Urban Fighting with MBT
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Russian - Manufactured Armored Vechicle Vulnerability in Urban Combat - A Chechnya Experience
cut / paste from www.fas.org, some of you may have seen this.
In December 1994, the Russian Army entered the breakaway Republic of Chechnya and attempted to seize the Chechen capital of Grozny from the march. After this attempt failed, the Russian Army spent two months in deliberate house-to-house fighting before finally capturing the city.(1) The dispirited Russian conscript force was badly mauled by the more mature, dedicated Chechen force, and the war drags on to this day. During the first month of the conflict, Russian forces wrote off 225 armored vehicles as nonrepairable battle losses. This represents 10.23% of the armored vehicles initially committed to the campaign. The Russians evacuated some of these 225 hulls to the Kubinka test range for analysis. General-Lieutenant A. Galkin, the head of the Armor Directorate, held a conference on their findings on 20 February 1995. The Minister of Defense attended the conference.(2) The results of the conference convinced the Russian Minister of Defense to stop procuring tanks with gas-turbine engines.(3) Further, the analysis disclosed Chechen anti-armor tactics and the vulnerabilities of Russian armored vehicles in urban combat.
Chechen Anti-armor Techniques
The Chechen forces are armed with Soviet and Russian-produced weapons, and most Chechen fighters served in the Soviet Armed Forces. The Chechen lower-level combat group consists of 15 to 20 personnel subdivided into three or four-man fighting cells. These cells consist of an antitank gunner (normally armed with the RPG-7 or RPG-18 shoulder-fired antitank rocket launcher), a machine gunner and a sniper.(4) Additional personnel serve as ammunition bearers and assistant gunners. Chechen combat groups would deploy these cells as anti-armor hunter-killer teams. The sniper and machine gunner would pin down the supporting infantry while the antitank gunner would engage the armored target. Teams deploy at ground level, in second and third stories, and in basements. Normally five or six hunter-killer teams simultaneously attack a single armored vehicle. Kill shots are generally made against the top, rear and sides of vehicles. Chechens also drop bottles filled with gasoline or jellied fuel on top of vehicles.(5) The Chechen hunter-killer teams try to trap vehicle columns in city streets where destruction of the first and last vehicles will trap the column and allow its total destruction.
The elevation and depression of the Russian main tank guns are incapable of dealing with hunter-killer teams fighting from basements and second or third-story positions and the simultaneous attack from five or six teams negate the effectiveness of the tank's machine guns. The Russians attached ZSU 23-4 and 2S6 track-mounted antiaircraft guns to armored columns to respond to these difficult-to-engage hunter-killer teams.(6)
Initial Russian vehicle losses were due to a combination of inappropriate tactics, underestimation of the opposing force, and a lack of combat readiness. The Russians moved into Grozny without encircling it and sealing it off from reinforcements. They planned to take the city from the march without dismounting. Due to shortages in personnel, the Russian columns consisted of composite units and most personnel carriers traveled with few or no dismounts. These initial columns were decimated.
As the Russians regrouped, they brought in more infantry and began a systematic advance through the city, house by house and block by block. Russian armored vehicle losses dropped off with their change in tactics. Russian infantry moved in front with armored combat vehicles in support or in reserve. Some Russian vehicles were outfitted with a cage of wire mesh mounted some 25-30 centimeters away from the hull armor to defeat the shaped charges of an antitank grenade launcher as well as to protect the vehicle from a Molotov cocktail or bundle of explosives. The Russians began establishing ambushes on approach routes into a selected area and then running vehicles into the area as bait to destroy Chechen hunter-killer teams.(7)
Vulnerabilities of Russian armored vehicles
Shoulder-fired antitank weapons and antitank grenades knocked out the bulk of armored vehicles and each destroyed vehicle took an average of three to six lethal hits.(
Fuel cells and engines are favorite aiming points for Chechen antitank gunners. The following illustrations have a grey area imposed which shows the area where 90% of the lethal hits occur
The BMD-1 is a personnel carrier assigned to airborne forces. As such, it is lightly armored.
It was vulnerable to front, rear, flanking and top-down fire. The front portion of the turret is reinforced and, consequently, not vulnerable, but the rear of the turret is.
There is more armor on the BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicle. However, its top armor is weak, its fuel tanks are within the rear doors and the driver's compartment is vulnerable.
The BTR-70 wheeled armored personnel carrier showed many of the same vulnerabilities as the BMD and BMP.
Sixty-two tanks were destroyed in the first month's fighting in Chechnya. Over 98% (apparently 61 tanks) were knocked out by rounds which impacted in areas not protected by reactive armor. The Russians employed the T-72 and T-80 tank in Chechnya. They were both invulnerable to frontal shots, since the front is heavily armored and covered with reactive armor. Kill shots were made at those points where there is no reactive armor--the sides and rear and, on top shots, on the drivers hatch and the rear of the turret and rear deck. Early in the conflict, most Russian tanks went into combat without their reactive armor. They were particularly vulnerable to damaging or lethal frontal hits without it.(10)
Conclusions
The Chechen forces developed effective techniques to defeat Russian armored vehicles on the streets of a large city. Many of their techniques can be adapted by other armed forces which might fight Russian-manufactured armored vehicles (or other types of armored vehicles) in urban combat. These techniques are:
1) Organize anti-tank hunter-killer teams which include a machine gunner and a sniper to protect the anti-tank gunner by suppressing infantry which is accompanying the armored vehicles.
2) Select anti-armor ambush areas in sections of the city where buildings restrict and canalize the movement of armored vehicles.
3) Lay out the ambush in order to seal off vehicles inside the kill zone.
4) Use multiple hunter-killer teams to engage armored vehicles from basements, ground level and from second- or third-floor positions. A problem with the RPG-7 and RPG-18 antitank weapons are the backblast, signature and time lapse between shots. The Chechens solved the time lapse problem by engaging each target simultaneously with five or six anti-tank weapons (obvious requirements for a future anti-armor weapon for urban combat is a low-signature, multi-shot, recoil-attenuated, light-weight weapon which can be fired from inside enclosures. The AT-4 and Javelin do not appear to meet these requirements). (** So much for LAW replacement)
5) Engage armored targets from the top, rear and sides. Shots against frontal armor protected by reactive armor only serve to expose the gunner.
6) Engage accompanying air-defense guns first.
still think it's a good idea to replace all our amx with large MBT?
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hmm, posted as a reply to the mbt forum but ended up as a new topic ...
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er... wat kind of add-on armour do we have to protect our amoured group? Is DSTA or ST developing depleted uranium or chobham armour tat was used to built M1A1/2 n the challenger? If tis types of armour r too heavy, r we working on any composite armour that can protect our armoured vehicles against current n future ATW threats?
as for urban armour warfare, armour battle groups must be supported wif armed choppers to protect them against holed up threats in buildings. however wif only 20 apaches, we can't cover much ground as we would like. 50 of these monsters will be ideal
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we must increase the number of 84mm RR tubes organic to each rifle company and increase the supply of our LAWs (our requivalent to RPGs) during an urban conflict which are armoured.
The PT-91 is similar to T72 and T80 right? -
who wans to carry these damned things? n law can't even dent PT-91 wif add-on armour. 84 maybe can dent abitOriginally posted by spencer99:we must increase the number of 84mm RR tubes organic to each rifle company and increase the supply of our LAWs (our requivalent to RPGs) during an urban conflict which are armoured.
The PT-91 is similar to T72 and T80 right?
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Originally posted by paulho:
First of all, good article. Thanks. Read something like that a while ago but without the nice pictures and illustrations.
still think it's a good idea to replace all our amx with large MBT?
Secondly, Urbane warfare is inheritantly difficult - look, the US and the British armies effective avoid going into cities in the latest Guif War. British forces effectively surrounded Basra for days before attacking it. Yet, attacking built up area without armour is sucidal as well. I think the answer lies somewhere in between, and perhaps the real solution is to perform a seize and let the enemies inside starve for days and lower there moral first. Going into any urban area where the enemies have sufficient time to layout tank killing teams, snipers and bobby traps are just asking for trouble. In any case, the US learnt a bloody lesson in Somalia and the Russian in Chechnya.
As to your question about MBT, I would say that SAF damn sure need some albeit not in big numbers. If we haven't learnt any lesson from WWII where the British laughed at the idea of having tanks in Malaya, think again. Essentially, I think the Jap taught us a good lesson about Jungle warfare and we MUST learn it well. Manoeuvrability + Firepower = Win Battle in jungle warfare. Not to mention, Penisular Malaysia is so well developed these days with many well paved roads and highways.Most part of Johor are not jungle and dense forest anyway. The objective of SAF is not to drive all the way to KL or most northern tip of Malaysia. The MBT will ensure that when any mechanised or armoured battle group meets any stiff resistence or the appearance of enemy's MBT, they can effectively neutralise that. I'm sure most infantry soldiers or armoured soldiers like to have some heavy duty tanks on their side just in case.
In any case, SAF ORBAT is not formed to operate MBT in any great numbers. They are there to deal with extreme cases. That is why I favour an MBT that has more speed than extremely thick armour. One that has low ground pressure and advanced sights, and effective active defensive aid suite. -
Not thinking of penetrating the armour for a total kill, mobility kills and vision kills are important and effective as well. When you don't have anti-amour weapon that can totally destroy a tank, the best thing to do is to disable it so that it is harder for the tank to return accurate fire. If opportunity arises, can run up to the tank, drop a couple of hand grenade or even the smokers drown the crew's "man-hole", could effectively kill it as well.Originally posted by 5.56:who wans to carry these damned things? n law can't even dent PT-91 wif add-on armour. 84 maybe can dent abit -
Does the M8 fits our needs? a 'thin skin' tank killer....Originally posted by Joe Black:In any case, SAF ORBAT is not formed to operate MBT in any great numbers. They are there to deal with extreme cases. That is why I favour an MBT that has more speed than extremely thick armour. One that has low ground pressure and advanced sights, and effective active defensive aid suite. -
Due to the "pre-emptive strike" doctrine, the SAF will probably take-on the Russians' role in a potential conflict.
we probably cannot afford a long delay. If we cannot by-pass urban areas we must probably neutralize quickly with or without a MBT. -
er .. first of all the topic was not directed against any entity or country, the example was merely used to illustrate why it is a bad idea to replace all our light tanks for heavy ones in SEA context to fighting in built up areas.
Contary to belief that the LAW is useless against MBT. True the MBT it can probably withstand the first shot but if you fired 5-6 LAW it will break every tank has vulnerbilities, a good example would be the Merkava that was 'killed' when it ran over a large home-made explosive charge in palestine. -
I think it will be suicidal for a pilot to try flying his helicopter in between 2 buildings. rpg/84mm attacks you' know ...Originally posted by 5.56:as for urban armour warfare, armour battle groups must be supported wif armed choppers to protect them against holed up threats in buildings. however wif only 20 apaches, we can't cover much ground as we would like. 50 of these monsters will be ideal -
Actually the tatics which you use armour in FIBUA is as important as having armour itself. It is a good idea to use MBTs in FIBUA, the firepower and protection they provide, if utilized properly, can easily neutralize enemy strongpoints that would risk many lives to take.
The experience of the Russians is more of a show how not to use armour in urban areas then the actual vulnerabilty of armour in urban applications.
When the Americans sent in armoured probes into Bagdad last year, they went into a hornet's nest of antitank weaponary, and yet they survived. They deployed their tank is a formation that allowed them to cover each other's vulnerable areas while presenting their strongest front to the enemy by tranversing their turrets.
In such a way, it was virtually impossible to get a shot at them without attracting withering fire. And the few that managed to get a shot off usually wasted it splattering against the strongest armour of the tanks. If I recall, they lost one tank in the incursion when enemy fire set some fuel being stored external on the back of the turret alight that dripped into the engine compartment, disabling the engine.
But considering how they managed to drive through Bagdad taking a lot of fire but coming out in one piece, I believe this proves that it is how you use armour that actually determines how it turns out.
Of course, on the pratical side, I don't see how using soft skinned AFVs like our AMX will be good in FIBUA, almost anything can knock it out. In FIBUA, protection matters more then mobility. -
This is a very old 1985 report on the US armour's experience in the rain forest of Vietnam :
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1985/CTG.htmMore importantly, the MACOV study concluded that tanks, with organic support,could move in 61 percent of Vietnam during the dry season and 46 percent during the wet season. Armored personnel carriers could move in 65 percent of the country all the year round.
The tank I believe is the tank was M48 MBT, where APC was M113.
Eventhough, it did not specifically said why the MBT is less tactical mobile as compare to the M113 espacially the raining season.
I believe it is due to the size and weight of the AFVs and especially the ground pressure as well.
The spec for M48A3:
Weight :47 tons Ground Pressure: 0.83Kgf/sq cm Width:3.6m
The Spec for M113A1 :
Weight :11 tons Ground Pressure: 0.54Kgf/sq cm Width:2.7m
SAF has stated to have the Primus designed to have width below 3m and weight below 30 tons.
So to have our armoured forces to to be small and nimble so to operate effectively in all those jungle tracks.I hope also with low ground pressure.
Another reason was due to I believe is the Class 30 Bionix/AMX-13 AVLB that we have abundant as our Class 30 floating brigdes.
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Then again, I reiterate my previous statement for SAF's long-term if not immediate requirement for radically new armour platforms in view of the devastating losses faced by the Russians in Chechnya:Originally posted by Joe Black:First of all, good article. Thanks. Read something like that a while ago but without the nice pictures and illustrations.
Secondly, Urbane warfare is inheritantly difficult - look, the US and the British armies effective avoid going into cities in the latest Guif War. British forces effectively surrounded Basra for days before attacking it. Yet, attacking built up area without armour is sucidal as well. I think the answer lies somewhere in between, and perhaps the real solution is to perform a seize and let the enemies inside starve for days and lower there moral first. Going into any urban area where the enemies have sufficient time to layout tank killing teams, snipers and bobby traps are just asking for trouble. In any case, the US learnt a bloody lesson in Somalia and the Russian in Chechnya.
As to your question about MBT, I would say that SAF damn sure need some albeit not in big numbers. If we haven't learnt any lesson from WWII where the British laughed at the idea of having tanks in Malaya, think again. Essentially, I think the Jap taught us a good lesson about Jungle warfare and we MUST learn it well. Manoeuvrability + Firepower = Win Battle in jungle warfare. Not to mention, Penisular Malaysia is so well developed these days with many well paved roads and highways.Most part of Johor are not jungle and dense forest anyway. The objective of SAF is not to drive all the way to KL or most northern tip of Malaysia. The MBT will ensure that when any mechanised or armoured battle group meets any stiff resistence or the appearance of enemy's MBT, they can effectively neutralise that. I'm sure most infantry soldiers or armoured soldiers like to have some heavy duty tanks on their side just in case.
In any case, SAF ORBAT is not formed to operate MBT in any great numbers. They are there to deal with extreme cases. That is why I favour an MBT that has more speed than extremely thick armour. One that has low ground pressure and advanced sights, and effective active defensive aid suite.
The real and immediate lesson to learn from wars like in Chechnya and Iraq is that the conventional armoured force employing mounted calvary style for urban assault is totally ineffective in the face of a dug-in guerilla enemy. New tactics may suffice at the present time given the level of technology the most advanced army may have is not even adequate in providing an absolute solution to such a scenario. However I would like to re-pose just one radical method at the end of this extract from me...
Firstly, considering the most plausible option available and practiceable today for the scenario experienced in Chechnya, is probably what the US coalition exercised during Operation Iraqi Freedom - laying seige to entire cities blasting away key targets with air strikes. Plausible, but also the most time consuming.
The next two viable options that could achieve more immediate positive results are:
- forewarning the combatants (and civilians alike) within the freshly besieged city to evacuate it, as a formal declaration by the attacking force to international media that such a measure is taken, before laying down overwhelming artillery barrage for total destruction. The grace period for evacuation must be as short as possible to prevent combatants from escaping undercover of civilian exodus. This solution is definitely not fool-proof in view of the potentially huge international outcry over human-rights. After the levelling the city, then the occupying (or sanitising) force will move in to clean up
- immediately move in the maneuver units under heavy cover of smoke and gas (concentrated NO2 or tear gas). Every element, be it soldier or vehicle will have self-contained continuous smoke dispersion/emanation equipment. Units could be equipped with optical and thermal jammers/decoys to negate enemy sensors during assault. Assault weapons make-up should include more incendiary type weapons - flamethrowers (infantry and vehicle-mounted), concussion-cum-thermobaric grenades for strongpoints like bunker, concrete buildings, basements etc. Room-entry will be preceded by these followed by routine room-clearing. Entrenched enemy heavy weapons will be pre-located and the buildings either levelled or allowing combat teams to sneak in under smoke cover and turning the heavy weapons on the enemy crew themselves - first subduing them, chaining them up and grouping them according to their crew strength and opening up their own weapons on them, the process and aftermath recorded under video to be distributed to their comrades
Now for the last point - back to my original statement that radical platforms should be introduced in response to FIBUA situations against a guerilla enemy. That is, to employ mechanised armoured walker platforms (bipedal and quadipedal) that can reach into upper floors and either engage the enemy sniper-MG-AT teams head-on or pour out the infantry against them at their level. Hand-to-hand combat would be preferred, with treatment of enemies in the way the Gurkhas would to any enemy, all recorded on video and distributed to enemy comrades -
Huh? What are you talking about? In the context of FIBUA, light AFVs, especialy light tanks are extremely vulnerable. While smaller and more nimble, they are unable to stop almost any kind of anti-armour weapon thrown at it. And in FIBUA, you getting hit is very likely. This is why when the unavoidable happens, you need armour to get you through.Originally posted by paulho:er .. first of all the topic was not directed against any entity or country, the example was merely used to illustrate why it is a bad idea to replace all our light tanks for heavy ones in SEA context to fighting in built up areas.
The US army had plenty of experience with light tanks and TDs fighting German armour in FIBUA situtation, and they soon found that the idea of lighter, faster does not work well in FIBUA. In the enclosed urban areas, mobility was less important then armour and when a tank faced AFVs, unless they got off the first shot, the TD was toast. What you need is not excessive mobility.
FIBUA is more of a slow and dangerous advance more of the time then a dance between buildings fighting a big tank. Often, you can stumbled across an ambush and in a light unit, you have no chance of surviving a hit.
An Abrams tank, properly supported by infantry or other AFVs covering its rear and flank is pratically invulnerable as long as its frontal armour faces the enemy. Almost nothing can get through to it and it can kill anything that dares show up.Contary to belief that the LAW is useless against MBT. True the MBT it can probably withstand the first shot but if you fired 5-6 LAW it will break every tank has vulnerbilities, a good example would be the Merkava that was 'killed' when it ran over a large home-made explosive charge in palestine.
Wrong again. An MBT is vulnerable in its weaker side, rear and top armour, but the frontal armour can wistand more then its fair share of hits. Armour tatics in FIBUA deploy the units in such a way that they cover each others weak spots and present the strongest armour to the enemy. As I said, tatics count as much as armour.
You can fire as many LAWs as you want at a well armoured MBT like the Abrams, but it won't do you no good as long as the strongest armour faced you. To get through with a lucky shot from the front means an inpratical number of LAWs fired, to what end? Attract attention from the MBT and its support elements?
As a testiment to the error of your points, several Abrams tanks were hit by RPG up to fifteen times rumbling through Bagdad and suffered no significant damage whatsoever. The combination of armour and tatics meant that the Iraqis resisting could never get a shot at the tanks' weak spot without being gunned down and the shots they could get off were wasted on the strongest armour.
And that homemade device that killed the Merkava was anything but small, it was a 250 kilo bomb, more then enough to kill even the strongest tank in the world. -
Originally posted by SingaporeTyrannosaur:
Actually, the point you made here is nearly what happened in the war in Lebanon in 1982 (Peace for Galilee). The IDF was facing Hizbollah throwing them RPGs, Syrian with their tanks in Beruit and the IDF pretty much employed the very tactics of deploying tanks as you have described here. The Centurions, M60s basically had reactive armoured protecting the front of the hull, the side of the turrent and the portion of the top of the turret. The reactive armour practically absorbed most of the RPG hits. Most of IDF tank loses were in fact due to Syrian tank fire in tank vs tank engagement. Of course IDF won the day with some 150 tanks lost whereas Syrian lost up to 400 tanks.
Wrong again. An MBT is vulnerable in its weaker side, rear and top armour, but the frontal armour can wistand more then its fair share of hits. Armour tatics in FIBUA deploy the units in such a way that they cover each others weak spots and present the strongest armour to the enemy. As I said, tatics count as much as armour.
You can fire as many LAWs as you want at a well armoured MBT like the Abrams, but it won't do you no good as long as the strongest armour faced you. To get through with a lucky shot from the front means an inpratical number of LAWs fired, to what end? Attract attention from the MBT and its support elements?
As a testiment to the error of your points, several Abrams tanks were hit by RPG up to fifteen times rumbling through Bagdad and suffered no significant damage whatsoever. The combination of armour and tatics meant that the Iraqis resisting could never get a shot at the tanks' weak spot without being gunned down and the shots they could get off were wasted on the strongest armour.
It was actually a home-made mine, detonated at the bottom of the Mekarva III Baz. Because of this the Mekarva Iv had added floor armour and a more V-shape hull bottom to divert blast away from from the center.
And that homemade device that killed the Merkava was anything but small, it was a 250 kilo bomb, more then enough to kill even the strongest tank in the world.[/b] -
General Tactical Observations for Operation Peace for Galilee
PLO and Syrian snipers
Both PLO and Syrians snipers were effective in blocking Israeli advances. Although poorly trained and equipped PLO snipers delayed IDF operations in Sidon, and Syrians snipers held up IDF operations in the southeastern suburbs of Beirut. The snipers main effect was psychological, forcing IDF personnel to keep their heads down. However, they were also an important source of intelligence about battle field conditions.
IDF Infantry & Tanks
The IDF found that armor attacks into urban areas that lacked proper infantry support were almost always more costly in lives and equipment than properly supported operations. During the siege of Beirut the IDF used combined task forces. Tanks and self-propelled artillery were attached to infantry units with the infantry generally retaining command for the duration of the operation. The armour suppressed enemy fire and the infantry shielded the armour from man-portable anti-tank weapons.
The IDF lost few tanks in urban fighting, although it is unclear whether this was due to good design, effective infantry support, or poor PLO anti-tank tactics.
IDF weapons
The IDF issued larger numbers of hand grenades, RPG launchers, light anti-tank weapons, illumination rounds for mortars, short-range tactical radios to infantry platoons deployed to urban centres.
IDF Small Unit Command and Control
IDF authorises small units like companies to operate with substantial independence throughout the battle zone. Juniors are expected to exercise discretion without referring to their superiors.
Smoke
Israeli forces made considerable use of smoke in the battle for Sidon, but made relatively little use of it in the siege of Beirut. Smoke had mixed advantages and disadvantages as it:- Reduced losses as it prevented PLO forces using RPGs and light weapons against the advancing IDF.
- Interfered with visual communication among attacking Israeli forces
[list=]Taxed the driving skills of vehicle operators [/list]
[list=]Slowed the overall rate of advance. [/list]
Mortars
Mortars were generally considered useful because of their psychological effect. Their high angle of fire allowed their use in built up areas. Mortars were extensively used to fire smoke and illumination rounds.
The IDF used small infantry mortars (60mm and the 81mm) that could not penetrate the upper roofs.
The heavier Soviet 120mm mortar could penetrate roofs. (Presumably used by the Syrians.)
The Syrians used the Soviet 240mm towed mortar to gut the top 1 to 3 stories of buildings. It could also crater roads.
Machineguns
The Syrians found machine-guns, especially heavy machine-guns (12.7mm), more useful in urban combat than assault rifles.
Anti-aircraft guns in ground support roles
Both the IDF and their opponents used anti-aircraft guns in urban settings. The AA guns had a sufficiently high elevation to be able to target upper stories of buildings (unlike other vehicle mounted weapons, for example the machinegun on the M113 couldn't reach upper stories), and a high rate of fire to suppress enemy forces (including snipers) to peel off the facade of buildings.
The IDF used the M163 Vulcan 20mm anti-aircraft guns.
The Syrian tactical doctrine used an anti-aircraft section of ZU-23 23mm cannons with a tank battalion whenever operating in an urban environment.
The PLO also used anti-aircraft guns in a ground-support role.
PLO SPG
The PLO produced self-propelled anti-aircraft artillery by mounting Soviet ZPU-1/2/4 14.5mm heavy machine-guns and ZU-23 23mm autocannons on light commercial trucks.
Helicopters
The Israelis made virtually no use of helicopter gun-ships in cities due to their vulnerability to anti-aircraft weapons and ground-fire.
Helicopters were only widely used in cities for transporting men and materiel from rear areas to just behind the front lines.
RPG
PLO forces were equipped with one RPG for every 3-6 fighters, although training in their use was often poor.
In an anti-tank role RPGs had little success against the Israeli Merkava tank, but forced the IDF to stop using M113 APCs in combat. The M113's aluminum armor tended to catch on fire after being hit by anti-tank weapons.
RPGs were more widely used as general purpose weapons for attacking troops in buildings, behind barricades, or for harassing fire.
Armoured bulldozers
IDF combat engineers used armored bulldozers to clear barricades, to smother bunkers, establish firing positions, widen and grade roads, and to create alternative avenues of advance to by-pass the urban infrastructure
IDF APC
The IDF had little success when using the M113 in Tyre. The limitations included:
Vulnerability to RPG fire. Their aluminum armour burst into flame when hit causing extensive IDF casualties.
Inability to provide suppressing fire. Their machine-guns lacked sufficient elevation to use against upper stories of building.
Extreme vulnerability to sniper fire for the crews serving out-side mounted machine-guns.
Inability to maneuver in narrow roads and allys of cities and refugee camps.
Increasingly IDF fear of RPG ambushes meant the infantry simply walked next to their APCs or rode outside. By the time of the siege of Beirut APCs were not used in the front line.
The IDF resorted to some make shift transport for their infantry:
With it ammunition racks removed the Merkava tank could transport 10 troops who entered/exited via the rear door. Similarly the Merkava was also used as an improvised armored ambulance.
The IDF also adapted an armored engineering vehicle called the Nagma-chon. Normally used to carry engineering troops it could also take infantry. It was relatively invulnerable to RPGs because its glacis and superstructure were protected by Blazer reactive armor.
The Israelis added passive spaced-armor to existing APCs.
source: http://www.balagan.org.uk/war/arab-israeli/1982.htm -
A very nifty solution to all future war scenarios of avoiding being targeted by enemy AT teams - blind themOriginally posted by SingaporeTyrannosaur:Wrong again. An MBT is vulnerable in its weaker side, rear and top armour, but the frontal armour can wistand more then its fair share of hits. Armour tatics in FIBUA deploy the units in such a way that they cover each others weak spots and present the strongest armour to the enemy. As I said, tatics count as much as armour.
You can fire as many LAWs as you want at a well armoured MBT like the Abrams, but it won't do you no good as long as the strongest armour faced you. To get through with a lucky shot from the front means an inpratical number of LAWs fired, to what end? Attract attention from the MBT and its support elements?
As a testiment to the error of your points, several Abrams tanks were hit by RPG up to fifteen times rumbling through Bagdad and suffered no significant damage whatsoever. The combination of armour and tatics meant that the Iraqis resisting could never get a shot at the tanks' weak spot without being gunned down and the shots they could get off were wasted on the strongest armour.
And that homemade device that killed the Merkava was anything but small, it was a 250 kilo bomb, more then enough to kill even the strongest tank in the world.
Vehicles and personnel should be equipped with portable devices that emit high intensity light all around, enough to disorient enemy gunners and cause them to dispace from their perches or go into hiding. The attacking force shall be equipped with equipment that negates such effects to themselves, either external electronics for vehicles or implanted with chipsets in their bodies. The raiding parties will then go in and dismember the remnants of the entrenched enemy - recording all the treatment of them on video to be distributed to their comrades... -
Every AT gunner knows that there is more than one way to disable at a tank, only the iraqiÂ’s are stupid enuf to shoot at the most shielded front of 1 of the most formidable tank in the world. I think saddam never sent his AT gunners for any training, mebbe save cost to build more palaces. In a sense the Americans were lucky they faced one of the lousiest trained armies in the world. Dun think will be so lucky if they faced off the Chinese or North Koreans using same AT weapons in a fibua environment.Originally posted by SingaporeTyrannosaur:Wrong again. An MBT is vulnerable in its weaker side, rear and top armour, but the frontal armour can wistand more then its fair share of hits. Armour tatics in FIBUA deploy the units in such a way that they cover each others weak spots and present the strongest armour to the enemy. As I said, tatics count as much as armour.
You can fire as many LAWs as you want at a well armoured MBT like the Abrams, but it won't do you no good as long as the strongest armour faced you. To get through with a lucky shot from the front means an inpratical number of LAWs fired, to what end? Attract attention from the MBT and its support elements?
As a testiment to the error of your points, several Abrams tanks were hit by RPG up to fifteen times rumbling through Bagdad and suffered no significant damage whatsoever. The combination of armour and tatics meant that the Iraqis resisting could never get a shot at the tanks' weak spot without being gunned down and the shots they could get off were wasted on the strongest armour.
And that homemade device that killed the Merkava was anything but small, it was a 250 kilo bomb, more then enough to kill even the strongest tank in the world.
As you say a tank is vulnerable at the top, rear and side being less shielded. Which means that any tank be it abrams, leclerc, T72 or amx13 already has such vulnerability.
In the given Chechnya ambush scenario where knowledgeable AT gunner teams are deployed in advantageous locations on high floors with full panoramic view of the oncoming MBT convoy into the canalised kill area where known vehicle movement is restricted and the tactic used which not uncommon is to disable the first and last vehicle thereby trapping everything in between for destruction.
Would you say that in such a scenario a lighter tank trapped in the center sharing same vulnerabilities which you speak in the MBT but being smaller and more nimble will be able to respond better and maybe escape destruction than itÂ’s heavier lumbering counterpart?
You also spoke of the armor tactics employed by the Americans when taking bagdad, being a gunner myself I am curious to know what these tactics are. Maybe you would like to share this information? -
First off. I must say that this has been one of the most interesting thread in MN for sometime.
Secondly, I think that Paul has a valid point in that the enemy's NOT dumb. I.e. in Chechnya's case, you have people who know your vulnerability and are determined to make you pay for it. So knowing where to hit and how to do it strategically i.e. ambush first and last of the convoy idea is important on how one should react to it.
Thirdly, I think the lessons learnt from Chechnya, Lebanon, Somalia should be consolidated:
1. It seems from Israel's experience that the more armour coupled with proper support from infantry is the key. Note that light APC like M113 does not work and that head to head confrontation with MBTs resulted in tank losses. But tank losses to enemy infantry was low. This might be attributed to lowly trained enemies with low knowledge of Israeli tank structures. But in war, enemies learn to adapt really fast. So I think that somehow the Israelis got it right in deploying the way they did (merkava armoured carriers - who would have thought of that. !!
)
2. However, if there isn't such clear doctrine of that infantry calls the shot, armour acts as support, mount proper armaments like AA guns to reach high buildings, then you may end with Somalia and Chechnya's fiasco where somehow the senior commands underestimated the enemy and had no clue of the ground. In this sense, Paul's original article only serves to strengthen the use of MBT albeit knowing its weaknesses and effectively countering it.
My conclusion would be to go with MBTs and heavy armour troop carriers with infantry driving the FIBUA operations. No helicopters in the front line (see somalia and recent Iraqi operations where Apache will wither in the face of concentrated ground infantry fire - blame it on all the high tech wizardry). Get the motars and arti support going with proper UAV real time information back to ops hq.
Starving the city can be done if you are the US with tons of logistics and troops at hand. Remember, by starving the city, you are also need to feed your troops cordoning the city.
My two cents. -
Are our bionix and ultras sufficiently armoured to survive in urban fighting? I suggest converting the tempest to APC like what the israelis have done to their centurion.
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Very True, in the battle for Grozny, After being initially mauled the russians re-grouped, adapted and changed tactics but in the end they paid a very dear price in terms of manpower equipment and materiel just to re-take and defend every single every building in the city took 60,000 troops against just 12,000 Chechian fighters, even then this was at times not enough.Originally posted by vaxjunior:Starving the city can be done if you are the US with tons of logistics and troops at hand. Remember, by starving the city, you are also need to feed your troops cordoning the city.
My two cents.
Also interesting how the russians later used counter ambush tactics against the AT gunners waiting to ambush them.
Some points and suggestions raised by other posters co-incide with the russian fact finding.
I tried to paste the original text unfortunately the post is too big
the full story can be found here
http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/war/docs/grozny.htm -
I doubt the quality of the Iraqi "army" was that deplorable back then. Rather consider why, some tanks, getting hit by RPGs nearly 20 times, all took their shots to their strongest areas?Originally posted by paulho:Every AT gunner knows that there is more than one way to disable at a tank, only the iraqiÂ’s are stupid enuf to shoot at the most shielded front of 1 of the most formidable tank in the world. I think saddam never sent his AT gunners for any training, mebbe save cost to build more palaces. In a sense the Americans were lucky they faced one of the lousiest trained armies in the world. Dun think will be so lucky if they faced off the Chinese or North Koreans using same AT weapons in a fibua environment.
While AT gunners can be this good, tankies themselves can also do much to make life difficult for them. There is more then one way of protecting yourself from AT gunners then just armour.As you say a tank is vulnerable at the top, rear and side being less shielded. Which means that any tank be it abrams, leclerc, T72 or amx13 already has such vulnerability.
It's more about how you manage the vulnerability then actually having the vulnerability.In the given Chechnya ambush scenario where knowledgeable AT gunner teams are deployed in advantageous locations on high floors with full panoramic view of the oncoming MBT convoy into the canalised kill area where known vehicle movement is restricted and the tactic used which not uncommon is to disable the first and last vehicle thereby trapping everything in between for destruction.
This is expected, but however, there are ways to manage these scenarios, such as having close air support or a backup convoy at hand to relief each other. Such vulnerabilites can also be limited by having good intelligence.Would you say that in such a scenario a lighter tank trapped in the center sharing same vulnerabilities which you speak in the MBT but being smaller and more nimble will be able to respond better and maybe escape destruction than itÂ’s heavier lumbering counterpart?
On the flip side, it's far more likely for a lighter tank to be caught in such a sceneriao because it is far more likely to get knocked out, even by a frontal shot, and lacking the firepower or armour to stay in the fight long enough to survive it.
And of course, the term "heavier, lumbering" is pretty much a misnomer as well, modern MBTs like the Abrams or Leopard have as much mobility then any light tank (in fact, more so then our AMX-13) and in an urban envionment, a 15 ton tank will block a road as easily as a 60 ton one. All that "mobility" (which is false anyway), hardly counts for much when you can't get anywhere.
So in such a sceneriao, one finds that the light tank actually fares far, far worse then an heavy unit.
This was proven in WW2 when American lighter armour was usually toast when it was ambushed or caught in a quickdraw situtation with German armour. In an Urban situtation, light tanks have problems surviving because when you are a tank, light and small is a misnomer.You also spoke of the armor tactics employed by the Americans when taking bagdad, being a gunner myself I am curious to know what these tactics are. Maybe you would like to share this information?
I don't have the specifics but they apparently employed a type of rolling fortess convoy defence consisting of Abrams and Bradelys when they went on their armoured probes. Where every single unit covered his own quadrant and protected the flank of another. Anybody trying to get a shot in at the weak area of one of the AFVs will have to content with fire from the units guarding that flank.
Note that the primary form of anti-tank activity in GW2 was not tank battles, but insurgents setting up anti-armour ambushes.
They no doubt chose their routes with a lot care and intelligence before hand, to prevent the kind of ambush you described. By using high mobility (they didn't creep around on their probes) and overwhelming firepower whenever they encountered resitance, they gave the enemy very little time to react to their moves.
The ruskies on the other hand, went in dumb, slow and blind. No surprise why they ended up this way.
Anyway the point remains that using light tanks in an urban context is sucide unless you are on a light operation where you do not expect much anti-armour resistence.
Our AMX-13 won't last long in an urban battle. -
I tend to disagree on that point. If I was the AT gunner in the ambush scenario and had to choose between 2 tank targets in a split second, I will go for the bigger broomstick first. 2 reasons.Originally posted by SingaporeTyrannosaur:On the flip side, it's far more likely for a lighter tank to be caught in such a sceneriao because it is far more likely to get knocked out, even by a frontal shot, and lacking the firepower or armour to stay in the fight long enough to survive it.
And of course, the term "heavier, lumbering" is pretty much a misnomer as well, modern MBTs like the Abrams or Leopard have as much mobility then any light tank (in fact, more so then our AMX-13) and in an urban envionment, a 15 ton tank will block a road as easily as a 60 ton one. All that "mobility" (which is false anyway), hardly counts for much when you can't get anywhere.
So in such a sceneriao, one finds that the light tank actually fares far, far worse then an heavy unit.
1) The surprise only last for a while. The bigger tank though more difficult to kill but is potentially more dangerous foe. All the AT will be gunning for it.
2) This one self intuition. The bigger tank more visible & has more 'target value' than a lighter one. Lighter tank has lesser value take second priority after all if bigger tank is stuck for the time being then so is the lighter one, can come back again for second round.
And abt mbt mobility. In an ambush situation most likely one end of road in the kill area will be barricaded. If the big tank cannot move forward, light tank also cannot. But based on above 2 reasons within the limited confines in the midst of the chaos a lighter tank may have more chance to return fire or can at the very least dive into a hole or a small alley to escape destruction. Your mbt cannot move at all is a roasted duck for the dinner table. -
That's why intelligence is extremely important, you can have the fastest, or most protected tank in the world and they won't be much good if you send them in blind. They very reason why the Ruskies failed miserably seems to be an effect of their poor training, inflexible thinking, lack of respect for the enemy, poor intelligence, and clunkiness in their movements, rather then a fault on their hardware.Originally posted by paulho:I tend to disagree on that point. If I was the AT gunner in the ambush scenario and had to choose between 2 tank targets in a split second, I will go for the bigger broomstick first. 2 reasons.
1) The surprise only last for a while. The bigger tank though more difficult to kill but is potentially more dangerous foe. All the AT will be gunning for it.
2) This one self intuition. The bigger tank more visible & has more 'target value' than a lighter one. Lighter tank has lesser value take second priority after all if bigger tank is stuck for the time being then so is the lighter one, can come back again for second round. [/quote]
Your points are not without merit, but I feel that there is a big flip side to this. A target can only be a target when it is present. Hence, when you have a convoy of light tanks, as opposed to MBTs, light tanks are still going to attract as much fire as an MBT for the reason that they are the only targets around. And the problem arises when light tanks are easily knocked out.
However, if you are talking in terms of a mixed convoy, then naturally a MBT would be an inviting target. However any savy AT gunner will know to knock out the light AFVs as they make as good a roadblock as any MBT, and not to mention they are easier to knock out.
Hence, mixing in light tanks with MBTs, one can conclude that light tanks are actually impose a liability. As they are more likely to stall a convoy when they get knocked out. An MBT can bash through a knocked out three tonner but it can't move a light tank out of the way, unless it has a dozer blade maybe.
In the end, you still need MBTs to protect the light tanks and take their fire for them for your point to work, without MBTs, the light tanks are toast.
[quote]And abt mbt mobility. In an ambush situation most likely one end of road in the kill area will be barricaded. If the big tank cannot move forward, light tank also cannot. But based on above 2 reasons within the limited confines in the midst of the chaos a lighter tank may have more chance to return fire or can at the very least dive into a hole or a small alley to escape destruction. Your mbt cannot move at all is a roasted duck for the dinner table.
Do you think they will fare any better if they had light tanks instead of their T-72s and T-80s? I suspect they'll take heavier losses.
Light tanks are useful as they can be rapidly deployed into global hotspots to provide rapid response or armoured support to light units, however in a protracted FIBUA situtation, they are not a subsitute for heavy armour.
What an MBT provides you however, is tatical options. With good intelligence, you an MBT like the Abrams, with heavy firepower and protection and mobility, you can keep the enemy off balance by literally storming their positions. In Iraqi, most RPG gunners couldn't get off more then one shot before they were overrun or killed, if they fired at all, and most of their shots were wasted anyway.
The Iraqi "ambushes" were knocked out and overrun before they could even be effective. By overrunning the enemy and keeping him off balance, you can effectively spoil all of this efforts to set up an ambush, let alone a defence.
However, if any light tank probe were to try this, they would have almost certainly been knocked out, they have a hard time surviving, let alone do their job.
Your "reliance" on light tanks taking cover and escaping ambushes (which is a marginal advantage over the MBT anyway) seems a shaky and rather narrow view of the true nature of armour in FIBUA, focusing on ambushes rather then the entire spectrum of armour in FIBUA situtations.
At the end of the day, when you do the math, you'll realize that MBTs are far more useful in an heavy FIBUA situtation then a light tank. You don't use a ball pen hammer to do a sledghammer's job.