Arizona Co. with Fleet of A-4 Skyhawks Taps Huge Training Market
By William B. Scott
August 3, 2003
PHOENIX AIR FORCE
For years, ex-fighter pilots having an entrepreneurial bent have extolled the benefits allied nations and the Pentagon could realize by outsourcing tactical pilot training. Private firms could provide economical "red air" or adversary fighter services, fly cruise and sea-skimming missile profiles, carry electronic warfare jamming pods and simulate "enemy" strikers attacking land- and sea-based targets--all for less money than military forces spend doing these tasks in-house.
All the startups needed was a fleet of retired U.S. Air Force, Navy or Marine Corps fighter-bombers, and there were plenty of those sitting in the Arizona desert--the Pentagon's "boneyard." And that's where the dreams and good ideas usually hit a wall. The Pentagon had dozens of valid reasons why high-performance military aircraft couldn't be transferred to a private company. Yes, a few retired fighters, trainers and strike aircraft were "bailed" or leased to companies for specific purposes, such as flight testing, but these were typically limited-time deals for specific purposes. All had to be "in the best interests of the U.S. government."
Importing fast-jets from other nations--even if they had originally come from the U.S. under foreign military sales programs--also proved problematic. Again, a few companies, such as BAE Systems (originally Flight Systems Inc.) and the National Test Pilot School at Mojave, Calif., were allowed to bring a handful of F-86s, T-33s, Swedish Drakens and other aging fighters and trainers into the country for well-defined training and flight-testing purposes.
Most fledgling training-services companies' business plans died before all the regulatory and licensing hurdles could be jumped. Typically, their sources of financing lacked the requisite depth, patience and enthusiasm, and investors were rarely convinced there was a long-term business case that made fiscal sense.
Despite often-sincere encouragement from USAF and Navy and allied leaders, when it came down to signing a contract for commercial high-performance aircraft services, the customer usually backed down. Budgets were typical culprits. Regardless of reasons given, someone in the armed services usually decided the best approach was to continue performing most of the "red air" adversary, target-towing, missile simulation and other training activities in-house, using their own aircraft and crews. The rationale was, "this is flying time for our crews, and we've already paid for them and the aircraft. We might as well use them rather than pay an outsider to provide the same services."
But the age of outsourcing advanced tactical training and training support services may have finally arrived--and with a vengeance. Downsized force structures, ever-leaner budgets and a profusion of global commitments have squeezed active-duty and reserve military air components to exhaustion. Aircrews who were deployed to Afghanistan, Iraq and other hot spots now return to the U.S. in need of rest and retraining to ensure they are mission-ready for yet another deployment. None are too enthused about going to Red Flag, Maple Flag or some other major exercise to fly as simulated enemy adversaries or "red air." This applies equally to both active-duty and reserve crews.
SIMILARLY, AIRCRAFT often return in need of maintenance, and many have consumed engine and airframe lifetime at rates exceeding what the services had expected. In other words, both people and aircraft are wearing out from real-word commitments the U.S. has assumed. With few exceptions, there simply aren't enough pilots and aircraft available to deliver the thousands of sorties required for adequate domestic and allied training anymore.
The 57th Wing at Nellis AFB, Nev., which runs periodic large-force Red Flag exercises and oversees the USAF Weapons School, has an estimated annual requirement for 9,125 adversary sorties. Its 414th Combat Training Sqdn. serves as red-air aggressors, but has been reduced to a handful of aircraft, and must be augmented by other units.
A January 2001 Defense Science Board report prepared by the Task Force on Training Superiority and Training Surprise identified a number of Air Force and Navy training shortfalls. Addressing the deterioration of adversary or "opposition force" (Opfor) units at Nellis and the Navy's Air Warfare Center at Naval Air Station Fallon, Nev., the report noted:
*In 1989, Nellis had four active-duty aggressor squadrons, each with 24 dissimilar aircraft (fighters of different types than "blue-air" or friendly aircraft). By December 1999, Nellis' stable of aggressors had shrunk to 8-10 dedicated F-16s, "all old and unreliable," the report said.
*Navy-Fallon went from four active-duty adversary squadrons, each with more than 20 dissimilar aircraft, in 1994 to "23 old dissimilar aircraft" limited to 3-g maneuvers and flown by Reserve pilots, plus 15 flyable F-18s and five F-14s in 1999.
*Both of these combat training centers can only field "antiquated EW [electronic warfare] for the Opfor" and have "limited maintenance and support budgets."
*"The 1999 cost to upgrade NAS Fallon EW and provide 18 dissimilar Opfor aircraft (F-16s) [is approximately] $940 million."
The report noted: "The Air Force decided years ago to forgo a substantial dedicated air opposing force (aggressor squadrons). 'Red' aircraft in [USAF] Red Flag Exercises are now manned mostly by active-duty pilots who, with their aircraft, are borrowed from other squadrons. These pilots receive negative training for the time spent trying to imitate enemy tactics. Moreover, the aircraft used are not 'dissimilar.' . . . This seriously degrades the training experience.
" . . . A key element missing from even the most-demanding training programs . . . is the notion of a dedicated opposing force that provides realistic simulation of enemy action," the report concluded.
Several commercial firms are offering to fill this widening gap between military training requirements and the Pentagon's ability to provide it. Others have tried and largely failed in the past, to be sure. But the business environment may be substantially different this time. Now, even big-name aerospace company executives believe the U.S. and allied military forces are in a position where they will accept--and pay for--outside training support services, and are jockeying to grab a portion of what may become billion-dollar contracts.
THREE YEARS AGO, a U.S. Navy vice admiral told Larry (Hoss) Pearson--a former U.S. Navy Blue Angels flight demonstration team commander, combat veteran and test pilot--"You should get into foreign military pilot training, because the Navy is getting out of it. With the downsizing, we're not going to be able to continue doing it." Pearson is now chairman and CEO of Advanced Training Systems International (ATSI) Inc., based here at the former Williams AFB, now called Williams Gateway Airport.
At that time, the Navy was facing a $10-billion budget cut over five years; $5 billion was to be absorbed by naval aviation. Immediately, three electronic-warfare training squadrons that provided jamming services for surface ships were disbanded--50 aircraft and about 500 people, Pearson estimated. Since then, the number of worldwide adversary units have been cut severely, and Navy-provided slots for training Kuwaiti, Saudi Arabian, Spanish, Italian and other foreign pilots also have all but disappeared.
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