German Aircraft Carrier of WW2
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If Doenitz had the 300 U-boats he desired at the start of the conflict,could he have won the Battle of the Atlantic? This question is very debatable...Originally posted by APV97MCV91:Hello Doenitz
I read your post in which you mentioned that a guerre de course strategy has serious limitation. I am no suggesting that a guerre de course strategy is a replacement for a maritme strategy that aimed at command of the sea but rather in view of Germany position, a guerre de course would have to be the temporary expedient untill Germany complete the consolidation of its continental hegemonic position. .
The thing is would Doenitz have the chance to build 300 U-boats in the first place? The 1935 Anglo-German Naval Agreement capped the size of the Ubootwaffe at 45% of the Royal Navy's submarine arm,so even if Germany concentrated on building U-boats from the start,she was starting from a position of numerical superiority.Furthermore,the building up of the Ubootwaffe would not be allowed to go unchecked by the British just like in WW1.The British,not to mention the Americans would arguably,counter by improving their ASW defences.Not only that,the other two armed services were rearming also and their rearmament programs took predecence over that of the Navy.
But I do agree that the Ubootwaffe could be decisive in the critical months of the Battle of Britain.During this period,most of the Royal Navy light units-destroyers,frigates etc-so crucial to the Battle of the North Atlantic were used for coastal defense to hedge against a potential German cross-channel invasion.Not surprisely,it was during this period when the "Happy Times" occurred and Britain teetered on the verge of starvation again.Indeed,the "Happy Times" occurred with only a limited number of U-boats on station in the North Atlantic.12 ocean going types were diverted to provide succour to the Afrika Korps.What could have happened if all energies were concentrated on emasculating Britain's Sea Lines of Communications?
But it was quite unlikely that the war at sea would take centre stage as ultimately,the CinC of Germany,Hitler was a land animal.Hitler described himself as "a coward at sea but a hero on land."He was not cognizant of the importance of sea power.He adhered to Harold McKinder's concept of the "Heartland" instead of Mahan's tenet of "Command of the Seas". That is one of the main reason why he was so obessed with subjugating Russia.
Wowwww...this is the longest post I ever typed in Military Nuts....Hahaha...Most of my threads are in sggirls and Bar...as this could go on and on,guess I shall end here.
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lol i see myself like this in a few years like y ouOriginally posted by APV97MCV91:Hello Doenitz
You are doing a postgraduate in History? I think that would be a hugely interesting thing to do
Just out of curiosity...what will your thesis be on for you to delve into the Kriegsmarine pre war expansion program? I am in the navy and about to do a postgraduate course as well....though in something related to science and engineering maybe I will pursue one in history or strategy in the future I have a passion for history even prior to joining the service and it is fortunate that my hobby happens to have relevance in my profession. It is sad that in this age of high technology warfare, most military officers are too enarmored by technology to appreciate that the technology does not make strategy obsolescent and many of the principles of strategy and politics behind warfare are as relevant today as they were in the age of Napoleon or even that of the Greeks and Romans for what use is the finest weapons if you do not understand when where and how to use the weapons. It is truly sad to see that many military officers and I am not just stating SAF officers are just about as ignorant as military history as civilians.The best way to understand strategy is through the study of history eg Operatio Babarossa teaches us the danger of strategic overstretch, the inital Israeli setbacks in the Yom Kippur War teaches us the danger of military hubris......Like how the cliches goes "Those who fail to understand history are condemned to repeat it......" 
oh and what does "guerre de course" mean ar?Hello 05
dun worry pal u dun insult me i dun insult u..
Before I comment on your points, I just want to say that our discussions and disagreements are nothing personal and let us not get too heated up by the disagreements. This may sound a bit frivolous but I have seen discussions degenerated in this forum into shouting matches because of strong disagreement if you disagree state your point and if possible a nice piece of reading material for me to go look at and analyse myself 
The thing about the RN during the inter war years is that the british already had some ships being built and the cost of scaping those ships would be more then to finish building them....so they continued even if those ships were outdated.Thus ensuring that even though they might have more ships those ships are not worth half of an enemy ship.Also the british were very weary of Japnese ambitions in the pacific that was why they built the Singapore Naval base.To house an emergancy response squradron should it to be needed.But yea the USN was a major player in the Pacific but their Fleet was stationed on their home shores and not in Pearl thus making their fleet way to far away.Also some pacific fleet ships were rotated to the Alantic.
As for the Kerigmarine well Plan Z and the ships that were borned out of it was light and good for the Norway attack though not built for it.However navy as always in Germany never got the funding it needed!Z Plan's completetion would not have meant that the German fleet was a threat it was made to simply enable Germany to have a fleet that would be able to mantain Germany's power in it's own waters.The Germans were moving alot into the area of using commerce raiders more then a big surface fleet action which would not be good.Also i disagree about the German's having lesser naval tech,as the German ships generally had better fire contorl,sighting system,navigation and detection system.
[quote]The replies to my thread are definitely not by novices.I wonder if you people read such things for recreation or you are into serious research like me? I am a postgraduate in History.[/quote
Err......i'm 18 in a few days and i waiting for Poly to start....so yea i do this for recreation. -
I am impressed with all the information posted here...I always feel that military buffs are more into armies and air forces than the perenial bridesmaids,navies. People seemed to be more interested in "garang" special forces and the more "glamorous" fighter jets rather than some strange looking boats.
Frankly,I know nuts about land warfare.I know quite a bit about airpower especially naval airpower.Hahaha -
heh well for me it's like this......i like warfare so i started reading about ww2 and how airpower was used the 1st time in such a scale.....but that lead to reading about land armies and the british navy.All that made me read about the cause of the war....which made my find out about ww1....and that lead me to the franco prussian war....and the napoleanic wars and so on so fought until the classical wars ahha long story lahOriginally posted by Doenitz:I am impressed with all the information posted here...I always feel that military buffs are more into armies and air forces than the perenial bridesmaids,navies. People seemed to be more interested in "garang" special forces and the more "glamorous" fighter jets rather than some strange looking boats.
Frankly,I know nuts about land warfare.I know quite a bit about airpower especially naval airpower.Hahaha
But everything is connected.War is about combined-arms as much as it is about tri service operations -
I like reading about the politics of the wars of unification.How Bismarck altered the telegram from the French ambassador,how Bismarck manipulated France and Austria..that sort of thing...Originally posted by |-|05|:heh well for me it's like this......i like warfare so i started reading about ww2 and how airpower was used the 1st time in such a scale.....but that lead to reading about land armies and the british navy.All that made me read about the cause of the war....which made my find out about ww1....and that lead me to the franco prussian war....and the napoleanic wars and so on so fought until the classical wars ahha long story lah
But everything is connected.War is about combined-arms as much as it is about tri service operations -
ahhhh that haha quite interesting also but sometimes politics bored me.Originally posted by Doenitz:I like reading about the politics of the wars of unification.How Bismarck altered the telegram from the French ambassador,how Bismarck manipulated France and Austria..that sort of thing... -
[quote]Originally posted by |-|05|:
[b]
dun worry pal u dun insult me i dun insult u.. if you disagree state your point and if possible a nice piece of reading material for me to go look at and analyse myself
The thing about the RN during the inter war years is that the british already had some ships being built and the cost of scaping those ships would be more then to finish building them....so they continued even if those ships were outdated.Thus ensuring that even though they might have more ships those ships are not worth half of an enemy ship.Also the british were very weary of Japnese ambitions in the pacific that was why they built the Singapore Naval base.To house an emergancy response squradron should it to be needed.But yea the USN was a major player in the Pacific but their Fleet was stationed on their home shores and not in Pearl thus making their fleet way to far away.Also some pacific fleet ships were rotated to the Alantic.
As for the Kerigmarine well Plan Z and the ships that were borned out of it was light and good for the Norway attack though not built for it.However navy as always in Germany never got the funding it needed!Z Plan's completetion would not have meant that the German fleet was a threat it was made to simply enable Germany to have a fleet that would be able to mantain Germany's power in it's own waters.The Germans were moving alot into the area of using commerce raiders more then a big surface fleet action which would not be good.Also i disagree about the German's having lesser naval tech,as the German ships generally had better fire contorl,sighting system,navigation and detection system.
The British did recognised that the Japanese would be a threat to their Asian colonies in the interwar years and I agree with you that the construction of the Singapore Naval Base was in recognition of that threat. However the construction of the base does not neccessarily means that the British feel that they have the capability to defend their asiatic colonies. The construction of the base was slow in the 1920s and only picked up in the 1930s under recognition of Japanese expansionistic tendencies especially in the 1933 Manchurian Incident. The fact the British refused to base their a fleet here and instead intend to dispatch a fleet here was illuminative of British strategic thoughts. In view of the political situation of the 1930s, the British began to appreciate that the possible prospect of a renewed war with a rearmed Germany and a resurgent Japan. There was implict recognition that a strong fleet would only be sent to Singapore should there not be a requirement for their basing in the Home Islands in a European conflict. If the British had not abandoned their global defense concept of the 19th and early 20th century, a fleet would probably be assigned on permanent station in Singapore togather with the base. What good would be a base without a fleet? In the end, Force K was dispatched to Singapore and in retrospect it was difficult to envisioned what the British hope to achieve against a Japanese invasion fleet covered by a task force involving at least 2 Fleet carriers. I bring up this point in support of my argument that the RN has switched its focus to the security of its home waters as mentioned in my earlier posts. The building up of its Eastern Fleet from 1943 onwards should be viewed in light that the European naval threat has subsided sufficiently for the build up of this fleet. After all, what good are battleships and fleet air craft carriers in the anti submarine war? An interesting side note to this was that in 1940/41 before Pearl Harbor, the British mooted to the Americans that they should shift their Pacific Fleet to Singapore but fortunately for the Americans, they turned down the offer.
It should be noted that the USN shifted its Pacific Fleet from the West Coast to Pearl Harbor in the mid 1930s in recognition of the Japanese threat and a view of the ORBAT would indicate that the majority of the principal surface combatants such as battleships and aircraft carriers were on rotation to the Pacific Fleet for a significantly longer period than they were to the Atlantic Fleet.
As for the Kriegsmarine, it is not surprising that the Kriegsmarine never did received the amount of funding it received. It is rare for a country to maintain both a strong navy and a strong army at the same time and you or Doenitz did mentioned that Germany recognised that she is first and foremost a landpower. I do not think Plan Z was meant merely for the protection of her home waters. Germany natural homewaters would be the Baltics and in the confined waters of the Skagerrak, perharps a different fleet structure instead of one with ocean going U Boats, aircraft carriers and battle ships would be more appropriate. However if you view the North Sea as Germany homewaters, the perharps your argument would be justified in view of the Germans experience of the British WW1 blockade. How can it be that a fleet envisioned under Plan Z is not viewed as a threat by the British? It is analogous to building 4 modern 12000 tons amphibious assault ships and claiming that they were meant for army transport and training
The local media description of their role is simply hilarious sometimes but I think the word Amphious Assault Capability is a rather dirty word in the language of the SAF which it is euphemistically termed "Land - Sea" movement. Naval technology wise, I am not saying that the Germans were inferior but me stating that the Germans lost the technological war should be viewed in context of the post which I mentioned - The U Boat war. The developement of the the shipboard centrimetric band radar, shipboard high frequency radio direction finding, escort carriers and long range ASW aircrafts all spelt the death knell of the U Boat arm. I recommend 2 books if you are interested in the U Boat War, both of which were written by this author called Clay Blair. (The Hunter - 1939 to 1942) (The Hunted - 1943-1945). These 2 books are comprehensive histories of the U Boat campaign. I share your sentiments on the superiority of the Germans technology you mentioned - The engagement between the Bismarck and the Hood/Prince of Wales is the best example of the mentioned superiority. -
Well honestly the U-boat arm was doomed from the start.The British had learnt from their ww1 experience and started convoy system almost at the start.The only ships not protacted were the erm......certain boats which had their own arms or were faster then 21knots.Those were sunk in quite some numbers but not really enough.Also the british was highly advanced in ASW so the u-boat was once again at an disadvantage.As for the surface fleet i erm...forgot wad was on difference ahha
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Where are you studying now?
ah, i'm taking o level this year. dont know whether i should go to JC or poly. i got no amaths. -
I shared your bleak prognosis of the U Boat arm but then I still feel that if the Germans had sufficient U Boats in 1939 and 1940 before the OPEN entry of the Americans into the war and the mobilisation of Allied resources, the outcome of the Atlantic campaign might have been very different. I think most of the merchant ships regardless of their speed were convoyed (convoy designation such as SX -slow convoy and HX - fast convoy). As for the armed merchant ships, I think you are refering to the Q ships which are armed with medium calibre guns normally of 4 - 5 inch calibre. This scheme exploited the fact that the U Boats prefer to surface and sink lone merchant ships by shelling with their deck gun rather expend valuable and scarce torpedoes. However this scheme was quickly abandoned. Besides the advantages that we have discussed in the post, another significant factor that contributed to the Allied victory but often overlooked was the Liberty merchant ship program which was essentially a merchant ship design that allowed for ease of construction involving extensive use of prefabricated parts. The adoption of this design allowed American shipyards to boost their production significantly and hence allowed the losses to U Boat to be made good. Disadvantage of the Kriegsmarine surface combatants - I think it will probably be the absence of naval aviation and insufficient numbers. Then again it would probably not be feasible for Germany to build such a fleet as I have argued earlier.Originally posted by |-|05|:Well honestly the U-boat arm was doomed from the start.The British had learnt from their ww1 experience and started convoy system almost at the start.The only ships not protacted were the erm......certain boats which had their own arms or were faster then 21knots.Those were sunk in quite some numbers but not really enough.Also the british was highly advanced in ASW so the u-boat was once again at an disadvantage.As for the surface fleet i erm...forgot wad was on difference ahha -
Well If going University is your goal, then perharps going to JC would be a safer bet. It is easier for you to qualify for university through the JC route than the poly route. But bear in mind that an A Level cert is worth much less than a poly diploma. You also need to think about what you want - If you want a more hands on education than probably poly would be better - A level has quite a lot of theoryOriginally posted by SingaporeMacross:ah, i'm taking o level this year. dont know whether i should go to JC or poly. i got no amaths.
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You seem to know a lot more than me.Used to digest a lot of such things when I was younger.For example,I know the aircraft complements of HIJMS Shokakau and Zuikaku during the Battle of the Philippine Sea were 27 Zekes,27 Judys,21 Jills each.Yeah,I even managed to assemble my own carrier task force from the Tamiya waterline series.But nowadays,more interesting in watching footie and skirt-chasing instead of reading such stuff.Do you study history at tertiary level?Originally posted by |-|05|:Well honestly the U-boat arm was doomed from the start.The British had learnt from their ww1 experience and started convoy system almost at the start.The only ships not protacted were the erm......certain boats which had their own arms or were faster then 21knots.Those were sunk in quite some numbers but not really enough.Also the british was highly advanced in ASW so the u-boat was once again at an disadvantage.As for the surface fleet i erm...forgot wad was on difference ahha -
[quote]Originally posted by APV97MCV91:
[b]
I shared your bleak prognosis of the U Boat arm but then I still feel that if the Germans had sufficient U Boats in 1939 and 1940 before the OPEN entry of the Americans into the war and the mobilisation of Allied resources, the outcome of the Atlantic campaign might have been very different.
If Doenitz had the 300 U-boats he desired at the start of the conflict,could he have won the Battle of the Atlantic? This question is very debatable...
The thing is would Doenitz have the chance to build 300 U-boats in the first place? The 1935 Anglo-German Naval Agreement capped the size of the Ubootwaffe at 45% of the Royal Navy's submarine arm,so even if Germany concentrated on building U-boats from the start,she was starting from a position of numerical superiority.Furthermore,the building up of the Ubootwaffe would not be allowed to go unchecked by the British just like in WW1.The British,not to mention the Americans would arguably,counter by improving their ASW defences.Not only that,the other two armed services were rearming also and their rearmament programs took predecence over that of the Navy.
So it is unlikely that Doenitz might have the chance to assemble a fleet of 300 U-boats before the start of hostilities. -
Yea the Liberty program and also the Canadian naval yards building the Standard British covette helpped almost double the number of escots for the convey.Yes there were SX and HX convoys but there was an indepentdent ship program which had ships faster then 21knots since they could out run the U-boats but those ships were generally smaller or passenger carrying ships/ferries.i Highly doubt the U-boat fleet could have done anymore then they did....though if they had better range the could be convoy raiders like the bismark.Also using them in the med would have been much much better.Maybe they could have used the u-boat wolfpack the take out the home fleet or at least 1 sqn of RN ships would have been nice.Originally posted by APV97MCV91:I shared your bleak prognosis of the U Boat arm but then I still feel that if the Germans had sufficient U Boats in 1939 and 1940 before the OPEN entry of the Americans into the war and the mobilisation of Allied resources, the outcome of the Atlantic campaign might have been very different. I think most of the merchant ships regardless of their speed were convoyed (convoy designation such as SX -slow convoy and HX - fast convoy). As for the armed merchant ships, I think you are refering to the Q ships which are armed with medium calibre guns normally of 4 - 5 inch calibre. This scheme exploited the fact that the U Boats prefer to surface and sink lone merchant ships by shelling with their deck gun rather expend valuable and scarce torpedoes. However this scheme was quickly abandoned. Besides the advantages that we have discussed in the post, another significant factor that contributed to the Allied victory but often overlooked was the Liberty merchant ship program which was essentially a merchant ship design that allowed for ease of construction involving extensive use of prefabricated parts. The adoption of this design allowed American shipyards to boost their production significantly and hence allowed the losses to U Boat to be made good. Disadvantage of the Kriegsmarine surface combatants - I think it will probably be the absence of naval aviation and insufficient numbers. Then again it would probably not be feasible for Germany to build such a fleet as I have argued earlier. -
I also prefer to chase skirts and watch football and stuff ahha.I only in poly now taking engineering.....i stopped taking history at sec 2 but i still read books to pass timeOriginally posted by Doenitz:You seem to know a lot more than me.Used to digest a lot of such things when I was younger.For example,I know the aircraft complements of HIJMS Shokakau and Zuikaku during the Battle of the Philippine Sea were 27 Zekes,27 Judys,21 Jills each.Yeah,I even managed to assemble my own carrier task force from the Tamiya waterline series.But nowadays,more interesting in watching footie and skirt-chasing instead of reading such stuff.Do you study history at tertiary level? -
hello 05
I stand corrected on the issue of the independent sailing by fast merchant ships . I do not understand your sentence If the U Boats had longer range, they could be convoy raiders like the Bismarck I thought the U Boats were already convoy raiders? As for the issue of using them in the Med, I think that would be an unwise tactical decision. Why would you want to divert your forces from the main theatre of operation - The Atlantic? Between the India - Britain convoys and the US-Britain convoys, I think the value of the latter would be much greater than the former. Moreover, only a few of the German U Boats diverted to the Med were able to emerge safely from the Med - The transit of the Straits of Gibraltar was especially hazardous. The U Boats diverted to the Med were hence effectively locked in the Med. I grant you the fact that the ASW conditions in the Med were terrible - High acoustic background and poor sound transmission etc. The British submarines based in Malta and Gibraltar did have an excellent campaign though but there was no requirement for them to be in the Atlantic. Using the U Boats to take out the Home Fleet would have been a misapplication of resources. As attractive as idea of taking out combatants were, the Atlantic Campaign was ultimately about the economic strangulation of Britain and hence taking out a tanker would be much better than taking out a cruiser. The risks were greater and the possible returns lower. To support my argument on this, I would point to the case of the Japanese submarine policy. The I Boats were designed with fleet action in mind and they were not unleashed on an organised commerce hunting campaign. The returns of the I Boats on warships were rather mediocre but at because of this decision, the Allies convoy in the Pacific were pretty much unmolested to the extent that by 1944, the Allies merchant vessels were travelling the Pacific unescorted and unconvoyed. I have 2 major critique of the U Boats operation. The 1st one was the inflexibility of the command and control system. Upon sighting of the convoy, direction of the convoy battle were shifted to U Boat HQ in Kerneval. The rationale was that the HQ would have a more holistic picture and hence better able to direct their operations to maximise impact. The downside of this was that the HQ have no inkling of the actual tactical conditions and the commanders were not free to pursue better options. Coordinating the wolf packs also generated large amount of signal traffic and with the advent of shipboard HFDF and the breaking of Engima, it allowed for the tracking of the U Boats and contributed to their destruction. A better model of tactical control would be the American method whereby the subs operated in packs of 3 or 4 with a local senior commander in full tactical control and minimal HQ interference. The 2nd main criticism was the very poor interservice cooperation between the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe. Insignificant aircraft were allocated to the U Boat campaign and even these were allocated grudgingly. Coordination of the air support and U Boat operation was minimal as well. This deprived the U Boats of intelligence and tactical support.
Doenitz
I read your post on the possibility of Germany having 300 U Boats on the eve. I was not aware of the cap on U Boat strength in the Anglo - German Naval treaty of 1933 and will find out more about it. Your arguments about the possibility makes sense and I thank you for this viewpoint. The Great Marianas Turkey Shoot - That was an anticlimax in view of the quality of the kido butai at that time. Nonetheless there were some interesting tactical decisions in that battle IE the concesssion of first strike against the orthodoxy of carrier warface by Spruance to the Japanese. Personally I find Midway a much more illuminative example of carrier warfare. -
Originally posted by APV97MCV91:
hmm.......makes sense...though the uboats could and were transported via rail to italy.But by sinking convoys in the med and with longer ranger the U-boats to seige the African coast,and the suez and maybe even Gilbratar they could have prevented troops from going into Africa and maybe win that place thus preventing the need for Stalingrad and the cacause(sic) fields.And to expand on ur Luftwaffe and uboat's poor interservice well the Germans did lack a long range bomber.heck they could hardly hit targets in Britian!.Basically i believe the Germans screwed their chances with a few key mistakes.
hello 05
I stand corrected on the issue of the independent sailing by fast merchant ships . I do not understand your sentence [b]If the U Boats had longer range, they could be convoy raiders like the Bismarck I thought the U Boats were already convoy raiders? As for the issue of using them in the Med, I think that would be an unwise tactical decision. Why would you want to divert your forces from the main theatre of operation - The Atlantic? Between the India - Britain convoys and the US-Britain convoys, I think the value of the latter would be much greater than the former. Moreover, only a few of the German U Boats diverted to the Med were able to emerge safely from the Med - The transit of the Straits of Gibraltar was especially hazardous. The U Boats diverted to the Med were hence effectively locked in the Med. I grant you the fact that the ASW conditions in the Med were terrible - High acoustic background and poor sound transmission etc. The British submarines based in Malta and Gibraltar did have an excellent campaign though but there was no requirement for them to be in the Atlantic. Using the U Boats to take out the Home Fleet would have been a misapplication of resources. As attractive as idea of taking out combatants were, the Atlantic Campaign was ultimately about the economic strangulation of Britain and hence taking out a tanker would be much better than taking out a cruiser. The risks were greater and the possible returns lower. To support my argument on this, I would point to the case of the Japanese submarine policy. The I Boats were designed with fleet action in mind and they were not unleashed on an organised commerce hunting campaign. The returns of the I Boats on warships were rather mediocre but at because of this decision, the Allies convoy in the Pacific were pretty much unmolested to the extent that by 1944, the Allies merchant vessels were travelling the Pacific unescorted and unconvoyed. I have 2 major critique of the U Boats operation. The 1st one was the inflexibility of the command and control system. Upon sighting of the convoy, direction of the convoy battle were shifted to U Boat HQ in Kerneval. The rationale was that the HQ would have a more holistic picture and hence better able to direct their operations to maximise impact. The downside of this was that the HQ have no inkling of the actual tactical conditions and the commanders were not free to pursue better options. Coordinating the wolf packs also generated large amount of signal traffic and with the advent of shipboard HFDF and the breaking of Engima, it allowed for the tracking of the U Boats and contributed to their destruction. A better model of tactical control would be the American method whereby the subs operated in packs of 3 or 4 with a local senior commander in full tactical control and minimal HQ interference. The 2nd main criticism was the very poor interservice cooperation between the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe. Insignificant aircraft were allocated to the U Boat campaign and even these were allocated grudgingly. Coordination of the air support and U Boat operation was minimal as well. This deprived the U Boats of intelligence and tactical support.
[/b] -
Conversation between Adolf Hitler and Commander Reinhard Hardegen of the Ubootwaffe on 13 May 1942(Cmdr Hardegen was at a dinner with the Fuehrer after receiving the KnightÂ’s Cross for exemplary performance. Also present were generals from the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe)
Hardegen: It was a great mistake abolishing the naval air arm, my Fuehrer
Hitler(surprised): What?
Hardegen: The Ubootwaffe desperately needs air coverage of its own-Focke Wulf 200 Kondor long-range reconnaissance planes to find convoys at sea, and the new Heinkel HE-177s, which not only have the range and fighting power to join us in attacking the convoys but also have the guns to take on the English aircraft over the Bay of Biscay
Hitler: I donÂ’t think you quite understand our military priorities, young manÂ…
Hardegen: Another thing, my Fuehrer. We would never have lost the Bismarck if you had allowed our aircraft carrier Graf Zeppelin to be completed. Its planes would have turned back the English attackersÂ…and Navy planes can drop torpedoes. Look at what the Italians did in the Mediterranean, and the Japanese at Pearl Harbour.
(Everyone at the dining table was frozen in silence by then at the impetuosity of this lowly Kriegsmarine officer)
Hardegen: You will forgive me, my Fuehrer if I say that you make the mistake of looking only to the east, while the war will be won or lost in the west-at sea.
Hitler(red in the face): Reichsmarshall Goering is enjoying great success with our air forces. He has our aviation strategies correctly in hand. We will have no more talk about these matters. -
Thanks Doenitz for posting this gem of a conversationOriginally posted by Doenitz:Conversation between Adolf Hitler and Commander Reinhard Hardegen of the Ubootwaffe on 13 May 1942(Cmdr Hardegen was at a dinner with the Fuehrer after receiving the KnightÂ’s Cross for exemplary performance. Also present were generals from the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe)
Hardegen: It was a great mistake abolishing the naval air arm, my Fuehrer
Hitler(surprised): What?
Hardegen: The Ubootwaffe desperately needs air coverage of its own-Focke Wulf 200 Kondor long-range reconnaissance planes to find convoys at sea, and the new Heinkel HE-177s, which not only have the range and fighting power to join us in attacking the convoys but also have the guns to take on the English aircraft over the Bay of Biscay
Hitler: I donÂ’t think you quite understand our military priorities, young manÂ…
Hardegen: Another thing, my Fuehrer. We would never have lost the Bismarck if you had allowed our aircraft carrier Graf Zeppelin to be completed. Its planes would have turned back the English attackersÂ…and Navy planes can drop torpedoes. Look at what the Italians did in the Mediterranean, and the Japanese at Pearl Harbour.
(Everyone at the dining table was frozen in silence by then at the impetuosity of this lowly Kriegsmarine officer)
Hardegen: You will forgive me, my Fuehrer if I say that you make the mistake of looking only to the east, while the war will be won or lost in the west-at sea.
Hitler(red in the face): Reichsmarshall Goering is enjoying great success with our air forces. He has our aviation strategies correctly in hand. We will have no more talk about these matters. Hardegen correctly surmised the potential and possibilites offered by naval aviation to the U Boat arm. It was fortunate for the Allies that Germany lacks more of such officers who dare to tell the truth instead of sycophants like Goering. There was mentioned of what the Italians did in the Med 
I think it will be more of what the British did to the Italians in the Med - Doenitz I am sure you would have heard of Taranto The last statement by Hitler was a joke. Success with our air force? After the humilation of the Battle of Britain? - Aviation strategy? Tasking a tactical oriented air force with strategic mission? I hope the RSAF will not forget the needs of the RSN in a conflict in view of the heavy demands placed on their resources in times of war. With the retirement of the Skyhawks which currently fulfill the maritime strike role, I would be interested to know which aircraft will be tasked as their replacement. -
Thanks Doenitz for posting this gem of a conversationOriginally posted by Doenitz:Conversation between Adolf Hitler and Commander Reinhard Hardegen of the Ubootwaffe on 13 May 1942(Cmdr Hardegen was at a dinner with the Fuehrer after receiving the KnightÂ’s Cross for exemplary performance. Also present were generals from the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe)
Hardegen: It was a great mistake abolishing the naval air arm, my Fuehrer
Hitler(surprised): What?
Hardegen: The Ubootwaffe desperately needs air coverage of its own-Focke Wulf 200 Kondor long-range reconnaissance planes to find convoys at sea, and the new Heinkel HE-177s, which not only have the range and fighting power to join us in attacking the convoys but also have the guns to take on the English aircraft over the Bay of Biscay
Hitler: I donÂ’t think you quite understand our military priorities, young manÂ…
Hardegen: Another thing, my Fuehrer. We would never have lost the Bismarck if you had allowed our aircraft carrier Graf Zeppelin to be completed. Its planes would have turned back the English attackersÂ…and Navy planes can drop torpedoes. Look at what the Italians did in the Mediterranean, and the Japanese at Pearl Harbour.
(Everyone at the dining table was frozen in silence by then at the impetuosity of this lowly Kriegsmarine officer)
Hardegen: You will forgive me, my Fuehrer if I say that you make the mistake of looking only to the east, while the war will be won or lost in the west-at sea.
Hitler(red in the face): Reichsmarshall Goering is enjoying great success with our air forces. He has our aviation strategies correctly in hand. We will have no more talk about these matters. Hardegen correctly surmised the potential and possibilites offered by naval aviation to the U Boat arm. It was fortunate for the Allies that Germany lacks more of such officers who dare to tell the truth instead of sycophants like Goering. There was mentioned of what the Italians did in the Med I think it will be more of what the British did to the Italians in the Med - Doenitz I am sure you would have heard of Taranto The last statement by Hitler was a joke. Success with our air force? After the humilation of the Battle of Britain? Claiming that the Luftwaffe can supply the besieged 6th Army at Stalingrad and hence making Hitler prohibit their earlier breakout and withdrawal - Aviation strategy? Tasking a tactical oriented air force with strategic mission? I hope the RSAF will not forget the needs of the RSN in a conflict in view of the heavy demands placed on their resources in times of war. With the retirement of the Skyhawks which currently fulfill the maritime strike role, I would be interested to know which aircraft will be tasked as their replacement. -
the Forkker loh...yes it can carry harpoonsOriginally posted by APV97MCV91:Thanks Doenitz for posting this gem of a conversation Hardegen correctly surmised the potential and possibilites offered by naval aviation to the U Boat arm. It was fortunate for the Allies that Germany lacks more of such officers who dare to tell the truth instead of sycophants like Goering. There was mentioned of what the Italians did in the Med I think it will be more of what the British did to the Italians in the Med - Doenitz I am sure you would have heard of Taranto The last statement by Hitler was a joke. Success with our air force? After the humilation of the Battle of Britain? Claiming that the Luftwaffe can supply the besieged 6th Army at Stalingrad and hence making Hitler prohibit their earlier breakout and withdrawal - Aviation strategy? Tasking a tactical oriented air force with strategic mission? I hope the RSAF will not forget the needs of the RSN in a conflict in view of the heavy demands placed on their resources in times of war. With the retirement of the Skyhawks which currently fulfill the maritime strike role, I would be interested to know which aircraft will be tasked as their replacement. -
Can the Fokker patrol plane carry Harpoons?Originally posted by APV97MCV91:I hope the RSAF will not forget the needs of the RSN in a conflict in view of the heavy demands placed on their resources in times of war. With the retirement of the Skyhawks which currently fulfill the maritime strike role, I would be interested to know which aircraft will be tasked as their replacement. -
You people should have heard of the message from Nimitz to Halsey in the heat of the Battle of Cape Engano on 26 October 1944:"Where is TF34,rpt,where is TF34? The world wonders." Halsey was incensed by the second part of the message as he did not know that it was padding to throw enemy intelligence off balance.Instead,Halsey felt that it was directed at him...
Recently,a misunderstanding between a friend and I occurred due to misperceptions like the one I mentioned above... -
FM: CINCPACOriginally posted by Doenitz:You people should have heard of the message from Nimitz to Halsey in the heat of the Battle of Cape Engano on 26 October 1944:"Where is TF34,rpt,where is TF34? The world wonders." Halsey was incensed by the second part of the message as he did not know that it was padding to throw enemy intelligence off balance.Instead,Halsey felt that it was directed at him...
Recently,a misunderstanding between a friend and I occurred due to misperceptions like the one I mentioned above...
TO: COM3FLT
BT
TURKEY TROTS TO WATER
BT
WHERE IS TASKFORCE 34?
BT
THE WORLD WONDERS -
FM: CINCPACOriginally posted by Doenitz:You people should have heard of the message from Nimitz to Halsey in the heat of the Battle of Cape Engano on 26 October 1944:"Where is TF34,rpt,where is TF34? The world wonders." Halsey was incensed by the second part of the message as he did not know that it was padding to throw enemy intelligence off balance.Instead,Halsey felt that it was directed at him...
Recently,a misunderstanding between a friend and I occurred due to misperceptions like the one I mentioned above...
TO: COM3FLT
BT
TURKEY TROTS TO WATER
BT
WHERE IS TASKFORCE 34?
BT
THE WORLD WONDERS
I think that was the actual message but the communication ensign who deciphered the signal thought that THE WORLD WONDERS might be have significance and hence when the message was passed to Halsey, It became what you said. That was one of my favourite radio message in the world Anyway Halsey deserved that reprimand if ever so. He fell for the trap and gave misleading assurance that TF34 (his battleships and cruisers) were guarding the San Bernandino Straits but in actual fact there was nothing there. What happened next between the Taffys and Kurita fleet became legendary