Eurofighter Typhoon service entry looms at last
Aviation Week & Space Technology
06/16/2003, page 128
Douglas Barrie
Munich
The Tranche 1 buy comprises 148 aircraft. Two further tranches are also covered by a 620-aircraft umbrella contract between the partner nations and industry.
However, once more in keeping with the partner nations' apparent inability to follow any path of least resistance, in parallel with service introduction, the four also are trying to hammer out the production contract on Tranche 2, recast its scope and possibly draw in elements of Tranche 3. As if this were not challenging enough, there are also indications the British government is being forced to reconsider acquisition numbers, which now stand at 232 with an option for a further 60. Meanwhile, the RAF has torn up its long-standing fielding plan in order to better reflect emerging operational needs.
The critical nature of getting Tranche 2 right is reinforced by two key issues: the changing concept of operations with regard to the aircraft, and the emerging budgetary pressures on the projected Tranche 3 production run.
The Typhoon--or the European Fighter Aircraft as originally conceived in the mid-1980s--is at least conceptually a "legacy" program. Driven by the need to find a successor to the partner air forces' inventory of air-defense aircraft--the British Tornado F3, German F-4, Spanish F-18, and Italian F-104--EFA was designed primarily for the air-to-air role.
As the recent war with Iraq has clearly evinced, serried ranks of threat fighters to be met in beyond-visual-range engagements no longer constitutes the most likely operational scenario.
The Iraqi air force, perhaps motivated by self-preservation, remained resolutely on the ground throughout the war. And while there was a latent, if limited, air-to-air threat, it failed to materialize. The likely majority of future conflicts Typhoon partners are liable to become embroiled in will surely see a preponderance of airpower in their favor. Such superiority, however, does not negate the need for an aircraft fully capable in air-to-air combat. Even given near-assured air dominance--part of the benefit of involvement in any U.S.-led coalition--the continuing export of third- and fourth-generation combat aircraft suggests some potential adversaries could still pose an air threat.
In limited conflicts, the ability to defeat a Western coalition increasingly may not have to constitute denying air supremacy, but rather inflicting only a publicly unacceptable level of loss. At its most extreme, ponder how many B-2s (or eventually F-22s) the U.S. public, or indeed the Pentagon, would consider as acceptable losses in a conflict such as Iraq, or Kosovo.
In the case of Europe, this then pushes toward the acquisition of platforms capable of being used to prosecute an air campaign predicated on air-to-surface engagements, while sustaining more than sufficient air-to-air capacity.
Reflecting this shift, the RAF is looking to transition its rollout of the aircraft into squadron service from dedicated units to an all-multirole force structure. This would see seven multirole squadrons available by around 2011.
RAF Air Commodore Chris Harper, who is responsible for Typhoon, argued in a recent presentation that this change "spread the operational loading" while also offering "significantly enhanced flexibility."
The initial RAF service-entry road map foresaw the creation of four dedicated air defense squadrons, to be followed by an air-to-surface squadron, and then two multirole units.
Rather fortuitously, Typhoon was conceived from the outset with a latent secondary air-to-surface capability.
Within both Tranches 1 and 2 there's an increased emphasis on developing, and expanding, this capability as rapidly as possible to maximize the utility of what will be a key platform for the customer nations.
All of this, however, is being carried out in the context of budgetary pressures among all of the partners, with the inevitable gap between desirability and affordability to be negotiated.
"In addition to the Typhoon's inherent air-to-air capability, we have to offer in a more flexible way an increased air-to-surface capability," Bagnato acknowledged.
"Tranche 1 is not only an air-to-air platform; there is already within the full operational capability an initial air-to-ground capacity. The Tranche 2 concept is to build on this capability, so the aircraft is already prepared for the integration of new weapons," he added.
The air-to-surface capability within Tranche 1, however, is severely constrained by the paucity of air-to-surface weapons to be integrated on the aircraft at this stage.
The first batch of Tranche 1 aircraft for the RAF, as initially configured, are suitable only for air-defense training and operational test and evaluation. The batch-two aircraft will have a moderately improved capability with the inclusion of the multifunction information distribution system (MIDS), the first iteration of the defensive aids subsystem (DASS), and the ability to utilize the Paveway II laser-guided bomb.
Tranche 2 is where a much broader range of air-to-surface weaponry is now planned to be introduced, supported by the requisite sensor fusion, and full DASS capabilities.
Harper outlined British priorities for Tranche 2 to include Enhanced Paveway II and laser designator pod capability, to be followed by the Storm Shadow cruise missile, and Meteor air-to-air missile. The yet-to-be-selected winner of the British Precision-Guided Bomb competition will also be integrated within the Tranche 2 standard.
The integration of a reconnaissance pod, as part of enhanced operational capability (EOC) 2, also is being considered. One of the emerging lessons of the war with Iraq is the continuing need for crewed tactical reconnaissance. These upgrades are to be implemented in two stages: EOC 1, in 2007-08, and EOC 2, 2009-10.
Eurofighter officials have asked the respective partner nations to come up with a priority list of air-to-surface weapons to be integrated within the context of the Tranche 2 program; however, industry sources say this continues to be very much a work in progress.
The weapons "wish list" is increasingly facing the litmus test of fiscal reality, and it's likely some will either be pushed back or removed completely.
"On additional weapon integration, we don't always want to have to go back to the beginning [in terms of clearances]," Bagnato said. "The Tranche 2 avionics architecture is intended to allow us to avoid this--for both air-to-surface and air-to-air weapons."
"We want to avoid what happened on the Tornado, where the three partner nations ended up with 17 variants of the basic type. Once you lose commonality, you lose much of the cost-effectiveness of a joint program," noted Massimo Tarantola, the Eurofighter support program director.
"The concept with the Typhoon is for 2-3-year regular updates, while also accommodating any urgent operational requirements. But I need to know [what these are] to be able to put them into the baseline configuration for the aircraft. Every two years or so, I will offer all the modifications, and the same will apply with new developments," he added.
Central to this idea is the International Weapon System Support Center recently established at Halbergmoos, near Munich. The IWSSC has been set up "to maintain central control of the entire weapon system support process and resources," according to Eurofighter.
However, as Tarantola recognized, in making this work over the life of the program, "the real problem [among the operators] is going to be discipline."
Regardless of how good an idea the IWSSC is, it can only be as effective as the customers will allow. If partner nations pursue a path similar to that of the Tornado, with the rapid emergence of discrete national variants, then the IWSSC will be sidelined, left to watch costs spiral as commonality is squandered.