Originally posted by zenden9:
How u know? Get any facts to back u? Will naval helos be really outdated at that time? UAV really more cost efficient and perform better than naval helos? Talk is cheap without facts
luckily for us... there are those in SAF who sees the future of unmanned combat vehicles for all 3 services of SAF 6 years ago!!....

http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer/back/journals/1998/Vol24_1/4.htm
Unmanned Warfare
by MAJ Tew See Mong
INTRODUCTION
Manpower scarcity has been a perennial problem for many armed forces around the world. Over the years, there has been a decline in the absolute numerical make-up of these organisations, which, if not managed properly, can affect their operational capabilities. This scarcity is a situation that is unlikely to improve in the foreseeable future, given the current low birth rates and conflicting demands for manpower.
From a numerical perspective, this constraint means that the armed forces cannot mass together the sheer number of ground troops as before. From a risk perspective, every soldier on the battlefield is now a precious resource which should not be exposed to unnecessary risks. This translates into further constraints for battle planners, who may not have the leeway to select the riskier but more expedient military options. Finally, from the skills perspective, smaller population bases make it difficult to find, select, train and develop specialised combatant resources like pilots and submariners.
Thus, it is crucial that new avenues be explored to circumvent this prevalent trend of manpower shortages. One viable solution lies in exploiting technology and pushing the limits of force multipliers. Within the domain of force multipliers, there lies a relatively new discipline, unmanned warfare.
DEFINITION
The definition of 'unmanned' chosen for this article is fairly loose, as the emphasis is not solely on taking men out of machines but also on how to employ technology to make better use of its manpower. Thus, while the focus is on unmanned warfare in its literal sense, the article will also touch on some equipment or systems which result in lower manpower usage (or higher operational capability with the same manning). In so doing, please accept that some aspects of this article border on technological innovation as opposed to unmanned warfare per se.
POTENTIAL OF UNMANNED WARFARE
Unmanned warfare is a relatively new approach in the conduct of warfare, where the boundaries are not well charted and limited largely by our imaginations. Unmanned warfare will not only help overcome manpower and resource constraints but will also enhance operational capabilities, since it can now move into areas where mankind has previously feared to tread. With unmanned warfare, the competitive advantage can be swung such that human numerical superiority is no longer an overwhelming advantage or a pre-requisite for victory.
WHY UNMANNED?
The impetus to go unmanned include optimising the deployment of manpower, enhancing operational capabilities and being able to venture into territory once out-of-bounds to mankind (e.g. deep ocean, space). In particular, unmanned systems should be used to replace humans where the work is dangerous, dirty or dull.
Some specific advantages in going unmanned include:
Reduction in manpower requirement. Developments in unmanned technology now enables machines to perform tasks once undertaken by operators with equal if not better precision. This direct substitution of manpower will lead to a corresponding reduction in manpower needs.
Overcome fatigue and human error. Machines do not tire out as easily as men. Operations that require constant alert or repetitive work over long durations are thus potential areas where unmanned warfare can be profitably employed.
Minimise hazards. Risks to humans can be reduced as unmanned systems can take over hazardous jobs previously done by human beings.
Cost savings. Besides manpower savings, there are also cost reductions in the form of human cost (life) savings, training cost savings or even system cost savings as new unmanned systems can enhance work flow and improve general work cycles.
Despite these advantages, there are several limitations which must be recognised and reconciled. Some of the limitations include:
Decision making. Although unmanned systems are becoming increasingly sophisticated and 'intelligent', it is still difficult to entrust machines with subjective decision making. We must avoid careless delegation of responsibilities to technology that perform only under programmed patterns.
Applicability. In certain areas and vocations, unmanned warfare acts merely as a catalyst to facilitate achieving the ultimate goal. The claim that there is no victory until the humble foot soldier occupies the objective is likely to remain valid for some time yet.
Diminution of esprit de corps. As manpower is increasingly scattered, we could witness diminishing avenues for display of teamwork, leadership, valour and other human qualities that make up a well trained and well-oiled armed force. This gradual 'erosion' of values belonging to the profession of arms must be guarded against.
LAND THEATRE UNMANNED WARFARE
The land theatre has traditionally been the largest employers of manpower. With reducing manpower and increasing battlefield risks, technology is no longer regarded as just a force multiplier, but rather one that would produce a paradigm shift in warfighting.
Manpower requirements can be dramatically reduced in the battlefield with unmanned platforms. UAVs, coupled with appropriate sensors, are able to give commanders a bird's eye view of the battlefield, without having to incur risks to himself, observers or pilots. Such a view has obvious benefits - to the intelligence community, to manoeuvre commanders and to targeting agencies. UAVs can also be employed as rebro or electronic warfare platforms. In the longer term, armed UAVs may well become operationally and economically viable, thus enabling them to perform tactical attack roles.
Tactical Unmanned Ground Vehicles (TUGV), the ground equivalent of UAVs, are able to perform some of the roles currently done by UAVs. Equipped with weaponry or sensors, they could complement or even replace some of the roles assumed by scouts and signallers. In these roles, one edge of the TUGV over the UAV is its staying power and ability to hold ground. TUGV is also able to breach and open minefields/ obstacles and clear axes for armour and logistics re-supply.
Unmanned Ground Sensors (UGS) are a cost effective replacement for manned systems that have previously been used for monitoring or for communications. They can, for example, be deployed by helicopters or C-130 to critical points to detect time critical mobile targets (i.e. manoeuvre forces, tank columns). They can also be used as signals nodes to serve as communication relay platforms, thus relieving signals personnel from performing a tedious and time consuming job.
Dramatic break throughs in robotics and tele-operated mine breaching can greatly reduce the labour-intensive nature of mine-clearing. Also, development of new mine detection technology now permits untrained troopers, using devices which incorporate thermal imaging and ground penetrating radar, to be able to detect metallic and non-metallic mines. This reduces the dependence on specialised combat engineers and simultaneously increases operational capability through speedy mine detection.
There are a few additional unmanned systems that are a long way from seeing operational employment, but which are worth mentioning in view of their long term potential. For example, developments in unmanned technology include robots that can undertake dangerous and dirty work. The US military has been pursuing the concept of 'Pointman' for some time. Pointman is a light-weight, sensor-laden, armed robot used to reconnoiter buildings, bunkers and tunnels, in order to detect booby traps, explosives and the enemy. It will be able to climb stairs, operate in all weather and light conditions, and is expected to be especially useful in what the US Army terms 'operations other than war'.
Still looking at longer term developments, armour units may one day field remotely-controlled tanks. One of the modes of employment is to have one manned tank control and operate two unmanned, remote-controlled tanks. Navigation and targeting inputs provided by the tank commander are utilised by the remote-controlled tanks to acquire and destroy targets. The firepower of armour units can hence be enhanced tremendously with fewer or similar numbers of tank crews.
Remotely-controlled self-propelled guns or howitzers could operate together with manned guns using the same concept as the remote controlled tanks. This concept seems closer to fruition than unmanned tanks, as the technological challenges appear less daunting. The need for human judgement in each individual fighting unit also appears less critical.
UNMANNED WARFARE IN THE AIR
Plagued with constraints of limited human resources and a sizable reduction in the pool of youths who fulfill stringent recruitment requirements, air forces around the world will be compelled to explore means to maintain or extend their operational capabilities with an increasingly trim fighting force.
The employment of unmanned platforms in the modern battlefield serves to alleviate problems caused by the shortage in manpower and resources. In employing unmanned platforms, pilots may also be removed from aircraft penetrating defended enemy airspace, thus reducing the danger arising from exposure to hostile fire.
The benefits are immediately obvious. First, human attrition will be reduced. Second, the aircrew whose functions are now assumed by unmanned platforms can be channeled to other crucial functions like air defence, C31 and transportation missions. Finally, planners will be able to undertake more risky but decisive combat missions, such as SEAD, without exposing aircrew to excessive risk.
UAVs can broadly be characterised as lethal and non-lethal systems. As its name suggests, non-lethal UAVs refers to the class of UAVs used for reconnaissance, surveillance, relay, target designation, ECM, SIGINT, ELINT, radar decoy and meteorological surveillance. Lethal UAVs, of course, refer to the class of UAVs which inflicts physical damage to enemy assets or installations operations.
Non-Lethal UAVs
Many non-lethal UAV roles have become well-established in many armed forces. Reconnaissance UAVs are widely used to map the enemy's defence locations, practices, electronic profiles and vulnerabilities. As their endurance and payload improve, these UAVs can take on the more demanding surveillance and airborne early warning functions as well. EW UAVs are capable of using chaff and ECM to degrade the enemy's radar or communications. Used together with anti-radiation missiles or drones, these EW UAVs can effectively shut down the enemy's radar operations. In SEAD) operations, UAVs can be deployed as decoys to entice the defenders to turn on their radars or fire their missiles at the wrong targets. Manned strikers following behind the UAVs can then move in to complete their missions with relative ease.
Lethal UAVs
Lethal UAVs can best be looked at by dividing them into two distinct categories: counter-air and strike. I will examine these two components separately and assess the viability of UAVs to replace manned aircraft during wartime.
Air-to-air combat is very dynamic and dependent upon the pilot's judgment and skill to outwit and out-manoeuver the aggressor so as to get into an advantageous position for the kill. This applies even when an aircraft is armed with the most advanced AAMs, especially if the enemy is similarly equipped. Furthermore, in an air battle, the air picture is usually a complex one, with many real-time injects like weather, use of ECM or ECCM, changes in tactics, attntion, etc. The pilots, with the help of GCI, will have to make impromptu, split- second decisions to circumvent the friction of war.
The use of UAVs as interceptors will expose one of its biggest shortcomings; its lack of decision making abilities. However advanced the UAV, it is still unable to replace the pilot in a dog-fight. The situational awareness is just not the same. More often than not, UAVs are very scenario dependent and operate well only in a predictable environment. The lack of a human on board limits a UAV to perform mostly pre-programmed standard functions.
Although UAVs cannot replace manned fighters in air-to-air combat, they can be used as decoys to reduce friendly losses. Decoys can be scrambled together with manned interceptors to complicate the enemy's air picture, distracting their pilots or causing them to expend their missiles on the decoys.
Strike missions are a hazardous task as the strike aircraft are susceptible to many threats: enemy fighters, SAMs, AAA etc. A typical strike mission would involve a lot of resources. Besides the strikers, sweepers to fly ahead and clear the path for their transit. In addition, to have accompanying escort fighters are needed to eliminate hostile aircraft that slip through to threaten the strike aircraft.
UAVs can be used to reduce the heavy demands and risks of strike missions. Many strike aircraft and bombers follow a pre-determined route into enemy territory and strike specific targets on the ground. The predictable nature of this task makes it suitable for UAV execution. Technically, the cruise missile is a small, disposable UAV. These missiles are cost-effective, proven in war, and do not need escorts or sweepers. Re-usable bomber UAVs are also under development, but these are probably less flexible and effective than missiles as they would require a great deal more support for them to fulfill their role.
A final benefit of using UAVs is that they are less dependent on runways. Most unmanned platforms are easier to store and deploy than fixed wing aircraft, and many do not need a long runway to launch from. Of particular significance, land or sea launched cruise missiles would allow an armed force to retain a long-range strike capability even if its runways were closed and its aircraft temporarily grounded.
NAVAL UNMANNED WARFARE
Unmanned platforms are relatively new naval forces. Naval forces should consider adopting more unmanned systems in the naval theatre, with manned warships deployed as a controlling force or a follow-up strike force when a high casualty rate has been inflicted on the opposing force.
They are the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (UUV) and Sound Ocean Surveillance System (SOSUS). The following discusses the ways these platforms can replace or supplement a navy's manned platforms and improve its operational effectiveness.
UAVs
Navies should acquire a mix of ground based and sea launched UAVs. Complete surveillance packages configured for tactical surveillance should be available in the sea launched version. Real time data-linked, probably through satellite communications, should be the main command and control requirement so that commanders ashore and at sea are able assess the reconnaissance picture. High adaptability to mission changes and reassignment should also be essential features of the vehicle.
Land based UAVs should augment the manned Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) so that round the clock surveillance and intelligence collection can be achieved. These UAVs would be especially useful at the beginning of war when naval warships have to be deployed beyond NADA controlled areas. The UAVs will remove the need to send manned MPAs to unprotected airspace, thus reducing the risk to the aircraft and its crew.
Sea-launched UAVs would by necessity, be lighter and have less endurance than their land based counterparts. However, they have an important role in that they provide flexibility and autonomy to the commanders at sea, who can then solve immediate tactical surveillance problems without assistance from shore.
For littoral warfare, UAVs should be able to solve some of the problems when ships operate in proximity to land. When warships operate in hostile coastal waters, the risk is invariantly higher as they are subjected to threat from ashore and ambushing enemy military or para-military craft. Surveillance pictures provided by UAVs would finish task group commanders with valuable early warning of enemy presence.
Clearance of island groups by warships is another challenging task. In this case, a naval force should further exploit unmanned technology by acquiring remote controlled arsenal craft equipped with short to medium range high discrimination missiles to engage hostile craft detected by the UAV.
In the area of naval gun fire support, UAVs can provide spotting and eventually Target Damage Assessment to the Shore Bombardment Commander.
Undersea Vehicles
The application of unmanned vehicles for underwater warfare is predominantly in the area of mine clearance. Mine clearance in hostile waters can be fulfilled with the Self-propelled Acoustic and Magnetic Minesweeping System (SAMMS). This unmanned, remotely controlled mine sweeping craft is capable of establishing a safe route through mined waters.
Navies could consider acquiring a passive mine clearance capability so as to expand their mine-sweeping versatility. The US Navy is currently developing a tactical scale Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (UUV) to conduct covert, fully autonomous, long duration mine warfare and tactical oceanography in littoral waters. To date, the UUV has demonstrated a navigational accuracy of 0.18% of distance traveled. Such a vehicle allows naval forces to conduct covert mine clearance and seabed surveys during POT when aggressive counter-mine measures could not be conducted. Another advantage of the UUV is that it can be launched covertly from a submarine.
Anti-Submarine Warfare
Manned assets are still largely used in the area of Anti-Submarine Warfare, as it remains the playground for tacticians. However, SOSUS can be used to monitor submarine movements at various key points in our area of operations. This will reduce the demands on manned anti-submarine warfare assets. With further development in UAVs, ASW packages can also be fitted onboard to provide an extended arm to airborne ASW.
TECHNOLOGY FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNMANNED SYSTEMS
Competition to dominate the battlefield of the future is competition to create, adopt and dominate emerging technologies. In the area of unmanned warfare, getting ahead requires:
a. A keen understanding of how future battles would be fought and how unmanned warfare fits in.
b. A developmental process for exploring, assimilating and exploiting current and emerging future technologies applicable in unmanned systems.
The unmanned warfare paradigm may be defined in three dimensions. Service groups broadly describe the various services in the Armed Forces, or who is being satisfied. Service functionalites describe service needs, or what is being satisfied. Technologies describe the way, or how the service groups needs are satisfied. The who and what, having already been discussed, we can see that the how may be classified into three main areas of required technologies. These are:
a. Sensory. This is predominantly in the departments of sight & sound (e.g. to detect the enemy), touch (e.g. to ascertain reality) and smell (e.g. to determine toxicity of air).
b. Mechatronics. This entails the delivery systems upon which the unmanned systems would ride on. It would include technologies such as propulsion, aerodynamics and robotics.
c. C4. For the human operator to command the unmanned systems, technologies that need to be mastered include artificial intelligence, radio-frequency technology and micro-controllers.
The key to mastering unmanned warfare would include the complex tasks of cross-selecting the technological components and integrating them into our military hardware. The selected components should be seen as capabilities a country's armed forces and defence industries must master, for they constitute the very essence of its future fighting capabilities.
Through a systematic and rigorous programme of developing this unmanned capability, new core competencies would emerge and these are potential highways to the future for our local defence industry. Besides providing a country's armed forces with a military advantage, technologies applied in unmanned systems have potential for a myriad of commercial payoffs. For instance, car manufacturers are beginning to explore unmanned driving on highways for safety as well as time and highway efficiency. Hence, unmanned technology offers our defence industry an attractive area to venture into, with additional potential for commercial payoffs.
CONCLUSION
The employment of unmanned platforms in the battlefield serves not only to overcome the constraints arising from manpower and resource shortages, but also increases the operational capability of a fighting force. They will provide tangible increases in combat range, firepower, speed, element of surprise, command and control, etc. As unmanned warfare and the mastery of unmanned technology will become increasingly important parts of a nation's strategic architecture, her armed forces and her defence industries will need to pay appropriate attention to this aspect of warfare.
Note: The writer wishes to thank MAJ Lai Chin Kwang, MAJ Gregory Loh, CPT Chiang Sin Ann, CPT Hi Cheong Leong, CPT Ho Kok Wei, CPT Lee Cher Heng, CPT Ngoh Sien Sen, CPT Soh Teck Kwee, CPT Tan Chee Khiong and CPT Tham Kah Weng for their contributions.
MAJ Tew See Mong is currently in G3-Army. He obtained a BSc (Hons) from NUS in 1990. MAJ Tew attended the Singapore Command and Staff College in 1997.