dude..when i say read up...i meant READ UP on my previous post..Originally posted by SingaporeTyrannosaur:If this is your brilliant response, that I assume that you have conceeded defeat.
While I have patently proven each and every one of your fallacies carefully and pointed out the real issue at hand, that FF is a result of large amount of factors, almost all of which have little, if anything to do with pilot incompetence at all, on the other hand, you have done quite a good job of repeating the same mantra of "It must be the pilot's fault for dropping the bombs." while completely ignoring all the facts that have been presented.
Of course, you quote the spec ops incident to death. It's amazing how you can contuine to cling to the "pilot never radio back" completely ignoring all that led up to the incident... which started with a spec operations operative on the ground who was too hasty to give specific coordinates, confirmed the fire mission and target type, and told the pilot to go ahead to bomb the target.
To insist on blaming the pilot come what may, is prehaps akin to blaming american WW2 tank commanders of being incompetent because they took heavy losses fighting German tanks in their inpotent M4 Shermans that had been designed by a compromise committe. And make grandose claims on how tank commanders should be more competent in fighting German armour. See the real issue here?
You have yet to produce any solid evidence supporting your case of pilot fault except from your vague, personal impressions of the whole incident gleamed from BBC. Ironically, even the BBC operators INVOLVED in the incident hold a far more rational, and objective view of the incident then you do. Just look at their report.
If you think I haven't been reading up, I urge you then, for my and everybody's benefit, post the links here. Other then that, your opinions of this incident and it's credibility as an argument is as thin as figurative paper. Airchair generals make hotheaded, simplistic claims, true soldiers acess the true, tatical picyure.
It would behoove you to stop shadow boxing, it's far more productive then posting irrational thoughts followed by more irrational reasons pulled out of thin air to support them.
Unlike the commandos, the air force certainly does not have an atmosphere that encourages or condones mindless risk taking with lives and equipment.Really now? And upon what basis do you base the CommandosÂ’ attitude? Having been one, and speaking from personal experience (as much as you are grieved by personal experience), I would heartily disagree with you. Please refer to my posts in the drowning incident thread for an expansion of what I learned in Cdo.
a few black sheep (which are rapidly weeded out under a merciless system)
I am defending the large majority who do their job right, and on them should the reputation of the air force be based.Or does your macro view absolve you from sticking to your statements? First you categorically state that they are weeded out, then you say that there are some about. What’s it going to be? My issue with you has always been the first statement – they are not weeded out, and that’s the point of my examples. Look, the gist of what you have written subsequently indicates that you acknowledge that the selection system does let some idiots through. Why don’t you just retract your categorical statement about the weeding out (which you already have contradicted yourself about anyway), and then we can get on to bigger and better things?
its a sad thing that..we have murphy's law to blame..n we cant do anythingOriginally posted by Gedanken:Nah, wouldn't be fair to say that, Heng - after all, ST has acknowledged that there are some pilots out there with an attitude problem. What it looks like is that he's mixed up everybody's arguments.
Faulty target acquisition system, perhaps? Or perhaps friendly fire upon himself?![]()
Originally posted by SingaporeTyrannosaur:
Why don't I break it down further for you?
After repeated
requests the Americans eventually gave us a briefing on condition we didn't say where it came from.
[b]During it we were told that a member of the American special forces, seemingly under great stress, had
requested an air-strike on the Iraqi tanks a mile away from us.
He told the pilot he didnÂ’t have time to give
him a grid reference; though looking back we still canÂ’t see why he was under such pressure.
We were given details of the exchange between the plane and the man on the ground.
The pilot says: "I see a road, I see an intersection, I see vehicles." The man on the ground says "Roger, thatÂ’s your target, youÂ’re cleared to fire." But it was the wrong intersection; the vehicles were ours and those of the Kurdish and the American
special forces we were with. One of them radios up shortly afterwards: “Ceasefire. Ceasefire" he says.
"You’re hitting friendlies. We’ve taken casualties.”
There may well have been recklessness on the part of
some of those involved. But the real problem seemed to be the particular[/colour] [color=red]system of close air support the Americans were using.
It meant they could drop a 1000 pound bomb on such inadequate information. No co-ordinates No grid references.
As you can see, there are multiple factors that led up to the unfortunate bombing of those hapless people. Does the blame rests soley on the shoulders of the pilot? Or does it lie in the system, a lax way of providing information to pilots in a combat situtation?
Viewed from any angle, not just your own myopic one, almost anyone could be blamed for this disaster. But at the end of the day, what did was done? Run lessons to increase pilot competence? Cease all air support? No, they now conducted CAS with a great amount of detailed information now, making sure good intel reaches the pilot before he is told to drop the bomb. And has it worked? Since that incident, aircraft now only bomb under detailed information and the final go-ahead now rests with the operator calling the airstrike. (read stragetypage.org on the AAR on FF incidents, despite a long list of things identified to cause FF, not once did they mention troop/pilot incompetency)
It has been estimated over 50 friendly fire incidents that would have happened on the old SOP were avoided. In any one of these changes did they increase pilot competence above a level then they already are in any way? No, it affected the entire force, both ground and air as a whole.
Avoiding FF is not about getting better pilots, especially in our context when we are already getting as good as we get. It lies in establishing proper procedures to minimise the risk of FF as much as possible.
[/b]
It was supposed to have been a routine "close air support operation." A group of U.S. special operations forces aiding a convoy of Kurdish fighters radioed two American fighter jets to strike an enemy tank that was firing at them about a mile away.i wonder y the same incident have 2 different story?
But instead of striking the Iraqi tank, one of the aircraft dropped a bomb on top of the convoy, killing 18 Kurds and injuring three U.S. soldiers.
Pentagon sources say the attack may have been caused by a simple mix-up: Transmitters worn by special operation forces to avoid "friendly fire" were compatible only with Air Force planes, and not the Navy jets that bombed them.
The convoy attack is one of a small group of friendly fire incidents during the Iraq war that highlight the technological advances -- and problems -- in preventing fratricide on an increasingly complex battlefield.
Murphy's laws of combat are as old as combat themself, they are not strictly laws of combat, but observances of how combat takes place, many people have bled and died for these laws to be formulated. Hold contempt for, or ignore them at your own risk.Originally posted by NathanG5:its a sad thing that..we have murphy's law to blame..n we cant do anything
my argument its the same as yours..there are pilots with attitude problem..but cockiness is not a problem to him..
Hmm, more interestingly, in any of the both versions, did any of it point to problems stemming from the pilots' level of competence, or do both of them point towards laspes in equipment and procedure that led up to this?Originally posted by NathanG5:i wonder y the same incident have 2 different story?
nervous Spec Ops?
Originally posted by SingaporeTyrannosaur:dude..aint it better to just post in a nice way?
Hmm, more interestingly, in any of the both versions, did any of it point to problems stemming from the pilots' level of competence, or do both of them point towards laspes in equipment and procedure that led up to this?
Anyway, whoes do you believe? The BBC or the CNN version? I believe the both stories are by themselves correct, they do not contradict each other at all, but present different parts of how things played out, the Spec Op's operative stress, compounded with laspe of procedure (or simply poor procedure) led the Navy jets to the wrong target, tragically, this was made worse by the fact that they had no correct transponders to be IFFed by the Navy jets, and were bombed.
Had procedure been clearer, or equipment correct, some friendlies would have been alive today.
Anyway the conclusion of your quoted article hits the hammer bang on the nail... these incidents indicate the technological advances... and problems... in avoiding FF incidents.
War is still a terribly confused affair, even with modern technology. Even an laspe as not turning on your headlamps (or turning them off), can attract deadily fire from your own side.
As one Delta operative puts it simply at the end of the day. "You can't control all these things from happening, that's just war.What matters is that [b]you did your duty and did it to the best of your ability"[/b]
Originally posted by Gedanken:
[b]So youÂ’re saying that I almost ended up candling because I jumped too heavy, and not because the pilot was going 20 knots too fast? I was doing a clean fatigue jump at the time, which means my weight was less than 65 kilograms. Or, in your expert opinion, is that already too heavy? Also, why would tailwinds, thermals, and unseen air currents affect airspeed? All three contribute to a bumpy ride, which I have no issue with.
It appears that you are mixing up my posts with NathanÂ’s. My stance has always been as follows: given my personal experience with pilots, my conclusion is that the process of weeding out pilots with an attitude problem that prevents them from doing the job right (NOT incompetent pilots) is inadequate./b]
[b]It was in response to Nathan’s anecdote about the pilot saying that pilots are superior – my point is that they as fallible as the rest of us. My arguments therefore address both human error and incompetence, but not circumstances.
Also, you seem to think that I have proposed some grandiose solutions – read my posts again and you will see that I have proposed no solutions, grandiose or otherwise. So far I have not even gotten to identifying what to fix yet – thanks to the current direction of this argument, we cannot yet get to that point.
By the way, don’t go embarrassing yourself trying to tell me about numbers. My doctorate thesis was in statistical analysis, and of all people I know how numbers can be controlled to present a distorted version of the truth. That is the importance of the disproof that I mentioned earlier – if the numbers contradict what you actually know from experience, betting odds are that the numbers are wrong.
With your example of crossing the road, I accept “most and “usual” enough to take my chances crossing the road. However, I am not as foolish as to use those numbers to propose that the driving test process weeds out all bad drivers.[b]
[b]With the rope incident, the very simple SOP of checking with the despatchers for an all-clear before pulling the release lever was already in place, and was violated by the pilot. In the case of my jump, the pilot violated the 115 knot limit stipulated in the TSR. IÂ’d classify these as unnecessary risks.
Dude... Isn't it better to post stating plain facts and conclusions rather then making emotional statements to make a point that obstructs the passage of logic?Originally posted by NathanG5:dude..aint it better to just post in a nice way?
lets get back to the topic...no the 2 article never say anything of the pilots competency?
the problem lies on using eyes to differentiate target?
certainly a convoy looks like a convoy...with american flags(maybe too tiny) but arent they flying low?
straight line convoy...too obvious to notice?
the operators have the wrong transponders..do the enemies have transponders? when u cant decide which is the right stuff..what u do?
i didnt get the article from both news agency...
i certainly dun trust both BBC or CNN article 100%
same with my own articles..
n it doesnt make sense to me..the operators did not fight a very hard battle from the start of the war...the kurds are doing all the fighting...y the pressure all of sudden?
You seemed to have missed this doozy of a quote:Originally posted by SingaporeTyrannosaur:I never claimed that the RSAF selection system weeded out all the bad drivers. But enough to have all bad things that happen in which our first instict is to blame the pilot be given a second, or even third look before we sic it on the pilot.
But since you have a doctorate in statistical analysis, I think you can agree with the proposition that having more information makes your conclusion more precise.
Strange that having a doctorate in statistical analysis, you are not alien to the idea of a zero percent error rate due to pilot failure... what exactly are you seeing in the numbers that I am missing.
In which case, what you assume to be problems that can be simply fingered towards pilot laxness or attitude problems, can be attributed to far many other factors, once you have all the data.
I have never proposed that the selection system weeded out all the idiots, but I propose the idea that it weeds out enough of the idiots that most of the bad incidents that do happen are more likely to be a combination of other factors that do not have to always to with pilot incompetence or laxness.
Note, it's not "most of which" or even "some of which", but just plain "which" - sounds pretty categorical to me. That is the one and only issue that I have here, and you still can't seem to address that.Originally posted by SingaporeTyrannosaur:a few black sheep (which are rapidly weeded out under a merciless system)
dude..what facts did u show me?Originally posted by SingaporeTyrannosaur:Dude... Isn't it better to post stating plain facts and conclusions rather then making emotional statements to make a point that obstructs the passage of logic?
Anyway, Mark 1 eyeball with neural net processor is still the most reliable and intelligent way of aquiring targets, however in modern fast jets, the human eye is limited by the fact that unlike birds of prey, we were designed to spot and aquire detail from targets in moderate distances of up to a kilometer. Even at 500 meters to perfect eyesight, a man or tank just looks just like a small dull blotch which is almost impossible to tell from the enemy. From the top, there is a added problem of not being able to see the side or front profiles of the unit. Everything looks similar from the air.
And contray to popular opinion, or at least what some thing, flying low makes things even harder to observe as the reduced field of view makes things zip by really fast, giving you very little time to actually spot them. Just as when you are travelling in a car, the objects further away seem to move a lot slower due to your wider field of vision relative to your motion.
And yes, a flag is almost impossible to spot with any kind of accuracy. In WW2, tests showed that the even small standard bright orange identification panels (previously standard issue to prevent aerial FF) could be easily missed by friendly aircraft and the only way of having even sometimes reliable identification was to hang one real big mother of a panel on the back of a tank. And even then, some units were attacked mistakenly. This was a time when planes flew a lot slower and there was far more time to aquire the target by eye.
A small american flag? Even one of normal size in a fast F-14 where you have only a few seconds to spot the convoy, let alone pick out the flag, this is no reliable way of visual identification.
Hence is it vital that those pilots get a clear picture from ground controllers what to bomb when providing CAS, where their targets are, and what their targets were.
In a way to overcome the limitations of visual identification, the transponders were an electronic means, where they would alert the jet's IFF to the presence of friendlies in the area before they dropped the bomb, but it didn't work. Any doubt in the mind of the pilot was removed when he was given the confirmation of the "target" and the go-ahead to bomb them.
In air combat, the rule of the thumb is, a target does not respond to electronic IFF is to shoot first and ask questions later. Even this was programmed into the Patriot missile system which shot down the Tornado it though was a ballistic missile. Hence the lack of IFF response and the confirmation of a target, the two key factors, led the pilots to add up the math and conclude that there is almost a complete certainty that the target was hostile, as it would have been in almost all other cases. But nobody figured on a double failure of wrong transponders and wrong info, either one working would have prevented the incident.
And as for pressure, it is hard to tell in war, but completely possible. The moment heavy fighting breaks out or a bullet snaps pass your head, or simply being involved in battle, even if you are not under direct fire, is massively stressful.
Weasel my way out of a tight spot? Tempted as I might be to even consider this preposterous depiction slightly for it's comical value, I must politely decline, given the fact that I am quite comfortable with the case I have built and have no intention of going anywhere quite yet. But in the event you do actually bother to look into them seriously without irrational and emotional bias, do give me a flag anytime, I'll will completely happy to indulge you.Originally posted by Gedanken:It's fine, ST, you can say whatever you want to weasel your way out of a tight spot, but I have already presented the hard evidence.
The issue here is simple - you made a categorical statement that in my view is incorrect and instead of addressing it, you choose to try and skirt around the issue by throwing red herrings in. Why should I bother discussing the bigger issues with you, when you don't even have the integrity to acknowledge an error on a relatively small one? Figure out how to fix it - pfft. Your statement is that the sytem weeds out the "black sheep" - if that's the case, why bother looking at solutions to a problem that you say doesn't exist? Get a grip.
Feel free to throw in all the chaff that you want - hell, you can even call it semantics if that helps you sleep better at night. I've got the measure of you and what you're made of already, and I don't need to know any more about you or your helicopter view.
You want to talk about the larger issues here? What's your claim to actual knowledge? I already have a report with recommendations on situational awareness that the Royal Australian Air Force is using for their selection of pilots and air traffic controllers, so what you have presented so far does not impress me enough to overlook your lack of intellectual honesty.
The ground spec ops operative that ordered the attack was described as "under stress", not the pilot. Go read.Originally posted by NathanG5:dude..what facts did u show me?
to tell me the pilot dunno which is which?
how abt mobile A/A Gun? any mobile A/A trucks...
in that case we're in deep Shlt...
in tat case any one who wear glasses can be a pilot..even both eyes total up to a 1000 degree..[/quote]
Heh, now then you know? That seeing things on the ground from an aircraft at speed is very difficult? That's why they are currently trying to get a reliable technological means for identifying who's friendly and who's not. Visual identification just isn't enough. Nearly 80 years of air combat has though us that, and the jets aren't getting any slower and response times are getting shorter and ground pictures more littorial.
From 300 feet above at 200 knots, a Bradley looks pretty much like a BMP-2, a dull, rectangle moving with a dust trail behind it. I assume you've taken a plane before, just look at the ground objects that you though were easy to identify just moments after takeoff, attitude makes a massive difference.
The human eye has a resolution of 0.59 arc minutes on a 50mm "prime" lens, there are limits to how much it can see from the air, we don't have eyes of birds of prey unfortunately, we were designed to see in acute colour with general, widefield steroscopic vision, hardly the binocular vision that would make identifying friendlies from the air easy.if u dunno who is down there...coms back
ask when u are not sure...
we all learn that from young..i learn it the hard way in NS..
Erm, if you read the transcript, you'll notice that they pilot did radio to the ground operator and described his "target" and the location when it reached it after been ordered to bomb targets there, the ground operator radioed back in the okay and he hit it.
[quote]about a bullet snap pass my head..yes indeed its stressful..
but in the above case..i didnt know tank can be use as A/A gun?
stress?
Heh, now then you know? That seeing things on the ground from an aircraft at speed is very difficult? That's why they are currently trying to get a reliable technological means for identifying who's friendly and who's not. Visual identification just isn't enough. Nearly 80 years of air combat has though us that, and the jets aren't getting any slower and response times are getting shorter and ground pictures more littorial.heh..in that case we are truly in trouble..
From 300 feet above at 200 knots, a Bradley looks pretty much like a BMP-2, a dull, rectangle moving with a dust trail behind it. I assume you've taken a plane before, just look at the ground objects that you though were easy to identify just moments after takeoff, attitude makes a massive difference.
The human eye has a resolution of 0.59 arc minutes on a 50mm "prime" lens, there are limits to how much it can see from the air, we don't have eyes of birds of prey unfortunately, we were designed to see in acute colour with general, widefield steroscopic vision, hardly the binocular vision that would make identifying friendlies from the air easy
Erm, if you read the transcript, you'll notice that they pilot did radio to the ground operator and described his "target" and the location when it reached it after been ordered to bomb targets there, the ground operator radioed back in the okay and he hit it.im saying ask again..duh
The ground spec ops operative that ordered the attack was described as "under stress", not the pilot. Go read.its either u forgot whats u type or something else..im refering to this-->
In air combat, the rule of the thumb is, a target does not respond to electronic IFF is to shoot first and ask questions later. Even this was programmed into the Patriot missile system which shot down the Tornado it though was a ballistic missile. Hence the lack of IFF response and the confirmation of a target, the two key factors, led the pilots to add up the math and conclude that there is almost a complete certainty that the target was hostile, as it would have been in almost all other cases. But nobody figured on a double failure of wrong transponders and wrong info, either one working would have prevented the incident.go read again.
And as for pressure, it is hard to tell in war, but completely possible. The moment heavy fighting breaks out or a bullet snaps pass your head, or simply being involved in battle, even if you are not under direct fire, is massively stressful.
heh..in that case we are truly in trouble..I'm not any happier then you about the risk of friendly fire, considering my butt is on the line too. That's why I am very interested in finding out the real underlying reason and getting to that rather then blame the pilot all the time. If it's the pilot, go get him, but if there are many other factors to fix, let's work on that first!
read up on the case again..how many truck convoy are there during the incident?
10? 20?
there is only one convoy..straight line..does tanks firing at enemy does a armor colunm in staright line?
think before giving me anything about vision on plane or chopper..
think again in this incident...does a straight line convoy look like tanks firing position?
im saying ask again..duhWell what's on my mind is that the pilot hardly had time to make sense of this up in the air approaching at high speed, expecially that of a fluid situtation. As I said, the Iraqis as an enemy are highly irregular in their tatics and anything, professional or tatically poor, is to be expected from them.
there are suppose to be 2 group of vehicles one teh ground..aint it obvious the pilot only saw one group of vehicles?
think...u are the pilot i saw only one group vehicles? n its in a straight line...whats in your mind now?
its either u forgot whats u type or something else..im refering to this-->I think you mistaken what I ment liao, I was writing on why the ground operative was stressed in response to your question on combat stress. Maybe I have mistaken your post to refer to the ground operator when you were to the stress pilot? What's the history? Clarification?
quote:
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In air combat, the rule of the thumb is, a target does not respond to electronic IFF is to shoot first and ask questions later. Even this was programmed into the Patriot missile system which shot down the Tornado it though was a ballistic missile. Hence the lack of IFF response and the confirmation of a target, the two key factors, led the pilots to add up the math and conclude that there is almost a complete certainty that the target was hostile, as it would have been in almost all other cases. But nobody figured on a double failure of wrong transponders and wrong info, either one working would have prevented the incident.
And as for pressure, it is hard to tell in war, but completely possible. The moment heavy fighting breaks out or a bullet snaps pass your head, or simply being involved in battle, even if you are not under direct fire, is massively stressful.
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go read again.
What's harder to miss, that, at the end of the day, you are proving yourself to be quite the lawyer but with little constructive to contribute.Originally posted by Gedanken:Fine by me. At the end of the day, you are the one who has yet to address a simple issue: you said "a few black sheep (which are rapidly weeded out under a merciless system) " - nothing about "most of" there, so it's plainly categorical, but in light of your later statements, plainly untrue as well. Is that simple enough for even you to understand?
If you can't even take care of something so elementary, and then you even go on to mix up everyone's arguments, how can you expect me to place any stock in anything else you say? You can't even deal with single trees, but you want to talk about the whole forest - now that is truly side-splitting. So, yes, you can say whatever you want - you're the one telling us that you can't back up what you write, and the evidence is all in this thread.
Call me fussy, but if I'm to hold a serious discussion with someone, I'd like to know that I'm talking to someone who's big enough to admit when he's wrong, especially when the error is so obvious. After all, if you can't even set a relatively trivial issue straight, what's that say about everything else you write?
to sum it all up issue..seriously i have no problem agreeing with from the start..Originally posted by SingaporeTyrannosaur:I think you mistaken what I ment liao, I was writing on why the ground operative was stressed in response to your question on combat stress. Maybe I have mistaken your post to refer to the ground operator when you were to the stress pilot? What's the history? Clarification?
Originally posted by Gedanken:Circular reasoning has it's appeal to you apparently, going on wild goose chases to reach back to square one. And should you agree with Nathan, it's good to note that while you have been bushwacking, people have been making good progress in understanding the issue and relations between accidents and personnel quality. I wonder where eactly in the fossil record do you stand now? Or are your views just a frankestien of hearing what you want to hear, pick and mix, with a verdict that demands evidence, and not the other way round?
As for So it's fine, you can just carry on like a two-bob watch. The rest of [b]us know better.[/b]