China vs the United States
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I think it will take some amount of time before the Act can be repealed. The Taiwan lobby there is really powerful. There are really quite a lot of Taiwanese interests in America, just like Jewish interests. It would suit the Americans best, that the status quo is maintained, but they have to realise that the status quo cannot stay forever, China will not allow it.Originally posted by Viper52:I forsee the US leaning more and more towards China in the coming years, and a repeal of the Taiwan Relations Act is only a matter of time. Expect increasing pressure by the US on Taiwan not to rock the boat in the coming years. It will be the same, whether a Republican or Democratic Administration is in charge in the White House. -
The americans seems to be on the decline as a power, r they riding into the sunset? Hard to imagine but these things do happen, only time will tell. Will they tango with the chinese? I think they still remember their near defeat and humiliation during korean war when they underestimated the tactics and tenacity of the little chinese and thought with more superior equipment and firepower over the then ragtag chinese army the "war will be over before christmas".
The russians though no-longer a global power are still v.formidable unlike in the past they now no longer seem to have territorial ambitions in the region rather they seem more interested exploiting home resources, supplying arms and cold war technology to countries in the region, they will benefit the most if war ever breaks out here. But if war breaks too close to home they may still ally with an arch enemy.
China is an emerging global superpower neighbour in this region there is definately going to be impact one day if they keep grabbing everybody's territory. Yes in time we will be courted heavily by both sides but we need to choose carefully, We need to see then who is the power of the day. If we back the yanks and they still lose taiwan in the end then we're horse meat with a huge dragon breathing down our necks. There are no real answers but we should choose out of survival not out of friendship or emotion. -
PENTAGON REPORT
Beijing blames US for military build-up against Taiwan
By Chua Chin Hon
http://straitstimes.asia1.com.sg/asia/story/0,4386,253901,00.html?
BEIJING - Making no apologies for its military build-up against Taiwan, China slammed the United States over the weekend for encouraging the island's pro-independence camp and jeopardising peace in the region.
The broadside was delivered via a commentary carried by the official Xinhua news agency on Sunday which defended the increased military activity as 'necessary'.
'Simply because a handful of people inside and outside of the island are still seeking Taiwan independence, China cannot make a commitment to renouncing the use of force for realising national reunification and has had to make necessary and limited military deployment,' Xinhua said.
'If the US really wants to help maintain peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, it should not have made irresponsible remarks on China's military deployment and used it as an excuse to keep selling advanced weapons to Taiwan.'
The strongly worded commentary came days after the Pentagon issued a new report saying that China is developing a series of 'credible military options' to deter Taiwan independence, or prevent 'third-party intervention in a cross-strait military crisis'.
Beijing was also visibly irked by Taiwan Vice-President Annette Lu's stopover in the US last week while en route to Central America.
The Pentagon report estimates that China has about 500 short-range ballistic missiles deployed against Taiwan, which could destroy the island's key leadership facilities if equipped with adequate guidance systems.
Total military spending by the Chinese last year was estimated to be between US$50 billion (S$85 billion) and US$70 billion - surpassing the officially budgeted amount of US$22 billion - making China the third largest defence spender in the world, after the US and Russia.
During its annual legislative session in March, China announced a further 11.6 per cent increase in military spending as part of its ambitious drive to modernise the People's Liberation Army.
Basing on these trends, the Pentagon report warned that China will in a few years' time be able to inflict significant damage on all of Taiwan's airfields and swiftly degrade its ground-based defences using a combination of short-range ballistic missiles, land-attack cruise missiles, and special operations forces.
Dr Li Nan, a senior fellow with the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, said the Taiwan issue was a key factor behind the military build-up, but was not the only reason.
He told The Straits Times that inter-service competition in the military and political rivalries were also likely to be encouraging the increased spending.
'The hardline position is the right position to take now,' Dr Li added. 'If you take a soft position, you will be seen as selling out.' -
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/d20040528PRC.pdf
The Pentagon report in question. Bloody long report. Below is a section I thought might be interesting. Found on page 48.
PLA Military Options
The PLAÂ’s offensive capabilities improve each year and provide Beijing with an increasing number of credible options to intimidate or actually attack Taiwan. ChinaÂ’s primary goal in acquiring this force most likely is to compel TaipeiÂ’s acquiescence to a
negotiated solution by promising swift and effective retaliation if it does not. Such force therefore would need to be capable of achieving a rapid collapse of TaiwanÂ’s national will and thereby preclude U.S. intervention. The specific coercive military strategy that Beijing would adopt is unclear but is likely to include some combination of the options specified below. A coercive campaign may seek to deter or punish Taiwan through sudden application of violence. China may choose gradually to escalate the level of
military pressure to compel TaiwanÂ’s political leadership to adopt policies favorable to BeijingÂ’s interests. On the other hand, Beijing may seek to deny TaiwanÂ’s military its ability to resist, thereby convincing the leadership to cease resistance. The PLA also
could adopt a decapitation strategy, seeking to neutralize TaiwanÂ’s political and military leadership on the assumption that their successors would accede to Beijing.
PLA Air Campaign
The PLAAF and PLANAF have a combined total of approximately 3,400 aircraft, consisting of air defense and multirole fighters, ground-attack fighter-bombers, and bombers. However, Taiwan maintains a qualitative edge by possessing three times as
many fourth-generation fighters as China. The PLAAF does not appear to have been putting large numbers of aircraft in the air simultaneously, controlling large numbers of engagements, or sustaining high sortie rates for extended periods. Pilot proficiency is
improving, but the capabilities of ChinaÂ’s best pilots lag behind those of their Taiwan counterparts.
However, ChinaÂ’s force modernization, weaponry, pilot training, tactics, and command and control are beginning to erode TaiwanÂ’s qualitative edge. The number of Chinese fourth-generation fighters, principally Su-27 and Su-30 aircraft, is expected to move
closer to TaiwanÂ’s. China will have improved situational awareness. BeijingÂ’s SRBM force also could be used to soften TaiwanÂ’s air defenses and disrupt airbase operations, supporting any air campaign designed to cripple the Taiwan Air Force and damage or
destroy Taiwan military facilities. Over the next several years, given current trends, China most likely will be able to cause significant damage to all of TaiwanÂ’s airfields and quickly degrade TaiwanÂ’s ground-based air defenses and associated command and
control through a combination of SRBMs, land-attack cruise missiles, special operations forces, and other assets.
Conventional Ballistic Missiles ChinaÂ’s growing force of approximately 500 SRBMs is believed to be based in the Nanjing
Military Region directly opposite Taiwan. From their garrisons, any missiles with adequate precision guidance could destroy key leadership facilities, military bases, and communication
and transportation nodes with minimal advanced warning. Some can attack U.S. bases on Okinawa. Longer-range conventional MRBMs are expected ultimately to join the inventory.
Naval Blockade
PLAN modernization is expanding options for a naval blockade of Taiwan. The least hostile blockade option would be one enforced in the South and East China Seas that compelled Taiwan-bound ships to stop in mainland ports for inspections. The most
effective blockade would involve direct action against major Taiwan ports such as declaring and enforcing closure areas in port approaches, mining ports and roadsteads, attacking ships approaching the ports, sinking ships in port channels, or destroying port facilities.
Information Operations
During a cross-Strait conflict, China most likely would initiate an intensive perception management campaign, with both global and regional audiences, to reduce the desire of Taiwan to resist, justify ChinaÂ’s military campaign, and deter U.S. intervention. China
anticipates that this strategy will succeed because of the fragility of the Taiwan populationÂ’s psychology. The Chinese perception management campaign most likely would use Chinese, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and other regional media to deliver messages to
the Taiwan people and leaders.
Unclassified Chinese writings reveal that attacking C4I systems, civilian information technology, and communication infrastructure are critical for gaining information superiority. Prior to an attack, Chinese information operations personnel and special
forces or espionage agents most likely would gain and maintain access to such communication nodes for intelligence exploitation and disrupt critical infrastructure, such as the power grid and vulnerable collocated military and civilian telecommunications.
Exploiting other portions of the information operations spectrum (through electronic warfare and denial and deception) also could disrupt TaiwanÂ’s defenses, and attacks against unclassified DoD computer networks related to logistics could delay U.S. efforts to
intervene.
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PLA Ground Forces
PLA ground forces have a considerable numerical advantage over TaiwanÂ’s Army and Marine forces. Three group armies are based in Nanjing Military Region opposite Taiwan, and several others most likely would be included as part of the primary attack
force in the event of an all-out invasion of the island. Airborne units, special operations forces, and marine units most likely would support these group armies. Despite its numerical advantage, ChinaÂ’s main ground forces have shortcomings in such areas as
sealift and logistics. However, China is steadily expanding its ability to transport ground forces by air. Special forces could play an important role in achieving objectives in which limited goals, scale of force, and time would be crucial to victory. Special forces missions could include reconnaissance, surveillance, targeting, and battle damage assessments; capturing or assassinating VIPs; locating or destroying communication assets, transport nodes, and
logistic depots; capturing or destroying airfields and ports; supporting invasion forces; destroying air defense assets; and conducting denial and deception and information operations.
Amphibious Invasion
If all other military options for subjugating Taiwan failed, Beijing could try to occupy the entire island of Taiwan. Such an operation would require a major commitment of civilian air and maritime transport assets, and success would not be guaranteed. The PLA's
success in a D-Day-style invasion of Taiwan would rest on a number of variables, some tangible -- principally lack of amphibious lift -- as well as a number of intangibles, including personnel and equipment attrition rates on both sides of the Strait; interoperability of PLA forces; and the ability of China's logistic system to support the necessarily high tempo of operations. For an invasion to succeed, Beijing would have to conduct a multifaceted campaign, involving all of the above options in concert. The PLA most likely would encounter great difficulty conducting such a sophisticated campaign throughout the remainder of the decade. Nevertheless, the campaign could succeed -- barring third-party intervention -- if Beijing were willing to accept the political, economic, diplomatic, and military costs that an invasion would produce.
PLA Counters to Foreign Intervention
Beijing sees Washington as the principal hurdle to any attempt to use military force to regain Taiwan. Therefore, deterring or defeating foreign intervention ahead of TaiwanÂ’s capitulation or defeat would be integral to BeijingÂ’s strategy.
Antiaccess Strategy
China could consider a sea- denial strategy to hold at risk U.S. naval forces approaching the Taiwan Strait. Deep-water naval mines, submarines, cruise missiles, and even special forces could be employed to threaten a U.S. aircraft carrier. This strategyÂ’s tactical elements might include shallow and deep-water mines, submarines, and surface combatants. Information operations assets could attack U.S. C4ISR and logistic systems.
Denial and Deception (D&D)
From China’s perspective, denial and deception are interrelated. The goal of D&D is “to induce the other side to take action that will benefit the deceiver in attaining his goals.” China uses military D&D to induce an adversary to make incorrect decisions and take
military actions that favor the Chinese. Chinese D&D practices appear to be intended to delay or reduce U.S. diplomatic and military roles in crises. Chinese D&D concepts include “counter-surveillance” measures limiting the flow of intelligence adversaries can gather on China, such as restricting news, isolating personnel, and blocking core intelligence. “Strategic deception” would interfere with enemy surveillance. China also could transmit a large volume of false information to enemy surveillance systems. Moreover, the PLA could attempt to conceal and disguise
the battlefield to “show the false while hiding the true situation.”
Underground Facilities The Chinese believe they can defeat the U.S. intelligence apparatus by hiding military activity. China has built civil and military underground facilities for at least four
decades, initially because of fear of a possible war with the former Soviet Union. Enormous resources were dedicated to building national command posts, civil defense facilities, and associated communications in defensible nuclear-hardened underground
facilities. Several of these facilities have fallen into disrepair owing to inadequate maintenance, but China implemented a modernization program in the early 1970s through the early 1980s.
These complexes and others like them have been expanded recently following the Gulf War and other U.S. military operations. Chinese exp erts have noted that “long- range air attacks have become an important pattern of modern warfare.” The Chinese believe that a successful strategic air campaign involves attacks on the defending country over a long period, with emphasis on C3 centers, missile facilities (ballistic and air defense), airfields,
and transportation hubs. China is implementing these lessons with a program to camouflage and protect such potential targets by expanding underground facilities. Operation ALLIED FORCE appears to have had at least as much impact on PLA
thinking as the Gulf War, although more as a validation of earlier assessments of the trends of modern warfare than as a catalyst for change. PLA commentary on NATOÂ’s Kosovo air operation concluded that a superior enemyÂ’s situational awareness and
precision-strike systems could be stymied through effective, and often low-technology, counter-reconnaissance measures, such as camouflage and concealment, simple decoys, dispersion, and frequent movement of forces. U.S. air operations reinforced the PLA focus on using underground facilities, landline communications, and well-concealed supply depots.
A Non-HEMP Unconventional Nuclear Weapon Option
Effects other than high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) result from a high-altitude nuclear burst, which causes a substantial change in the ionization of the upper atmosphere, including the ionosphere and magnetosphere. These effects would be likely to significantly degrade warfighting capabilities, including communication links, radar transmissions, and the full spectrum of electro-optic sensors. Depending on the weapon and the altitude of the burst, these effects could persist from seconds to days and extend over thousands of square kilometers. Russian and U.S. experiences with high- altitude nuclear weapon effects have been well documented, and a number of papers are in the public domain and possibly would be known to physicists and engineers worldwide. Thus, PLA theorists who have become aware of these electromagnetic effects may have considered using a nuclear weapon as an unconventional attack option. China could use
high-altitude nuclear bursts to disrupt enemy C4ISR. Sophisticated military capabilities that exploit the full electromagnetic spectrum are more vulnerable to these effects than are less advanced capabilities. In contrast to HEMP, ionization effects would occur
regardless of the weaponÂ’s design or sophistication. This phenomenon raises the possibility of an adversary employing an unsophisticated nuclear weapon as an asymmetric attack option.
TaiwanÂ’s Strengths in Countering PLA Courses of Action
Asymmetric capabilities that Taiwan possesses or is acquiring could deter a Chinese attack by making it unacceptably costly. Taiwan most likely will expand these capabilities either in tandem with or in lieu of improving its conventional forces.
Strike Capabilities Against the Mainland
Taipei political and military leaders have recently suggested acquiring weapon systems capable of standoff strikes against the Chinese mainland as a cost-effective means of deterrence. TaiwanÂ’s Air Force already has a latent capability for airstrikes against China. Leaders have publicly cited the need for ballistic and land-attack cruise missiles. Since Taipei cannot match BeijingÂ’s ability to field offensive systems, proponents of
strikes against the mainland apparently hope that merely presenting credible threats to ChinaÂ’s urban population or high- value targets, such as the Three Gorges Dam, will deter
Chinese military coercion.
Diplomatic Support
President ChenÂ’s administration has sought to elicit international sympathy for TaiwanÂ’s plight in the face of ChinaÂ’s growing ballistic missile force, for which the island has no adequate countermeasures. A diplomatic initiative begun late in 2002 sought to draw international attention to the growing cross-Strait missile imbalance. A resolution demanding that China withdraw its missiles from the Taiwan Strait area was initially selected as the topic for the islandÂ’s first popular referendum. Taipei probably hopes
these efforts will deter such an attack by increasing the prospect for diplomatic consequences.
Computer Network Attack
TaiwanÂ’s limited ability to attack Chinese military bases has prompted some Taiwan authors to endorse attacking ChinaÂ’s command and control systems to achieve information superiority. Specific targets would include Chinese airports, command and
control centers, and communication nodes. Taiwan has significant potential in this area, thanks to the islandÂ’s high information technology level and the militaryÂ’s ability to conscript personnel from a tech-savvy population.
Psychological Warfare
The Taiwan militaryÂ’s principal psychological warfare (PSYWAR) organization is the General Political Warfare Bureau of the Ministry of National Defense (MND). Subordinate units conducting strategic psychological operations include the 1st Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Group, three Army PSYOP companies responsible
for publishing and propaganda, and the Political Warfare College, which trains PSYWAR cadre. The Army PSYWAR Preparedness Center was set up in January 2002. This center will carry out future PSYOP missions with the armed forces' first wholly dedicated PSYWAR units, integrated with combat intelligence. If the PSYWAR Preparedness Center succeeds, a special command organization will be set up in the MND. Army, Navy, and Air Force PSYOP units probably will be organized in the future.
Electronic Warfare
EW is a top Taiwan military priority because of concerns about ChinaÂ’s own developing EW capabilities. During the islandÂ’s HANKUANG-19 exercise in 2003, tactical EW units exercised jamming against command and control networks and intelligence
collection systems supporting enemy amphibious landings. TaiwanÂ’s MND Communications Development Office also reportedly has a strategic EW capability. Taiwan has more than 30 other ground electronic reconnaissance stations and communications intelligence stations.
Information Operations
Taiwan’s MND has identified information warfare as a key area for modernization. The military intends that information operations, along with command and control systems, will survive an initial PLA assault. Taiwan’s ongoing “Posheng” C4ISR modernization
project includes electronic countermeasure and electronic counter-countermeasure enhancements. These efforts aim to ensure TaiwanÂ’s C4ISR survives kinetic and nonkinetic attacks, such as cyberwarfare. In the past 2 years, training exercises worked
to set a firm foundation for information operations capabilities. -
Just something to note. I agree with Viper52 that the US military is currently stretched very thin. However, large number of US ground troops are not needed. A future war in the Taiwan Straits would focus heavily on domination of the sea and the air. If every single PLA soldier pisses on Taiwan, Taiwan would probably sink. But there is no way the Chinese could get this impressive force over without first gaining air and sea superiority. This is where the US can come in. US ground troops are currently tied down in Iraq, Europe and S.Korea but US naval and air assets are not.Originally posted by Viper52:Personally, based on current state of US forces and American economic interest in China, I'll buck the trend here and say the Americans will NOT intervene militarily in a China-Taiwan war.
The US military is stretched thin by its current commitments in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo and other global hotspots. More and more reserve/National Guard units are called up for service, and units are staying longer in action and getting called back to the frontline faster after returning from frontline tours. Stop-loss actions is being implemented throughout the service, and there is increasing talk of the 5 letter "D" word (Hint: Think Vietnam). The US military is not in a shape to get involved in another war. Nor does the American people have the stomach to involve itself in a war where there are no direct American interests involved (other than economic interests...and thats mostly in China).
Economically, the Americans have too much invested in China already. Some call it addiction to the cheap Chinese imports, but if the US were to cut itself off this, the economy will be devastated (yes devastated). China's economy will suffer too, but remember, its territorial integrity is concerned, while the US has no such issues, China will be more willing to pay the economic price.
I forsee the US leaning more and more towards China in the coming years, and a repeal of the Taiwan Relations Act is only a matter of time. Expect increasing pressure by the US on Taiwan not to rock the boat in the coming years. It will be the same, whether a Republican or Democratic Administration is in charge in the White House.
Deploy the US Seventh Fleet to Taiwan so that they can intercept any fighters, transport aircraft, missiles, warships and amphibious transports crossing to Taiwan. Getting to Taiwan itself is the most dangerous component of any invasion and in conjunction with the Taiwanese, the US can wreak sufficent havoc that the Chinese would be forced to roll back to China. Patriot and other SAM batteries could also be deployed by the US to Taiwan, manned by American or Taiwanese troops.
Of course, the Chinese will respond with their Su-27s and Su-30s, 500 SRBMs and Soveremmy class destroyers with the much feared Sunburn missiles. Any future war will be short duration and high-intensity. The total opposite of Iraq. -
Any attempt to use the 7th Fleet in the restricted waters Straits of Taiwan is downright dangerous. A saturation anti-shipping missile attack would ensue and should any of the USN ships be sunk, the pictures of oil-drenched US sailors being plucked from the sea would turn the home public against the war, particularly a war when the US if fighting a war on the side that is detrimental to their (economic) interests.Originally posted by Langley:Deploy the US Seventh Fleet to Taiwan so that they can intercept any fighters, transport aircraft, missiles, warships and amphibious transports crossing to Taiwan. Getting to Taiwan itself is the most dangerous component of any invasion and in conjunction with the Taiwanese, the US can wreak sufficent havoc that the Chinese would be forced to roll back to China. Patriot and other SAM batteries could also be deployed by the US to Taiwan, manned by American or Taiwanese troops.
Besides, involving yourself in a war its not just about whether you can spare the planes and ships. The central question is, can you spare the $$ to deploy those planes and ships? If you have the planes and ships, but no $$ to deploy them, it will become pointless.
There was an article posted here a while back, the PLA does not need to take Taiwan using an all-out conventional assault. An asymmetrical/unconventional attack (w/o use of WMDs) could turn out to be more effective. -
Right now it's a war of words, and all the parties involved are happy to keep it that way, there are just way too many vested interests in this complex issue. Maybe if things turned out differently in the future, we might see something happen, but for now, it's pretty much saber rattling.
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While I would like to agree that we are only seeing a case of sabre-rattling, this is not to be. The first prominent factor that is evident is that both the US and China are now increasingly being constricted by a case of tunnel vision. Both countries have already portrayed the other power as a threat, as a potential enemy that sooner or later, the cauldron will just boil over. This is due to the fact that with both countries liable to think the worse of the other, the mutual distrust wil prevent both countries from actually sitting down to discuss any move that might be interpreted differently from the other power's point of view. This problem will only be exarcebated as time progress.
Furthermore, one big problem is the existence of many popular war literature in the US, which portrays China as the evil empire, with the US coming in to defeat them bloodlessly with a minimum of effort through its technological advantage. This is not giving the American public the right picture and many will just support the American war effort, thinking that it will be a quick and bloodless one.
For the Cold War, the West and USSR never came to an actual clash of arms due to the fact that for both countries, their territorial integrities were not violated. Not so the case for the Taiwanese situation. Taiwan will remain a key sticking point for China, very simply because it is a daily reminder to the Chinese government of the humiliations that it suffered under the hands of foreign powers. China will recover Taiwan, it is only a matter of when. For China, it is no longer a question of democracy or mere hard headedness, national pride is at stake here. The Taiwanese Straits tension will only increase in the future and not decrease. The reason is very simple. As China modernizes its armed forces, there will be an increasing confidence that it would now be able to take on the US armed forces. The US on the other hand will never perceive itself to be threatened by China, as it has never been beaten in modern warfare before. From both perspective, the inclination to fight is there. Budget wise is never going to be a problem for the US as it perceives itself as the shield of democracy in the world. It will stand forth, and enter the fight primarily due to the notion that if it does not weaken China, it will lose its hegemonic power, not only within the region but also worldwide, as the world perceives a weakened US, unable to stand by its own treaty commitments. -
I also agree that this may no longer be a case of sabre-rattling unlike the 1996 Taiwan Missile Crisis. The thing is, the peace that has been maintained in the Taiwan Straits for so long is because of the doctrine of 'strategic ambiguity'. That is everyone involved, China, Taiwan and the US, would reaffirm their commitment to 'One China' but leave the issue of how to acheive it open-ended.
This situation has come to be challenged by Taiwan. Lee Teng Hui laid the foundation of Taiwan's present pro-independence movement which has been inherited by Chen Shui Bian. He so successfully exploited the issue of the 'China threat' to arouse patriotism during the recent presidential elections that even the traditionally pro-reunification KMT has been forced to explore the issue of independence.
Taiwan has called everyone's bluff. If China doesn't respond forcefully, it'll be exposed as a paper tiger. Furthermore, the tide of Chinese nationalism is unstoppable. What's better than a popular war to win the support of your people? And lastly, despite decrying the war on Iraq, the Chinese still believe that force can resolve everything. Qin Shihuang, Yuan Shikai and Mao Zedong. All these people have shown that talk is useless and only force can reunify the Chinese nation. Confucius and Sun Yatsen are admirable and noble personalities. But they sux at politics.
Once the Chinese decide to use force, the US would have to be involved, one way or another. The US's notion of 'one China' is different from China's notion. China feels that it is entitled to bring about 'One China' by all means necessary, even force. However, the US has said that it would only accept a settlement which has been accepted by both sides. It would neither support any unilateral attempts to change the status quo (Taiwan) nor any attempts at forceful reunification (China). -
Taiwan is within 300 km from mainland China.
People who talk about US navy controlling the strait between Taiwan and mainland China, do not know anything about military. -
How so? 300 km is not narrow by any definition. The distance between Taiwan and China is greater than that between Normandy and England. A ship travelling at 50km/h will take 6 hours to reach Taiwan. Imagine that. 6 hours of exposure! Also, 300km is approximately the protective radius of a US carrier battle group already. Furthermore, the carrier does not have to enter the Taiwan Straits itself. During the 1996 Taiwan Missile Crisis, the 2 US carriers deployed stationed themselves at the northern and southern tips of the Straits, with plenty of room to manoeuvre in.
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If there is going to be a war, it will not be China with taiwan or US. It will be more of China again the force of nature the - Sea .Originally posted by zhaozhilong:Taiwan is within 300 km from mainland China.
People who talk about US navy controlling the strait between Taiwan and mainland China, do not know anything about military. -
you would be wrong on this....the UN forces never expected the chinese to interfere.Even if the signs were all there the US general did not believe the chinese wld do anything with out their russian "master's" approval.Anyway in the end the situation was back where it started...back at the 39th(i think) parrallel.Infact the near defeat and humiliation was provided by the Koreans during the opening stages of the war when the US troops were out numbered and under armed...though Inchon(sci) turned the tide.Originally posted by arburthen?:The americans seems to be on the decline as a power, r they riding into the sunset? Hard to imagine but these things do happen, only time will tell. Will they tango with the chinese? I think they still remember their near defeat and humiliation during korean war when they underestimated the tactics and tenacity of the little chinese and thought with more superior equipment and firepower over the then ragtag chinese army the "war will be over before christmas". -
The human wave tactics of the Chinese then are outdated now. Using troops as cannon fodder. Geez!
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Langley, the Taiwan Strait is not narrow by our definition, but to a CVBG, the Taiwan Strait is a pond.Originally posted by Langley:How so? 300 km is not narrow by any definition. The distance between Taiwan and China is greater than that between Normandy and England. A ship travelling at 50km/h will take 6 hours to reach Taiwan. Imagine that. 6 hours of exposure! Also, 300km is approximately the protective radius of a US carrier battle group already. Furthermore, the carrier does not have to enter the Taiwan Straits itself. During the 1996 Taiwan Missile Crisis, the 2 US carriers deployed stationed themselves at the northern and southern tips of the Straits, with plenty of room to manoeuvre in.
As for the 1996 incident, that move, ordered by Clinton was denounced by a whole bunch of active and retired admirals, because the regarded the move as highly risky because they still regarded the area as still too restricted to maximise the CVBG's strength.
A safer move for the CVBG would be to station itself east of Taiwan in the East China Sea, but that would increase reaction time.
But anyway, without the $$ to sustain another war, and with arguably more economic interest in China than in Taiwan, all this is moot for the Americans. -
Ok lah. Since CVBGs are power projection tools, just station them somewhere near Taiwan can liao. I remember reading somewhere that in 1996, the Chinese did not have enough capability to even monitor the CVBGs sent to the Taiwan Straits. I doubt that they would have made so much improvement since then to be able to sink a CVBG.
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source : http://www.rt66.com/~korteng/SmallArms/CCF1stCampaign1.htm
October 25-November 5, 1950
China's 1st Phase Offensive
The CCF entered the Korean War with a short, violent probing offensive. Although elements of three CCF Armies ... the 38th, 39th, and 40th ... were in place, apparently only about 30,000 CCF foot infantry were mainly deployed. These veteran troops, directed by skillful patrol actions and experienced planning, wreaked devastation among our unprepared and disorganized forces. They destroyed the ROK 7th and 15th Infantry Regiments and also inflicted about 800 casualties on our 8th Cavalry Regiment and capturing over half their equipment while smashing us back.
The CCF tactics were strange to us, they being extremely effective by night and by infiltration and highly effective roadblocks. Even their methods of communications, such as the whistles used in small-unit assault above, seemed eerie and helped demoralize many of our troops.
On November 5, the CCF broke off contact to evaluate the results of their attack and the capabilities of their enemies. This was musunderstood by the UN High Command, who fatally underestimated both the strength and the intent of the CCF forces facing them. After re-grouping, Eighth Army again formed on the Chongchon River, and prepared to launch a general assault on November 25, an assault to get our forces "home for Christmas."
In retrospect, this was an incredible, incomprehensible blunder.
Shortly, China was to make a similar and equally fatal blunder.
Such is war.
another article ...
The accomplishments of the CCF (Chinese Communist Forces) against an army which was far better armed, and which enjoyed total air supremacy, are truly remarkable. Although the NK had been well armed by Russia, and carefully prepared for their invasion of the South, the CCF were so ill-equipped to challenge a modern army that it is almost understandable why our Far East Command initially thought they were an ineffective rabble of "volunteers". Armed with a bewildering mixture of British, US, Japanese and other weapons, presenting an incomprehensible logistics problem, without heavy artillery or tanks, and no air power, it was difficult for high command to take them seriously. Plus, they gave no obvious sign of their entry, let alone their large numbers, until they first attacked.
Trained and battle hardened in guerilla warfare, the CCF carried none of the baggage of a modern army. Masters of concealment, they moved and fought best by night. Wearing thick, padded, green or white uniforms, caps with a red star, carrying a personal weapon, grenades, 80 rounds of ammunition, a few stick grenades, spare foot rags, sewing kit and a week's rations of fish, rice and tea, their working day began about 7 pm. They marched until about 3am, then prepared camouflaged positions for the day. Only scout units moved during daylight, to determine routes for the next night's march, and they were ordered, under penalty of death, to freeze motionless if they heard aircraft. Their only heavy weapons were mortars, but they came in increasingly vast numbers.
The CCF didn't begin seriously fighting until October 25, when it crushed the ROK 6th Division in an attack that increased and lasted for 10 days, further smashing back our 1st Cavalry Division with the ROK units. In the east, the 7th Marines had our only successes, in relief of battered ROK units at the Sudong Gorge, 30 miles below Chosin. The 7th killed around 1500 Chinese, destroying the fighting capability of the CCF 124th division in a brutal 3-day battle.
1stMarDiv commander General Smith had been determined that the Marines would be successful in their first battle with the CCF, which they were. But the 124th was only one division in the CCF 42nd Army. General Smith wondered where the other two divisions were.
This probing first CCF strike effectively ended the Eighth Army offensive, for the moment.
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the use of whistles and bungles are very interesting aspect of korean war. Much like tactics in sun tzu using drums and horns.
The CCF then lacking in equipment only fought at night & they would take turns to frequently charge american positions depriving them of their sleep and tiring them out, Just prior to a charge all the units will give out long whistles followed by long loud bungles or horns, in the cold hills of korea this deception gave an echoing effect and errie-ly greatly magnified their numbers.
To the americans who defended their positions in the night it sounded like an invisible enemy was everywhere and they were surrounded.
It distressed and demoralised them greatly. -
I wouldn't put too much hope on that. The Taiwan Straits Crisis, Gulf War 1 and 2, plus the Balkan conflict were all lessons that the Chinese took very seriously. It is unlikely that the Chinese is going to let the same mistake being made again. Furthermore, it appears that the PLAAF's operation tempo has risen in recent years. A CVBG does not exactly make for a small target, and with the amount of electronic noise that it puts out, especially that of its Aegis-equipped escorts, it isn't exactly that hard for the Chinese to actually find the CVBG. Once the CVBG is found, the SS-N-22 Sunburn missiles that China has will be extremely dangerous to the carriers themselves, especially when launched together in concert with the other anti-shipping missiles that China has. The sheer number of fighters and ships that China has will ensure that the CVBG will be swarmed with different types of anti-shipping missiles.Originally posted by Langley:Ok lah. Since CVBGs are power projection tools, just station them somewhere near Taiwan can liao. I remember reading somewhere that in 1996, the Chinese did not have enough capability to even monitor the CVBGs sent to the Taiwan Straits. I doubt that they would have made so much improvement since then to be able to sink a CVBG.
Furthermore, with UK now backing the bid to lift the EU arms sanctions against China, there is a high possibility that within the next 2 years, the sanctions will be lifted. That would mean that China would now gain access to equipments that are of a technological parity with the US in most aspects, especially the command and control side. That is why that the Chinese threat can only increase as time passes and not decrease. Especially so with the qualitative improvement in Chinese pilots, which might soon gain parity with the Americans. -
China Boycotting Singapore dialogue
US, India, Japan, Korea, they're all here for defence talks - but no China. ABC
Jun 5, 2004
http://www.littlespeck.com/current/index.html#boycott
Singapore has warned of the risk of a war between the United States and China that would make Iraq seem like a small problem.
The danger of war over Taiwan was emphasised by Singapore's Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong at the start of a meeting of Asia-Pacific defence ministers.
The meeting is being boycotted by China.
Graeme Dobell reports that China is refusing to attend the Singapore talks because of the presence of one delegate from Taiwan.
The US Defence Secretary is here, the Defence Minister of Australia, of India, of Japan, of South Korea, but not China.
In fact, no official from Beijing is at the Singapore dialogue because of the presence of one delegate from a Taiwan think tank.
China says Taiwan is not a state and thus has no right to discuss security issues at the third annual meeting of Asia Pacific Defence Ministers.
In the words of one participant it shows how toxic the Taiwan issue is for China, a point underlined by Mr Goh, warning of the war that would follow if Taiwan steps over the red line to claim formal independence.
He said: "The result would be war, and a permanent rise in Chinese nationalism and hostility. The consequences of such a war will make Iraq seem a small problem."
Dobell: The warning from Singapore's Prime Minister reflects Asia's fear that Taiwan is stepping ever closer to a formal claim of independence.
Goh says to avert that, China is prepared to sacrifice decades of its own growth, to devastate Taiwan physically and economically, and to fight the United States.
"If the Taiwanese know that this will be the outcome, maybe they will pause to ask whether this price is worth paying for a bid for independence, he added.
"Stable US-China relations are the foundation of East Asian stability.
"If the long-term stability of US-China relations can be assured, East Asia will grow and benefit the US as well.
"If there is permanent enmity between China and the US, not only will East Asian growth be set back, but the entire region will be dragged down," Goh said.
ABC -
Wise words from our Prime Minister up there.
I doubt that they would have made so much improvement since then to be able to sink a CVBG.
Mhm.. don't rule out the Cheena yet.
They have a couple of Sunburn-armed Sovremenny class destroyers from Russia, with a possibility of having up to a whole squadron of six of these vessels by 2006. The Sovremenny destroyers are marvellous vessels and would present an American Carrier Group with a dangerous threat.
The PLA Air Force is also catching up to the US.. they are acquiring more and more next-generation fighters from Russia that could challenge the supremarity of America's best fighters. Heard their pilots are also becoming on par with that of the US in terms of skill.
China is no Iraq. The US will have a very tough fight against China if war ever breaks out. I pray it doesn't, but if it does, the scale of the conflict will be bigger than the two Gulf wars, perhaps the biggest thing since WWII, as it will drag countries such as Japan and South Korea into this. It will be nothing short of a disaster for East Asia if such a thing happens.
So bai bai to your tua pek kong that such a war would never break out, even if it does mean that Taiwan has to forget about independence to avoid the loss of the lives of thousands. -
Originally posted by Merkava MK4:Wise words from our Prime Minister up there.
Mhm.. don't rule out the Cheena yet.
They have a couple of Sunburn-armed Sovremenny class destroyers from Russia, with a possibility of having up to a whole squadron of six of these vessels by 2006. The Sovremenny destroyers are marvellous vessels and would present an American Carrier Group with a dangerous threat.
The PLA Air Force is also catching up to the US.. they are acquiring more and more next-generation fighters from Russia that could challenge the supremarity of America's best fighters. Heard their pilots are also becoming on par with that of the US in terms of skill.
China is no Iraq. The US will have a very tough fight against China if war ever breaks out. I pray it doesn't, but if it does, the scale of the conflict will be bigger than the two Gulf wars, perhaps the biggest thing since WWII, as it will drag countries such as Japan and South Korea into this. It will be nothing short of a disaster for East Asia if such a thing happens.
So cross your fingers and hope that such a war would never break out, even if it does mean that Taiwan has to forget about independence to avoid the loss of the lives of thousands. -
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Yeah.. guess China's tactic would be to swamp a CVBG's defences. Bloody effective tactic. But what about the US's response then? The latest Arleigh Burke destroyers are also Aegis equipped right? Plus Japan's own Aegis cruisers which would likely be deployed to support any US military operation, perhaps the US would be able to pay the Chinese back in their own coin: an overwhelming number of Aegis-equipped crusiers and destroyers.Originally posted by bot_in_shop:I wouldn't put too much hope on that. The Taiwan Straits Crisis, Gulf War 1 and 2, plus the Balkan conflict were all lessons that the Chinese took very seriously. It is unlikely that the Chinese is going to let the same mistake being made again. Furthermore, it appears that the PLAAF's operation tempo has risen in recent years. A CVBG does not exactly make for a small target, and with the amount of electronic noise that it puts out, especially that of its Aegis-equipped escorts, it isn't exactly that hard for the Chinese to actually find the CVBG. Once the CVBG is found, the SS-N-22 Sunburn missiles that China has will be extremely dangerous to the carriers themselves, especially when launched together in concert with the other anti-shipping missiles that China has. The sheer number of fighters and ships that China has will ensure that the CVBG will be swarmed with different types of anti-shipping missiles.
Furthermore, with UK now backing the bid to lift the EU arms sanctions against China, there is a high possibility that within the next 2 years, the sanctions will be lifted. That would mean that China would now gain access to equipments that are of a technological parity with the US in most aspects, especially the command and control side. That is why that the Chinese threat can only increase as time passes and not decrease. Especially so with the qualitative improvement in Chinese pilots, which might soon gain parity with the Americans.
Not sure about the layer of anti-missile defence provided by the fighters though. The AIM-54 Phoneix is probably outdated already and the AMRAAMs dun seem very good too. Still, I have faith that the US should be able to think of something up. As one of the previous articles on the PLA reveal, the Chinese always like to 'tua pao' i.e. talk big, and a PLA general himself commented that the Americans are more pragmatic.
The EU's move is pretty surprising. They have always been very famous for their excellent human rights policy, which is even better than that of the US
. E.g. they refused to sign a FTA with ASEAN because of Myanmmar's repressive government. Really dunno why they lifting the arms embargo with the full knowledge that the arms would be used by a Communist bully to suppress a democratic Taiwan. Hope that the left-wing elements in the EU would prevail and prevent such a scenairo from happening.