Support equipment could come from refurbished Cadillac Gage V-200 and V-150 LAVs, if PDF were to give them up, we could transfer them for a new naval regiment.Agreed with heli-ops and air-ops being the most effective and timely way to insert your troops in-theatre these days.Beachfront assault is for coastal conflicts, and with urban centers becoming the most likely place for any future battles, we should also concentrate on HALO training for our elite elements.
Actually I dunno if the idea of naval crack troops will work. On the one hand, the RSAF & the SPF now respectively have FDS & KINS units & it seems unlikey the RSN will be left out. On the other hand, these existing "internal" ground forces are all land-based & largely defensively oriented. I'm hoping to pick the mind of a cousin of mine over CNY, who's a longtime Naval officer (at least MAJ) but has somehow spent almost half of his service stint on overseas study leave!
I didn't connect the dots until last night, but the American equivalent to our naval contribution to the Aceh HATF mission isn't the Marines or the US Navy. Rather it's their Coast Guard or, rather, the role of their WWII Coast Guard, who manned the LSTs, landing crafts (aka revamped as the DuckTour ride at Suntec) & transport ships in places like Guadacanal, Normandy, the Philippines, Okinawa, et al. That was about the only time their sailors truly did amphibious ops, albeit in an auxiliary role. Armed or not, their goal remained helping both to establish & to evacuate from a beachead, even if there's enemy fire. I'm not sure infantry-fighting skills are needed in this respect.
On the US Marines: I'm not saying they don't heli-drop or do rapid-deployment, cuz these trainings have existed even before the Vietnam War. In fact they function as an independent combined-arms fleet, with their own command, ground combat, aviation combat (planes & choppers) & service support elements - & could deploy anytime from BN to DIV size.
But their latter nomenclature ("MEU", "MEB", "MEF") contains a common word - "Expeditionary" - that is synoymous with them, & that their ops are primarily amphibious-oriented as well. It also remains however that their last (only) great post-WWII beach assualt was at Inchon, Korea - an event that's 55 years ago. Since then, the Marines have conducted seaborne landing-force missions here & there, in Vietnam, Grenada, Panama (overelaborated overthrow of Noreiga) & the Persian Gulf. All of them were contributive to topical military objectives, but notably none gained headliner status like in the glory years.
The times the Marines were deployed in a Regular Army or Joint-Staff Task Force role, the impression lingered that less-elite infantrymen could've done just as well (eg. vs. Vietcong/NVA; land sweep into Iraq), or they plainly resulted in disaster (blotched embassy rescue in Tehran; 240 killed by Beirut truck bomb). Yet they must lobby for these missions in order to stay militarily relevant & prevent budget cuts, an expeditionary force paradoxically seeking continual work in a peacetime operational readiness.