Singaporean Covert Operations in Myanmar
-
The following is sourced from Janes Intelligence Review.
http://www.sfdonline.org/sfd/Link%20Pages/Link%20Folders/Human%20Rights/burmasing.html
It lists activities connected in some way to our intelligene community.I would place weight in this article,given that it is sourced from Janes Intelligence Review.
Does this violate anything?For one,this is public domain,as it can be found in Janes Intelligene Review,which one can subscribe to over the Internet.
I don't think posting this here contravenes forum rules in any way as it does not expose national secrets,does not threaten national interests or our security,and it is a good case to argue for an increase in our defence budget.Time to expand the RSN and get some Kongo-class Destroyers from Japan as well as replenishment and supply vessels,to expand RSN sphere of ops up through the Malacaa Straits to the Andaman Sea and out into the South China Sea.We rule the skies of South East Asia,it is time for us to rule the waters.It is our right.
A rising China poses both a strategic benefit and deficiency,and we should just be prepared in case of China decides to become slightly more hegemonistic and expansionist in its tendencies.
Extract:
While China may be the most obvious country trying to win over Burma's affections, Rangoon has, in fact, received significant advances from an altogether more subtle suitor, as William Ashton reports.
EVER since the establishment of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) almost 10 years ago, there have been persistent claims that Burma's military government has been secretly supported by Singapore. Rumours of a close strategic relationship continue to circulate under the SLORC's successor, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), the formation of which seems to have been prompted by representations made to General Ne Win during his recent Southeast Asian tour. While Singapore's motives clearly include a wish to take advantage of the commercial opportunities flowing from Rangoon's new 'open door' economic policies, wider strategic factors are just as important.
Following the massacres of pro-democracy demonstrators and creation of the SLORC in September 1988, Burma was severely criticised by most of the international community. Aid and financial flows critical to the survival of the military regime were suspended. In addition, Burma's traditional arms suppliers announced that they would not sell it any new weapons or military equipment. Even West Germany, until then the main source of Burma's military technology, suspended co-operation on indigenous arms production. The SLORC, faced with the country's economic collapse and fearful of a link-up between ethnic insurgents in the countryside and urban-based dissidents, was desperate to restock its depleted armouries. China and Thailand were quick to step in with offers of support, but the first country to come to the regime's rescue was in fact Singapore. -
I read from somewhere that our frigates are designed for bluewater operations up to the Indian Ocean.So, basing on that assumption on range and radius of patrol, I could conclude that they too have the range to patrol the Spratlys up to the Hainan Island region of the South China Sea.To get involved in such a major crisis if any, would really test the leadership and the quality of our armed forces.Perhaps its then you will find out whether your scholars can led and the right choice was made to litter the upper echelons with their paper-heavy backs.
-
Singapore pushed for Myanmar's entry into ASEAN for a very good reason. Even though such a move met considerable opposition from both the EU and the US, we still went ahead with it. Considering the countries that border Myanmar, it is extremely important to ensure that the major land route into Southeast Asia is not overtly hostile or too much in the Chinese camp.