Hey,
Came across this article talking abt the RSN program for the naval helicopters, and thought u guys might want a look. The rest of the artice can be found at
http://www.maritime-index.com/index.php?pg=129Article starts:
At the moment the most significant regional naval helicopter competition is that for the Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN), who are on the verge of entering the naval helicopter business for the first time. The RSN naval helicopter requirement grew out of a decision to expand the capabilities of the RSN, through the acquisition of six frigates. This created a requirement where a naval helicopter force was essential to conduct Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW) and Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) and a host of other missions. However, although the decision to order the six La Fayette class frigates from DCN International (now Armaris) was taken in March 2000, progress on equipping them with an organic helicopter capability has been very slow.
Singapore Starts A Search
Originally the RSN and the Defence Science & Technology Agency (DSTA) issued a reasonably broad Request for Information (RFI), but then it became apparent that Singapore had an expanded helicopter strategy in mind. Instead of a single purchase for the RSN, Singapore was looking for a combined purchase that would also cover the helicopter needs of the Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) and its requirement to replace its existing UH-1H utility helicopters. Their aim was to limit the number of helicopter types in Singaporean service and by combining the RSN and RSAF requirements, achieve better value for money.
The emphasis on the combined requirement would change the shape of the helicopter competition. Originally, the competition had attracted a wide range of interested parties including AgustaWestland offering the Super Lynx Series 300 and the EH101, Eurocopter offering the Cougar, Kaman offering the SH-2G Super Seasprite, NH Industries offering the NH 90 and Sikorsky offering the S-70. The combined helicopter requirement excluded the two intermediate weight naval helicopters in the form of the Super Lynx and Super Seasprite from the competition, while issues of deck strength on the new frigates excluded the larger EH101 from contention.
Thus whether they intended it or not, the DSTA had already created a final three for their competition before it had really got underway! Even so, the fact that DSTA was looking for a single helicopter type for two very distinct missions added a great deal of complexity to the evaluation task. As if this were not enough, as time went on both the DSTA and the RSN became increasingly aware of the costs of a dedicated naval helicopter. This cost obstacle had not been anticipated at the start of the evaluation process and it was to have a continuing impact on the helicopter programme.
Matters Become Complex
As we reported in a previous issue of Asian Military Review (Issue 2, March/April 2003), the financial issues related to the naval helicopter have reached a critical point. The Eurocopter Cougar bid is said to be in the region of $27 million per unit, but it is also said to be not fully compliant with the RSN requirement, a similar situation is alleged to be the case with the Sikorsky SH-60R bid, which has a unit cost of some $38 million per unit. According to AMR sources, the only fully compliant bid is the NH90NFH, which is said to have a unit cost of $40 million. AgustaWestland is leading the NH90 bid for the RSN requirement.
With the only fully compliant bid being in the $320 million region, the naval helicopter programme is becoming a very expensive proposition. Added to which, the RSN needs to purchase a missile for the ASuW mission. Currently the most likely option is, as an interim, the Kongsberg Penguin Mk2 Mod 7, which has a weight of 350kg and a range of 40 km. In the future another Kongsberg system in the form of the helicopter-launched version of the Naval Strike Missile (NSM), which weighs a little over 400 kg and has a range of over 150 km, seems the most obvious candidate for the RSN. The NSM is due to become operational in its ship-launched version in 2005. It is also worth noting that Norway has ordered 14 NH90NFH helicopters, with options on 10 more as its future ASW helicopter.
As we can see, by the time you add the procurement costs of the helicopter and associated weapon systems, plus through life costs, the acquisition of an advanced naval helicopter is a costly exercise. Add this to desire of Singapore to standardise on a single helicopter type for the RSAF as well and it is easy to see why the DSTA has spent so much time analysing the options and hence the programme being delayed. Although the NH90 is said to be the only fully compliant helicopter, the lure of the Sikorsky SH-60 cannot be underestimated. Firstly, U.S. defence links with Singapore are very strong and the U.S. Navy is reputed to keep a substantial stock of SH-60 parts in Singapore. Finally, the Eurocopter bid has support in the RSAF due to commonality with the existing Super Puma fleet and the long relationship with Eurocopter products.
The final point to discuss in the RSN helicopter programme is the fact that the RSN has no naval aviation experience and will therefore have to develop doctrine from a blank piece of paper. The RSAF will be providing the aircrew and maintenance support for the helicopters, both onboard ship and on land. Although the helicopter decision is still awaited, the task of turning RSN helicopter plans into operational reality will probably prove the most difficult task of all.
Article continues
http://www.maritime-index.com/index.php?pg=129
