly referred to as Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT). But it took until May of 2000 for the Army to open the first MOUT city specifically designed to train mounted warriors with Abrams tanks, along with the other members of
the combined arms team.
Two Ways to Approach MOUT Tactics
A combined arms team should always
be the primary maneuver force in
MOUT environments. The tank’s inherent features — a large caliber precision cannon, several machine guns mounted in stable cradles carrying more ammunition than two squads of infantry, and a moveable protective barrier — would be an undeniable asset to this combined arms team. Fighting in MOUT is slow and deliberate, regardless of the care given to protecting the force or civilian population. MOUT fighting also presents many tactical problems. The Israeli
Defense Force (IDF) and the Russian
Army are forces that have both recently conducted combat in MOUT environments, with each using fundamentally different tactics.
At one end of the spectrum are the
tactics used by the Russians in Chechnya. During combat operations between 1994 and 1996, the Russians suffered devastating losses in city fighting due to badly defined strategy, poor tactical maneuver, and inadequately protected vehicles. Their tactical solution, however, came at a price that would appall most Western powers. Russian forces, towards the end of the first Chechen war, adopted a scorched earth policy similar to tactics used during World War II. Air power and artillery were liberally used to reduce urban environments to rubble before maneuver forces would enter to mop things up.
The Russian weapon of choice for urban warfare in Chechnya seems to be the TOS-1 heavy flamethrower system, designed to defeat targets with the effects of high temperature and extreme pressure by firing 30 incendiary rockets singularly or in salvo.1 TOS-1s and
massed artillery became a way for the Russians to achieve a “bloodless” victory — for them. This combination of TOS-1s and artillery is capable of releasing
large clouds of flammable gas
and creating massive blasts that incinerate buildings and people.2 In the second Chechen war, Russian tactics have been similar. The following excerpt describes the outcome:
“Today, Grozny is no more. The
contrast between the damaged
Grozny before the latest battle
and the utter destruction afterwards could not be more pronounced. The literal leveling of the city points to lessons that the Russian Armed Forces learned
from their earlier battles for
Grozny.”
By removing the urban from urbanenvironment, Russian forces reduced the tactical problem presented and created a more favorable battlefield.
Israeli forces, on the other hand, demonstrated in the 1982 Lebanon campaign that MOUT operations are able to achieve tactical success without indiscriminate destruction or civilian casualties.
They learned that, in MOUT, infantry must advance dismounted as part of a combined arms team, and operational timetables cannot be set to keep pace with mounted maneuver forces.
By surrounding and isolating large urban areas, the IDF took a slow, deliberate, and systematic approach to successfully clear cities. Dividing and subdividing the MOUT into areas that were subsequently reduced using direct and indirect coordinated fires spared unnecessary collateral damage to property and the civilian population. If faced with a similar tactical fight in MOUT, the U.S. Army would likely use similar tactics.
But tactics and training are not the only areas the Army will have to master to succeed in MOUT as part of the combined arms team. Systems and components — preferably “off the shelf”— will be needed to improve the fightability and survivability of the Abrams tank in a MOUT environment.
The most effective combat technique
in MOUT fighting is for tanks and infantry to work together as part of a combined arms team. MOUT is not just an infantry problem, and effective use of armor in MOUT quickly becomes an issue when bullets are flying. According
to published doctrine, armored vehicles will face a variety of tactical problems and possibilities in MOUT environments. Issues like restricted movement, complicated and confused
command and control, and the canalizing
effects presented by buildings
will be unlike maneuvering in open
terrain. Additionally, the Abrams tank
has limitations imposed by its design — the first being its sheer size. Most tankers know first-hand the challenges of trying to negotiate a street or town with a behemoth 70 times larger than the typical vehicle. In addition, the
main gunÂ’s limits of elevation and depression
— and the traversing restrictions
imposed by narrow streets — will
hamper its effectiveness against targets in tall buildings and basements. A third problem is the dead space in the area immediately surrounding the tank. This dead space falls between the sides and
rear of the tank and the closest point
that can be seen through the vision
blocks. Another problem in the MOUT
environment is the tankÂ’s exposure to attack from above, which is an area that is not as heavily armored as the tankÂ’s frontal armor.
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http://call.army.mil/products/mout/misc-pubs/4mouttank.pdf[/b]