An Eternal Now

26 Aug 14, 10:22

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/twotruths-india/

The Theory of Two Truths in India

First published Thu Feb 17, 2011

The theory of the two truths has a twenty-five century long history behind it. It has its origin in the sixth century BCE^[1] India with the emergence of the SiddhÄ�rtha Gautama. It is said, according to the PitÄ�pÅ«trasamÄ�gama-sÅ«tra, SiddhÄ�rtha became a buddha “awakened one” because he fully understood the meaning of the two truths—conventional truth (saá¹�vá¹›ti-satya) and ultimate truth (paramÄ�rtha-satya)—and that the reality of all the objects of knowledge, the text says, is exhaustively comprised of the two truths (Sde Dge, dkon brtsegs nga, 60b). The theory of the two truths, according to the SamÄ�dhirÄ�ja-sÅ«tra, is a unique contribution made by the Buddha towards Indian philosophy. This text states: “the knower of the world, without hearing it from others, taught that there are the two truths” (Sde dge, mdo-sde da 174b–210b). NÄ�gÄ�rjuna, in his MÅ«lamadhyamakakÄ�rikÄ�, (MMK) attributes the two truths to the Buddha as follows: “the Dharma taught by the buddhas is precisely based on the two truths: a truth of mundane conventions and a truth of the ultimate” (MMK 24:8).

The theory of the two truths is the heart of the Buddha's philosophy. It serves as the mirror reflecting the core message of the Buddha's teachings and the massive philosophical literature it inspired. At the heart of the theory of the two truths is the Buddha's ever poignant existential and soteriological concerns about the reality of things and of life. NirvÄ�á¹‡a, ultimate freedom from the suffering conditioned by desires, is only ever achieved, according to the theory of the two truths, from a correct understanding of two truths. Knowledge of the conventional truth informs us how things are conventionally, and thus grounds our epistemic practice in its proper linguistic and conceptual framework. Knowledge of the ultimate truth informs us of how things really are ultimately, and so takes our minds beyond the bounds of conceptual and linguistic coventions.

In India the theory of the two truths the Buddha had explained, of course without much elaboration, stimulated rich philosophical exchanges amongst the Buddhist philosophers and practitioners, not to mention the exchanges with traditional Hindu thinkers. The exchange of different ideas and views of the two truths between the early Buddhists, among other factors, gave birth to Buddhism as the philosophy we know today. The transformation of the two truths theory from a simple to a complex system of thought with highly sophisticated concepts is perhaps the most significant contribution resulting from the schisms the Buddhism experienced after the Buddha passed away (ca. 380 BCE). Various schools with varying interpretations of the Buddha's words soon appeared in Buddhism, which resulted in rich and vibrant philosophical and hermeutic atmosphere.

In later years, SarvÄ�stivÄ�din (VaibhÄ�á¹£ika) and SautrÄ�ntika, Madhyamaka (from the first century CE onwards) and YogÄ�cÄ�ra (ca. sixth century CE onwards) became the dominant schools. Our investigation of the theory of the two truths will briefly focus on how these schools have received, interpreted and understood it. Although all these schools regard the theory of two truths as the centrepiece of the Buddha's philosophy, all have nevertheless adopted very different approaches to the theory. As we shall see each understood and interpreted the two truths in different ways, and are often fundamentaly and radically opposed to each other.

1. Ä€bhidharmikas / SarvÄ�stivÄ�da (VaibhÄ�á¹£ika)

In the fourth century, Vasubandhu undertook a comprehensive survey of the SarvÄ�stivÄ�da School's thought, and wrote a compendium, Treasury of Knowledge, (AbhidharmakoÅ›akÄ�rikÄ� AbhiDK; Mngon pa ku 1b–25a) with his own Commentary on the Treasury of Knowledge (AbhidharmakoÅ›abhÄ�á¹£ya AbhiDKB, Mngon pa ku 26b–258a). This commentary not only offers an excellent account of the SarvÄ�stivÄ�din views, including the theory of the two truths, but also offers a sharp critique of many views held by the SarvÄ�stivÄ�dins. Vasubandhu based his commentary on the MahÄ�vibhÄ�á¹£Ä� (The Great Commentary), as the SarvÄ�stivÄ�dins held their philosophical positions according to the teachings of the MahÄ�vibhÄ�á¹£Ä�. Consequently, SarvÄ�stivÄ�dins are often known as VaibhÄ�á¹£ikas.

The SarvÄ�stivÄ�din's ontology^[2] or the theory of the two truths makes two fundamental claims.

the claim that the ultimate truth consists of irreducible spatial units (e.g., atoms of the material category) and irreducible temporal units (e.g., point-instant consciousnesses) of the five basic categories, and
the claim that the conventional truth consists of reducible spatial wholes or temporal continua.

To put the matter straightforwardly, for the SarvÄ�stivÄ�dins, wholes and continua are only conventionally real, whereas the atoms and point-instant consciousness are only ultimately real.

1.1 Conventional truth

To see how the SarvÄ�stivÄ�dins defend these two claims, we shall have a close look at their definitions of the two truths. We will examine conventional truth first. This will provide the argument in support of the second claim. In the AbhidharmakoÅ›a Vasubandu defines conventional truth/reality as follows: “An entity, the cognition of which does not arise when it is destroyed and, mentally divided, is conventionally existent like a pot and water. Ultimate existence is otherwise.” (AbhiDK 6.4, Mngon pa khu 7ab) Whatever is, on this definition, designated as “conventionally existent” is taken to be “conventionally real” or conventional truth when the idea or concept of which ceases to arise when it is physically destroyed, by means of a hammer for instance. Or its properties such as shape are stripped away from it by means of subjecting it under analysis, thereby conceptually excluding them. A pot and water are designated as conventionally existent therefore conventionally real for the concept “pot” ceases to exist when it is destroyed physically, and the concept “water” no longer arises when we conceptually exclude from it its shape, colour etc.

On the SarvÄ�stivÄ�din definition, for an entity to be real, it does not need to be ultimate truth or ultimately real, exclusively. For a thing to be ultimately real is for that thing to be “foundationally existent” (dravya-sat / rdzas yod)^[3] in contrast with being “compositely existent” (avayavidravya / rdzas grub). By “foundationally existent” the SarvÄ�stivÄ�din refer to the entity which is fundamentally real, the concept or the cognition of which is not dependent on conceptual construction, hence not conceptually existent (prajñaptisat) nor a composition of the aggregative phenomena. In the case of foundational existent there always remains something irreducible to which the concept of the thing applies, hence it is ultimate truth. A simple entity is not reducible to conceptual forms, or conventional designations, nor is it compositely existent entity. We will have lot more to say on this point shortly.

Pot and water are not the foundational entities. They are rather composite entities (avayavi-dravya / rdzas grub). By composite entity, we mean an entity or existent which is not fundamental, primary or simple, but is rather a conceptually constructed (prajñaptisat), composition of various properties, and is thus reducible both physically and logically.

Hence for the SarvÄ�stivÄ�din, conventional truth (samvá¹›tisatya), composite-existence (avayavi-dravya / rdzas grub), and the lack of intrinsic reality (niá¸¥svabhÄ�va) are all equivalents. A conventional truth is therefore characterised as a reducible conventional entity on three grounds: (i) conventional truth is both physically and logically reducible, as it disintegrates when it is subjected to physical destruction and disappears from our minds when its parts are separated from it by logical analysis; (ii) conventional truth borrows its identity from other things including its parts, concepts etc., it does not exist independently in virtue of its intrinsic reality (niá¸¥svabhÄ�va), the exclusion of its parts and concepts thus affects and reduces its inherent nature; and (iii) conventional truth is a product of mental constructions, like that of conventionally real wholes, causation, continuum etc, and it does not exists intrinsically.

1.2 Ultimate truth

The definition of the ultimate truth, as we shall see, offers the SarvÄ�stivÄ�din response to the claim that ultimate truth consists of irreducible atoms and point-instant moments. In glossing the AbhiDK 6.4 verse his commentary explains that utimate truth is regarded as ultimately existent, one that is both physically and logically irreducible. Vasubandhu supplies three arguments to support this: (i) ultimate truth is both physically and logically irreducible, as it does not disintegrate when it is subjected to physical destruction and that its identity does not disappear when its parts are separated from it under logical analysis; and (ii) ultimate truth does not borrow its nature from other things including its parts. Rather it exists independently in virtue of its intrinsic reality (svabhÄ�va), the exclusion of its parts thus does not affect its inherent nature; and (iii) it is not a product of mental constructions, like that of conventionally real wholes, causation, continuum etc. It exists intrinsically (AbhiDKB 6.4, Mngon pa khu 214a).

Ultimate truth is of two types: the compounded (saá¹�ská¹›ta) ultimate, and the uncompounded (asaá¹�ská¹›ta) ultimate. The uncompounded ultimate consists of (a) space (akÄ�Å›a), and (b) nirvÄ�á¹‡a—analytical cessation (pratisaá¹�kyÄ�-nirodha) and non-analytical cessation (apratisaá¹�khyÄ�-nirodha). These three ultimates are uncompounded as each is seen as being causally unconditioned. They are nonspatial concepts. These concepts do not have any physical referent whatsoever. Space is a mere absence of entity. Analytical and nonanalytical cessations are the two forms of nirvÄ�á¹‡a, which is simply freedom from afflictive suffering, or the elimination of afflictive suffering. These concepts are not associated in positing any thing that can be described as remotely physical. They are thus the concepts that are irreducible physically and logically.

The compounded ultimate consists of the five aggregates—material aggregate (rÅ«pa), feeling aggregate (vedanÄ�), perception-aggregate (saá¹�jñÄ�), dispositional aggregate (saá¹�skÄ�ra), and consciousness-aggregate (vijñÄ�na)—since they are causally produced, and the ideas of each aggregate are conceived individually rather than collectively. If the aggregates, the ideas of which are conceived collectively as a whole(s) or a continuum/continua, they could not be ultimately real. The collective concepts of the aggregate as a “whole” or as a “continuum” subject to cessation as they cease to appear to the mind, get excluded from the conceptual framework of the reality of the five aggregates when they are logically analysed.

2. SautrÄ�ntika

The philosophers^[4] who championed this view are some of the best-known Indian logicians and epistemologists. Other great names who propogated the tradition include Devendrabuddhi (?), ÅšÄ�khyabuddhi (?), Vinitadeva (630–700), Dharmottara (750–810), Moká¹£akaragupt (ca. 1100–1200). DignÄ�ga (480–540) and DharmakÄ«rti (600–660) are credited to have founded this school. For the theory of the two truths in the SautrÄ�ntika we will need to rely on the following texts:

DignÄ�ga's Compendium of Right-cognition (PramÄ�á¹‡asamuccaya, Tshad ma ce 1b–13a),
DignÄ�ga's Auto-commentary on the Compendium of Right-cognition (PramÄ�á¹‡asamuccayavá¹›tti, Tshad ma ce 14b–85b),
DharmakÄ«rti's Verses on Right-cognition (PramÄ�á¹‡avÄ�rttikakÄ�rikÄ�, PVK; tshad ma ce 94b–151a),
DharmakÄ«rti's Commentary on the Verses of Right-cognition (PramÄ�á¹‡avÄ�rttikavá¹›tti, PVT; tshad ma ce 261b–365a),
DharmakÄ«rti's Ascertainment of Right-cognition (PramÄ�á¹‡aviniÅ›caya, tshad ma ce 152b–230a),
DharmakÄ«rti's Dose of Logical Reasoning (NyÄ�yabindu, tshad ma ce 231b–238a).

Broadly, all objects of knowledge are classified into two realities based on the ways in which right-cognition (pramÄ�á¹‡a) engages with its object. They are either directly accessible (pratyaká¹£a), which constitutes the objects that are obvious to the cognition, or they are directly inaccessible (paroká¹£a), which constitutes the objects that are occulted, or obscured from the cognition. A directly accessible object is principally known by the direct perceptual right-cognition (pratyaá¹£a-pramÄ�á¹‡a), whereas a directly inaccessible object is principally known by the inferential right-cognition (anumÄ�na-pramÄ�á¹‡a).

2.1 Ultimate truth

Of the two types of objects, some are ultimately real while others are only conventional real, and some are not even conventionally real, they are just false, or fictions. In defining the ultimate truth in the SautrÄ�ntika tradition, we read in DharmakÄ«rti's PVK: “That which is ultimately causally efficient is here the ultimately existent (paramÄ�rthasat). Conventionally existent (saá¹�vá¹›tisat) is otherwise. They are declared as the definitions of the unique particular (svalaká¹£aá¹‡a) and the universal (sÄ�mÄ�á¹…yalaká¹£aá¹‡a)” (DharmakÄ«rti PVK Tshad ma ce 118b).

Ultimate truth is, on this definition, a phenomenon (dharma) that is ultimately existent, and ultimately existent are ultimately causally efficient. Phenomenon that is ultimately causally efficient is intrinsically or objectively real, existing in and of itself as a “unique particular” (svalaká¹£aá¹‡a).^[5] By “unique particular” DharmakÄ«rti means ultimately real phenomenon—dharma that is self-defined, uniquely individual, objectively real, existing independent of any conceptual fabrication, ultimately causally efficient (artha), dharma that serves as the objects of direct perception, dharma that presents itself to the cognitions as distinctive/unique individuals.

In the PVT DharmakÄ«rti characterises (Tshad ma ce 274b–279b) all ultimately real unique particulars exist as distinct individuals with their own intrinsic natures. And they satisfy three criteria:

They have determinate spatial locations (deÅ›aniyata / yul nges pa) of their own, as real things do not have a shared property amongs themselves. The real fire we see is either near or far, or at the left or the right, or at the back or in the front. By contrast, the universal fireness^[6], that is, the concept of being a fire, does not occupy a determinate position.
Unique particulars are temporally determinate (kÄ�laniyata / dus nges pa or dus ma ‘dres pa). They are only momentary instants. They spontaneously go out of existence the moment they have come into existence. This is not the case with the universals. Being purely conceptually constructed, they remain uninfluenced by the dynamism of causal conditions, and hence are not affected by time.
Unique particulars are ontologically determinate (Ä�kÄ�raniyata / ngo bo nges pa / ngo bo ma ‘dres pa) as they are causally conditioned; the effects of the aggregation of the causal conditions that have the ability to produce them. When those causal conditions come together at certain points in time, unique particulars come into existence. When those conditions disintegrate and are not replaced by new conditions, the unique particulars go out of the existence. When the conditions have not yet come together, unique particulars are yet to obtain their ontological status.

So the “determinate intrinsic natures of the unique particulars,” DharmakÄ«rti argues in PVT “are not accidental or fortuitous since what is not determinate cannot be spatially, temporally and ontologically determinate” (Tshad ma ce 179a).

The unique particulars are, SautrÄ�ntika claims, ultimately real, and they supply us four arguments to support the claim:

(1) Unique particulars are causally efficient phenomena (arthakriyÄ�samartha) (PVT Tshad ma ce 179a) because: (a) they have the ability to serve the pragmatic purpose of life—fulfil the objectives in our life, and (b) ability to produce a variety of cognitive images due to their remoteness or proximity. (Dharmottara's NyÄ�binduá¹Ä«kÄ� Tshad ma we 36b–92a) Both of these abilities must be associated exclusively with the objects of direct perception (Tshad ma we 45a).

(2) Unique particulars present themselves only to direct perceptual cognition as distinct and uniquely defined individuals because the unique particulars are, as DharmakÄ«rti's NyÄ�yabindu points out “the objects whose nearness or remoteness presents the difference of cognitive image” (Tshad ma ce 231a) and that object alone which produces the impression of vividness according to its remoteness or proximity, exists ultimately (DharmottaraTshad ma we 44b–45a).

(3) Unique particulars are not denotable by language since they are beyond the full grasp of any conceptual mind (Å›abdasyÄ�viÅ›aya). Although unique particulars are the objective references of language and thought, and we may have firm beliefs about them, conceptual mind does not fully grasp their real nature. They are ultimately real, directly cognisable by the means of certain perception without the reliance on other factors (nimitta) such as language and thought. Therefore they must exist. They are the sorts of phenomenon whose cognition would not occur if they are not objectively real.

In the SautrÄ�ntika ontology ultimately real/existent (synonymous) unique particulars are classified into three kinds:

momentary instants of matter (rÅ«pa),
momentary instants of consciousness (vijñÄ�na) and
momentary instants of the non-associated composite phenomena, which are neither matter nor minds or mental factors (citta-caitta-viprayukta-saá¹ƒskÄ�ra).

The SautrÄ�ntika's theory of ultimate truth mirrors its ontology of flux in which the unique particulars are viewed as the spatially infinitesimal atoms constituting temporally momentary events (ká¹£aá¹‡ika) or as successive flashes of consciousnesses, cognitive events, all devoid of any real continuity as substratum. Unique particulars are ultimately real, although they are not enduring substances (dravyas) inhering in it's qualities (guá¹‡as) and actions (karmas) as the NaiyÄ�yika-VaiÅ›eá¹£ika claims. They are rather bundles of events arising and disappearing instantly. Even the continuity of things and motion are only successive events closely resembling each other. On this theory ultimate realities are momentary point instants, and Vasubandhu and DharmakÄ«rti both argue that no conditioned phenomenon, therefore, no ultimately real unique particulars, endure more than a single moment—hence they are momentary instants (ká¹£aá¹‡ika).

Four closely interrelated arguments provide the defence of the SautrÄ�ntika's claim that ultimately real unique particulars are momentary instants. Vasubandhu and DharmakÄ«rti both employ the first two arguments. The third argument is one DharmakÄ«rti specialises in his works.

(1) Ultimately real unique particulars are momentary instants because their perishing or destruction is spontaneous to their becoming. This follows because (i) unique particulars are inherently self-destructive (Vasubandhu, AbhiDKB, Mngon pa khu 166b–167a), and (ii) their perishing or cessation is intrinsic and does not depend on any other extrinsic causal factors (DharmakÄ«rti, PVK Tshad ma ce 102a; PVT, Tshad ma ce 178ab).

(2) The ultimately real unique particulars are momentary instants because they are motionless, and do not move from one temporal or spatial location to another. They perish just where they were born since nothing exists later than its acquisition of existence (Vasubandhu, AbhiDKB Mngon pa khu 166b).

(3) The third argument proves the momentary instants of the unique particulars from the inference of existence (sattvÄ�numÄ�na). This is a case of the argument from identity of existence and production (svabhÄ�vahetu). All unique particulars which are ultimately existent, are necessarily produced, since only those that are ultimately existent, insofar as DharmakÄ«riti is concerned, are able to a perform causal function—i.e., to produce effects. And causally efficient unique particulars imply constant change for the renewal and the perishing of their antecedent identities, therefore, they are momentary.

Finally (4), unique particulars are ultimately real not only on the ground that they constitute the final ontological status, but also because it forms the basis of the SautrÄ�ntika soteriology. The attainment of nirvÄ�á¹‡a — the ultimate freedom from the afflictions of life—for the SautrÄ�ntika, according to DharmakÄ«rti's VÄ�danyÄ�ya, has an immediate perception of the unique particulars as its necessary condition (Tshad ma che 108b–109a).

2.2 Conventional truth

DharmakÄ«rti defines conventional truth, in his PVK, as dharma which is “conventionally existent” and he identifies conventional truth with the “universal” (sÄ�mÄ�nya-laká¹£aá¹‡a)^[7] just as he identifies ultimate truth with the unique particular (Tshad ma ce 118b). When a SautrÄ�ntika philosopher describes a certain entity as a universal, he means a conceptual entity not apprehended by virtue of its own being. He means a general property that is conceptually constructed, appearing to be something common amongst all the items in a certain class of objects. Unlike NyÄ�ya-VaiÅ›eá¹£ika view where the universals are regarded as objectively real and eternal entities inhering in the substances, qualities and particulars, universals, for the SautrÄ�ntika are pure conceptual constructs. SautrÄ�ntika holds the view known as nominalism or conceptualism—the view that denies universals any independent extramental objective reality existing on their own apart from being mentally constructed.

While unique particulars exist independently of the linguistic convention, universals have no reality in isolation from the linguistic and conceptual conventions. Thus, universals and ultimate reality are mutually exclusive. Universals are therefore only conventionally real, lacking any intrinsic nature, whereas unique particulars are the ultimately real, and exist intrinsically.

The SautrÄ�ntika defends the claim that the universals (sÄ�mÄ�nya-laká¹£aá¹‡a) are only conventional truths for the following reasons (tshad ma ce 118b):

Universals are the domains of inferential cognition since they are exhaustively grasped by the conceptual mind by the means of language and thought (DharmakÄ«rti, NyÄ�yabindu, tshad ma ce 231a).
Universals are the objects of the apprehending cognition which arises simply out of having beliefs about the objects without the need to see any real object.
Universals are causally inefficient. By “causal inefficiency,” the SautrÄ�ntika, according to Dharmottara's NyÄ�yabinduá¹Ä«kÄ�, (Tshad ma we 45ab) means three things: (a) universals are purely conceptually constructed, hence unreal; (b) universals are unable to serve a pragmatic purpose as they do not fulfil the life's objectives; and (c) cognitive images produced by universals are independent of the proximity between the objects and their cognitions since the production of the image does not require seeing the object as it is in the case of perception and the unique particulars.
Universals are products of the unifying or mixing of language and their referential objects (unique particulars), and thus appear to conceptual minds as generalities, unified wholes, unity, continuity, as phenomena that appear to the conceptual mind to have shared properties linking with all the items in the same class of objects.
Universals, consequently, obscure the individualities of the unique particulars from being directly apprehended. This is because, as we have already seen, universals, according to DharmakÄ«rti's PVK (Tshad ma ce 97ab) and PVT (Tshad ma ce 282ab), are only conventionally real since they are conceptual constructs founded on unifying and putting together the distinct individualities of the unique particulars as having one common property being shared by all items in the same class.

According to the SautrÄ�ntika philosophy, language does not describe reality or the unique particulars positively through the real universals as suggested by the NaiyÄ�yikas. SautrÄ�ntika developed an alternative nominalist theory of universal called the apoha-theory in which language is seen to engage with the reality negatively by means of elimination or the exclusion of the other (anyÄ�poha / gzhan sel). On this theory, the function of language, specifically naming, is to eliminate the object from the class of those objects to which language does not apply.

In brief the SautrÄ�ntika's theory of the two truths rests on dichotomising objects between the unique particulars, which are understood as ultimately reals, dynamic, momentary, causally effective, the objective domain of the direct perception; and the universals, which are understood as only conventionally reals, conceptually constructed, static, causally ineffective and the objective domain of the inferential cognition.

3. YogÄ�cÄ�ra

The VaibhÄ�á¹£ika's realistic theory of the two truths and the SautrÄ�ntika's representationalist theory of the two truths both affirm the ultimate reality of the physical objects constituted by the atoms. YogÄ�cÄ�ra rejects the physical realism of both VaibhÄ�á¹£ika and SautrÄ�ntika, although it agrees with the SautrÄ�ntika's representationalist theory as far as they both affirm representation as the intentional object in perception and deny in perception a direct access to the external object. Where they part their company is in their response to the questions: what causes the representations? Is the contact of senses with physical objects necessary to give rise to the representations in perception? The SautrÄ�ntika's reply is that the external objects cause representations, given that these representations are the intentional objects there is indeed a contact between the senses and the external objects. This affirmative response allows the SautrÄ�ntika to affirm the reality of external objects. The YogÄ�cÄ�rin however replies that the “subliminal impressions” (vÄ�sanÄ�s) from the foundational consciousness (Ä�layavijñÄ�na) are the causes of the mental representations, and given that these impressions are only internal phenomena acting as the intentional objects, the contact between the senses and the external objects is therefore rejected even conventionally. This allows the YogÄ�cÄ�rin to deny even the conventional reality of all physical objects, and argue that only conventional reals are our mental representations, mental creations, cognitions etc.

The central thesis in the YogÄ�cÄ�ra philosophy, the theory of the two truths echoes this, is the assertion that all that is conventionally real is only ideas, representations, images, creations of the mind, and that there is no conventionally real object that exists outside the mind to which it corresponds. These ideas are the only objects of any cognition. The whole universe is a mental universe. All physical objects are only fiction, they are unreal even by the conventional standard, similar to a dream, a mirage, a magical illusion, where what we perceive are only products of our mind, without a real external existence.

Inspired by the idealistic tendencies of various sÅ«tras consisting of important elements of the idealistic doctrines, in the third and the fourth centuries many Indian philosophers developed and systematised a coherent Idealist School. In the beginning of the Viá¹ƒÅ›atikÄ� Vasubandhu treats citta, manas, vijñÄ�na, vijñÄ�pti as synonymous and uses these terms as the names of the idealistic school. The chief founders were MaitreyanÄ�th (ca. 300) and Asaá¹…ga (315–390), propagated by Vasubandhu (320–380), DignÄ�ga (480–540) Sthiramati (ca. 500), DharmapÄ�la (530–561), Hiuan-tsang (602–664), DharmakÄ«rti (600–660), ÅšÄ�ntaraká¹£ita (ca.725–788) and KamalaÅ›Ä«la (ca.740–795). The last two are YogÄ�cÄ�ra-MÄ�dhyamikas in contrast with the earlier figures who are identified as YogÄ�cÄ�rins.

Like other Buddhist schools, the theory of the two truths captures the central YogÄ�cÄ�ra doctrines. MaitreyanÄ�th asserts in his Verses on the Distinction Between Phenomena and Reality (DharmadharmatÄ�vibhaá¹…ga-kÄ�rikÄ�, DharDVK; Sems tsam phi 50b–53b)—“All this is understood to be condensed in two categories: phenomena (dharma) and reality (dharmatÄ�) because they encompass all.” (DharDVK 2, Sems tsam phi) By “All” YogÄ�cÄ�rin means every possible object of knowledge, and they are said to be contained in the two truths since objects are either the conventional truth or the ultimate truth. Things are either objects of conventional knowledge or objects of ultimate knowledge, and a third category is not admitted.

3.1 Conventional Truth

Etymologically the term conventional truth covers the sense of what we ordinarily take as commonsensical truths. However, in contrast with the naïve realism associated with the common sense notions of truths, for YogÄ�cÄ�ra the term “conventional truth” has somewhat a negative connotation. It exclusively refers to the objects of knowledge like forms, sound etc., the mode of existence or mode of being which radically contradicts with the mode of its appearance, and thus they are false, unreal, and deceptive. Forms, sounds, etc., are defined as conventional truths in that they are realities/truths from the perspective of, or by the force of, three forms of convention:

fabrication (asatkalpita),
consciousness (vijñÄ�na), or
language, signifier, a convenient designator (Å›abda).

A conventional truth is therefore a truth by virtue of being fabricated by the conceptual mind; or it is truth erroneously apprehended by means of the dualistic consciousness; or it is true concept, meaning, signified and designated by a convenient designator/signifier.

Because the YogÄ�cÄ�rins admit three conventions, it also admits three categories of conventional truths:

fabricated phenomena;
mind/consciousness; and
language since conventional truths exist due to the force of these three conventions.

The first and the last are categories of the imaginary phenomena (parikalpita) and the second is the dependent phenomena (paratantra).

YogÄ�cÄ�ra's claim that external objects are not even conventionally real, what is conventionally real are only our impressions, and mental representations is one Vasubandhu closely defends by means of the YogÄ�cÄ�ra's theory of the three natures (trisvabhÄ�va). In his Discernment of the Three Natures (TrisvabhÄ�vakÄ�rikÄ�, or TrisvabhÄ�vanirdeÅ›a, TSN; Sems tsam shi 10a–11b), Vasubandhu explains that the YogÄ�cÄ�ra ontology and phenomenology as consisting of the unity of three natures (svabhÄ�va):

the dependent or other (paratantra);
the imaginary / conceptual (parikalpita); and
the perfect / ultimate (pariniá¹£panna) (TSN 1, Sems tsam shi 10a)

The first two account for conventional truth and the latter ultimate truth. We shall consider the import of the three in turn.

First, Vasubandhu defines the dependent nature as: (a) one that exists due to being causally conditioned (pratyayÄ�dhÄ«navá¹›ttitvÄ�t), and (b) it is the basis of “what appears” (yat khyÄ�ti) mistakenly in our cognition as conventionally real, it is the basis for the “unreal conceptual fabrication” (asatkalpa) which is the phenomenological basis of the appearance of reified subjects and objects (TSN 2 Sems tsam shi 10a). The implications of the YogÄ�cÄ�rin expression “what appears” to describe the dependent nature are therefore twofold: (a) that the things that appear in our cognitions are exclusively the representations, which are the manifest forms of the subliminal impressions, and (b) that the entire web of conventional reality, which presents itself to our cognitions phenomenologically in various ways, is exclusively the appearance of those representations. Apart from those representations, consciousnesses, which appear to be external objects, there is no conventionally real external content which corresponds to what appears.

Second, in contrast with the dependent nature which is the basis of “what appears” (yat khyÄ�ti), the imaginary nature (parikalpita), as Vasubandu defines it, is the mode of appearance “as it appears” (sau yathÄ� khyÄ�ti) on the ground that its existence is only an “unreal conceptual fabrication” (asatakalpo) (TriSN 2, Sems tsam chi 10a). The imaginary nature is only an “unreal conceptual construction” because of two reasons: (i) it is the dependent nature—representations—merely dually reified by the mind as an ultimately real subject, or self, or eg, and (ii) the imaginary nature is dualistic reification of beings and objects as existing really and externally, there is no such reality.

Third, given the fact that the dependent nature is devoid, or free from this duality, the imaginary nature is a mere superimposition on it. Hence nonduality, the perfect nature (pariniá¹£panna) is the ultimate reality of the dependent nature.

3.2 Ultimate truth

In the Commentary on the SÅ«tra of Intent (Ä€rya-saá¹ƒdhinirmocana-sÅ«tra, Mdo sde ca 1b–55b) it is stated that “Reality as it is, which is the intentional object of a pure consciousness, is the definition of the perfect nature. This must be so because it is with respect to this that the Victorious Buddha attributed all phenomena as natureless, ultimately.” (Mdo sde ca 35b) Vasubandhu's TSN defines “the perfect nature (pariniá¹£panna) as the eternal nonexistence of ‘as it appears’ of ‘what appears’ because it is unalterable.” (TSN 3, Sems tsam chi 10a) “What appears” is the dependent nature—a series of cognitive events, the representations. “As it appears” is the imaginary nature—the unreal conceptual fabrication of the subject-object duality. The representations, (i.e., the dependent nature) appear in the cognition as if they have in them the subject-object duality, even though the dependent nature is wholly devoid of such subject-object duality. The perfect nature is therefore this eternal nonexistence of the imaginary nature—the duality—in the dependent nature.

Vasubandhu defines the perfect nature as the ultimate truth and identifies it with mere-consciousness. “This is the ultimate (paramÄ�rtha) of the dharmas, and so it is the reality (tathatÄ�) too. Because its reality is like this all the time, it is mere consciousness.” (Triá¹ƒ 25, Sems tsam shi 3b) Accordingly Sthiramati's Commentary on the Thirty Verses (Triá¹ƒÅ›ikÄ�bhÄ�á¹£ya, Triá¹ƒB; Sems tsam shi 146b–171b), explains “ultimate” (paramÄ�rtha) here as refering to “’the the world-transcending knowledge’ (lokottara-nirvikalpa-jñÄ�na) in that there is nothing that surpasses it. Since it is the object of [the transcendent knowledge], it is the ultimate. It is even like the space in having the same taste everywhere. It is the perfect nature, which is stainless and unchangable. Therefore, it is known as the ‘ultimate.’” (Triá¹ƒB, Sems tsam shi 169ab)

So, as we can see the dependent and the imaginary natures together explain the YogÄ�cÄ�ra's position on conventional reality and the perfect nature explains its conception of the ultimate reality. The first two natures provide an argument for YogÄ�cÄ�ra's empirical and practical standpoint (vyavahÄ�ra), conventional truth and the third nature an argument for its ultimate truth. Even then the dependent nature alone is conventionally real and the perfect nature alone is ultimately real. By contrast, the imaginary nature is unreal and false even by the empirical and practical standards. This is true in spite of the fact the imaginary nature is constitutive of the conventional truth.

So, the perfect nature—nondual mind, i.e., emptiness (Å›Å«nyatÄ�) of the subject-object duality—is the ultimate reality of the YogÄ�cÄ�ra conception. Ultimate truth takes various forms as it is understood within the YogÄ�cÄ�rin tradition. As MaitreyanÄ�tha states, ultimate truth takes three primary forms—as emptiness it is the ultimate object, as nirvÄ�á¹‡a it is the ultimate attainment, and as nonconceptual knowledge it is the ultimate realization (MadhVK, Sems tsam phi 42B).

YogÄ�cÄ�ra Arguments

The core argument in support of the only mind thesis is the impossibility of the existence of external objects. Vasubandhu develops this argument in his Viá¹ƒ 1–27 as does DignÄ�ga in his Examination of the Intentional Object (Ä€lambanaparÄ«ká¹£Ä�vá¹›tti, Ä€lamPV 1–8, Tshad ma ce 86a–87b) against the atomists (NaiyÄ�yikas-VaiÅ›eá¹£ika and Ä€bhidharmikas^[8]). Against the YogÄ�cÄ�ra idealist thesis the realist opponents, as Vasubandhu observes, raise three objections:—“If consciousness (does) not (arise) out from an object (i) neither the determination or certainty (niyama) in regard to place (deÅ›a) and time (kÄ�la), (ii) nor the indetermination or unexclusiveness (aniyama) in regard to the series of (consciousness) (iii) nor the performance of the (specific) function (ká¹›tyakriya) are logically possible (yuktÄ�)” (Viá¹� 2, Sems tsam shi 3a).

Vasubandhu offers his YogÄ�cÄ�ra reply in the Viá¹ƒ to these realist objections and insists that the idealist position does not face these three problems. The first problem is not an issue for the YogÄ�cÄ�ra since dreams (svapna) account for the spatio-temporal determination. In dreams, in the absence of an external object, one still has the cognition of a woman, or a man in only determinate / specific time and place, and not arbitrarily and not everywhere and not in any moment. Neither is the second problem of the lack of an intersubjective agreement an issue for the YogÄ�cÄ�ra. The case of the pretas (hungry-ghosts) account for intersubjective agreement as they look at water they alone, not other beings, see rivers of pus, urine, excrement, and collectively hallucinates demons as the hell guardians. Although pus, urine, excrement and hell guardians are nonexistent externally, due to the maturation of their collective karma, pretas exclusively experience the series of cognitions (vijñapti), other beings do not encounter such experience (Viá¹ƒ 3, Sems tsam shi). Nor is the lack of causal efficacy of the impressions or representations in the consciousness a problem for the YogÄ�cÄ�ra. As in the case of wet dreams, even without a union of the couple, the emission of semen can occur, and so the representations in the consciousness are causally efficient even without the externally real object.

YogÄ�cÄ�ra's defensive arguments against the realist challenges are quite strong. However unless YogÄ�cÄ�ra is able to undermine the core realist thesis—i.e., reality of the external objects—and its key supporting argument—the existence of atoms—then the debate could go either way. Therefore YogÄ�cÄ�ra shows the nonexistence, or unreality of the atoms as the basis of the external object to reject the realist position.

YogÄ�cÄ�ra's impressions-only theory and the SautrÄ�ntika's representationalist theory both explain our sensory experience (the spatio-temporal determinacy, intersubjective agreement, and causal efficacy). They agree on what the observables are: mental entities, including mental images but also emotions such as desires. They also agree that karma plays vital role in explaining our experience. The realist theory, though, according to DignÄ�ga's Investigation About the Support of the Cognition (Ä€lambanaparÄ«ká¹£Ä�vá¹› tti, Ä€lamPV) has to posit the reality of additional physical objects, things that are in principle unobservable, given that all we experience in the cognition are our impressions (Ä€lamPV, Tshad ma ce 86a).

If the realist thesis were correct, then there would be three alternatives for the atoms to act as the intentional objects of cognition.

Atoms of the things would be either one in the way the Nyya-Vaieika conceives the whole as something constituted by parts but being single, one, different from the parts that compose it, and having a real existence apart from the existence of the parts. Or
things would have to be constituted by multiple atoms i.e., a number or a group of atoms coexisting one besides the other without forming a composite whole as a result of mutual cohesion between the atoms. Or
things would have to be atoms grouped together, massed together as a unity among themselves with a tight cohesion. YogÄ�cÄ�ra contends that these are the only three alternatives in which the reality of the external objects can functioning as the objects of cognition.

Of the three alternatives: (1) points to the unity of a thing conceived as a whole; and (2) and (3) point to the multiplicity looking at the things as loose atoms, i.e., composite atoms. Not one of the three possibilities is, on YogÄ�cÄ�ra's account, admissible as the object of cognition however. The first is inadmissible because nowhere an external object is grasped as a unity, whole, one apart from its parts (Ä€lamPV Tshad ma ce 86b). The second is inadmissible because when we see things we find that the atoms are not perceived individually as one by one (Viá¹ƒ13, Sems tsam shi 3b). The third alternative is also rejected because the atoms in this case cannot be proved to exist as an indivisible (Viá¹ƒ 14, Sems tsam shi 3b).

Further, if there were a simultaneous conjunction of an atom with other six atoms coming from the six directions, the atom would have six parts because that which is the locus of one atom cannot be the locus of another atom. If the locus of one atom were the locus of the six atoms, which were in conjunction with it, then since all the seven atoms would have the same common locus, the whole mass constituted by the seven atoms would be of the size of a single atom, because of the mutual exclusion of the occupants of a locus. Consequently, there would be no visible mass (Viá¹ƒ12, Sems tsam shi 3b).

Since unity is an essential characteristic of being the whole, or composite whereas indivisibility an essential characteristic of being an atom when both the unity and individuality of the atoms are rejected, then the whole and indivisible atoms are no longer admissible. Therefore, Vasubandhu sums up the YogÄ�cÄ�ra objections against the reality of the external sense-objects (Ä�yatanas) as: “An external sense-object is unreal because it cannot be the intentional object of cognition either as (1) a single thing or (2) as a multiple in [isolated] atoms; or (3) as a aggregate because the atom is not proven to exist” (Viá¹ƒ11, Sems tsam shi 3b).

The realist insists that the external sense objects are real and that their reality is ascertained by the various means of knowledge (pramÄ�á¹‡as) of which perception (pratyaká¹£a) is the most important. If the external sense objects are nonexistents, there can be no intentional objects, then cognition would not arise. Since cognitions do arise, there must be external objects as their intentional objects.

To this objection, YogÄ�cÄ�ra employs two arguments to refute the realist claim and to establish the mechanism of cognition, which takes place without the atoms of an external object. The first argument shows that atoms do not satisfy the criterian of being the intentional object, therefore they do not cause the perception. “Perceptual cognition [takes place] just like in dreams and the like [even without an external object]; moreover, when that [cognition] occurs, the external object is not seen; how can it be thought that this is a case of perception?” (Viá¹ƒ16, Sems tsam shi 3b).

The second is the time-lag argument, according to which, there is a time-gap between the perceptual judgement we make and the actual perceptual process. When we make a perceptual judgement, at that time we do not perceive the external object as it is in our mental consciousness (manovijñÄ�na) that carries out the judgement and since the visual consciousness that perceives the object has already ceased. Hence at the time when the mental consciousness delivers it judgment, the perceptual cognition no longer exists since all things are momentary. Therefore the atoms of an external object is not the intentional object of perceptual cognition, since it has already ceased and does not now exist therefore it is not responsible for the cognition's having the content it has, like the unseen events occurring on the other side of the wall (Vasubandhu's Viá¹ƒÅ›atikÄ�-kÄ�rikÄ�vá¹›tti, Viá¹ƒKV 16–17).

YogÄ�cÄ�ra therefore concludes that we cannot postulate the reality of an external object through direct perception. However since in perceptual cognition we are directly aware of something, there must be an intentional object of the perceptual cognition. That intentional object of the perceptual cognition is, according to YogÄ�cÄ�ra, none other than the subliminal impressions (vÄ�sanÄ�s) passing from their latent state contained in the storehouse consciousness (Ä�layavijñÄ�na) to their conscious level. Therefore the impressions are the only things that are conventionally real.

Vasubandhu's TSN 35–36 inspired by the Buddhist traditional religious beliefs also offers others arguments to defend the idealism of YogÄ�cÄ�ra:

one and the same thing appears differently to beings that are in different states of existence (pretas, men, and gods);
the ability of the bodhisattvas and dhyÄ�yins (practitioners of meditation) who have attained the power of thinking (cetovaÅ›itÄ�) to visualise objects at will;
the capacity of the yogins who have attained serenity of mind (Å›amatha) and a direct vision of dharmas as they really are (dharma-vipaÅ›yanÄ�) to perceive things at the very moment of the concentration of mind (manasikÄ�ra) with their essential characteristics of flux, suffering, nonself, empty; and
the power of those who have attained intuitive knowledge (nirvikalpakajñÄ�na) which enables them not to block the perception of things.

All these arguments based on the facts of experience show that the objects do not exist really outside the mind, that they are the products of mental creation and that their appearance is entirely mind dependent. Therefore YogÄ�cÄ�ra's theory of the two truths concludes that the whole world is a product of mind—it is the collective mental action (karma) of all beings. All living beings see the same world because of the identical maturation of their karmic consequences. Since the karmic histories of beings are same, there is homogeneity in the way in which the world is experienced and perceived. This is the reason there is an orderly world instead of chaotic and arbitrariness. This is also the reason behind the impressions of the objectivity of the world.

4. Madhyamaka

After the Buddha the philosopher who broke new ground on the theory of the two truths in the Madhyamaka system is a South Indian monk, NÄ�gÄ�rjuna (ca. 100 BCE–100 CE). Amongst his seminal philosophical works delineating the theory are NÄ�gÄ�rjuna's

Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way (MÅ«lamadhyamakakÄ�rikÄ� MMK),
Seventy Verses on Emptiness (ÅšunyatÄ�saptati),
Rebutting the Disputes (VigrahvyÄ�vartanÄ« VigV)^[9] and
Sixty Verses on Logical Reasoning (Yuktiá¹£aá¹£á¹ikÄ�).

Ä€ryadeva's work Catuá¸¥Å›atakaá¹£Ä�strakÄ�rikÄ� (Four Hundred Verses) is also considered as one of the foundational texts delineating Madhyamaka's theory of the two truths.

NÄ�gÄ�rjuna saw himself as propagating the dharma taught by the Buddha, which he says is precisely based on the theory of the two truths: a truth of mundane conventions and a truth of the ultimate. (MMK 24.8, Dbu ma tsa 14b–15a) He saw the theory of the two truths as constituting the Buddha's core teaching and his philosophy. NÄ�gÄ�rjuna maitains therefore that those who do not understand the distinction between these two truths would fail to understand the Buddha's teaching (MMK 24.9, Dbu ma tsa 15a). This is so, for NÄ�gÄ�rjuna, because (1) without relying on the conventional truth, the meaning of the ultimate cannot be explained, and (2) without understanding the meaning of the ultimate, nirvÄ�á¹‡a is not achieved (MKK 24.10, Dbu ma tsa 15a).

NÄ�gÄ�rjuna's theory of the two truths is fundamentally different from all theories of truth in other Indian philosophies. Hindu philosophers of NyÄ�ya-VaiÅ›eá¹£ika, SÄ�á¹ƒkya-Yoga, and MÄ«mÄ�á¹�sÄ�-VedÄ�nta—all advocate a foundationalism of some kind according to which ultimate reality is taken to be the “substantive reality” (drayva) or foundation upon which stands the entire edifice of the conventional ontological structures where the ultimate reality is posited as immutable, fixed, irreducible and independent of any interpretative conventions. That is so, even though the conventional structure that stands upon it constantly changes and transforms.

As we saw the Buddhist realism of the VaibhÄ�á¹£ika and the representationalism of the SautrÄ�ntika both advocate ultimate truth as ultimately real, logically irreducible. The idealism of YogÄ�cÄ�ra holds the nondual mind as the only ultimate reality and the external world as merely conventional truths. On NÄ�gÄ�rjuna's Madhyamaka all things including ultimate truth are ultimately unreal, empty (Å›Å«nya) of any intrinsic nature (svabhÄ�va) including the emptiness (Å›Å«nyatÄ�) itself, therefore all are groundless. In this sense a MÄ�dhyamika (a proponent of the Madhyamaka thought) is a an advocate of the emptiness (Å›Å«nyavÄ�din), advocate of the intrinsic unreality (niá¸¥svabhÄ�vavÄ�din), groundless, essenceless, or coreless. Nevertheless to assert that all things are empty of any intrinsic reality, for NÄ�gÄ�rjuna, is not to undermine the existential status of things as simply nothing. On the contrary, NÄ�gÄ�rjuna argues, to assert that the things are empty of any intrinsic reality is to explain the way things really are as causally conditioned phenomena (pratÄ«tyasamputpaá¹…hÄ�).

NÄ�gÄ�rjuna's central argument to support his radical non-foundationalist theory of the two truths draws upon an understanding of conventional truth as tied to dependently arisen phenomena, and ultimate truth as tied to emptiness of the intrinsic nature. Since the former and the latter are coconstitutive of each other, in that each entials the other, ultimate reality is tied to being conventionally real. NÄ�gÄ�rjuna advances important arguments justifying the correlation between the conventional truth vis-à-vis dependent arising, and emptiness vis-à-vis ultimate truth. These arguments bring home their epistemological and ontological correlations (MMK 24.14; Dbu ma tsa 15a). He argues that wherever applies emptiness as the ultimate truth, there applies the causal efficacy of the conventional truth and wherever emptiness does not apply as the ultimate truth, there does not apply the causal efficacy of the conventional truth (Vig.71) (Dbu ma tsa 29a). According to NÄ�gÄ�rjuna, ultimate truth's being empty of any intrinsic reality affords conventional truth its causal efficacy since being ultimately empty is identical to being causally produced, conventionally. This must be so since, for NÄ�gÄ�rjuna, “there is no thing that is not dependently arisen; therefore, there is no such thing that is not empty” (MMK 24.19, Dbu ma tsa 15a).

SvÄ�tantrika / PrÄ�saá¹…gika and the two truths

The theory of the two truths in the Madhyamaka in India took a great resurgence from the fifth century onwards soon after BuddhapÄ�lita (ca. 470–540) wrote A Commentary on [NÄ�gÄ�rjuna's] Fundamental Verses of the Middle Way (BuddhapÄ�litamÅ«lamadhyamakavá¹›tti,^[10]Dbu ma tsa 158b–281a). Set forth in this text is a thoroughgoing non-foundationalist philosophic reasoning and method—prÄ�saá¹…ga arguments or reductio ad absurdum style without relying upon the svatantra, independent syllogistic argument—to elucidate the Madhyamaka metaphysics and epistemology ingrained in theory of the two truths. For this reason, BuddhapÄ�lita is often described as the founder of the PrÄ�saá¹…gika Madhyamaka, although elucidation of the theory itself is set out in the works of CandrakÄ«rti. Three decades later BhÄ�vaviveka^[11] (ca. 500–570) challenged BuddhapÄ�lita's interpretation of the two truths, and developed a Madhyamaka account of the two truths that reflects a significant ontological and epistemological shift from BuddhapalitÄ�'s position, which was later championed by CandrakÄ«rti to whom we shall return shortly.

Many later commentators ignore the philosophical content of the debate between the PrÄ�saá¹…gika and the SvÄ�tantrika and claim that their controversy is confined only to pedagogical or methodological issues. There is another view according to which the content of the debate between the PrÄ�saá¹…gika and the SvÄ�tantrika—BuddhapÄ�lita versus BhÄ�vavevika followed by BhÄ�vavevika versus CandrakÄ«rti—is essentially philosophic in nature. Underpinning the dialectical or methodological controversy between the two Madhyamaka camps lies a deeper ontological and epistemological divide implied within their theories of the two truths, and this in turn is reflected in the different methodological considerations they each deploy. So on this second view, the variation in the methods used by the two schools of the Madhyamaka are not simple differences in their rhetorical devices or pedagogical tools, they are underlain by more serious philosophical disagreements between the two.

According to this view the philosophical differentiations between the SvÄ�tantrika and the PrÄ�saá¹…gika is best contained within the discourse of the two truths. PrÄ�saá¹…gika's theory of the two truths we leave aside for the time being. First we shall take up the SvÄ�tantrika's account.

4.1 SvÄ�tantrika Madhyamaka

BhÄ�vaviveka wrote some of the major Madhyamaka treatises including

Lamp of Wisdom (PrajñÄ�pradÄ«pamÅ«lamadhyamakavá¹›tti PPMV, Dbu ma tsha 45b–259b),
Verses on the Heart of the Middle Way (Madhyamakahá¹›dayakÄ�rikÄ� MadhHK),
Blazes of Reasoning: A Commentary on Verses of the Heart of the Middle Way (TarkajvÄ�lÄ�).

In these texts BhÄ�vavevika rejects the Brahmanical systems of NyÄ�ya-VaiÅ›eá¹£ika, SÄ�á¹ƒkhya-Yoga, MÄ«mÄ�á¹ƒsÄ�-VedÄ�nta on both metaphysical and epistemological grounds. All the theories of truth and knowledge advanced in these systems from his Madhyamaka point of view are too rigid to be of any significant use. BhÄ�vavevika's critiques of Ä€bhidharmikas—VaibhÄ�á¹£ika and SautrÄ�ntika—and YogÄ�cÄ�ra predominantly target the ontological foundationalism which underpins their theories of the ultimate truth. He rejects them on the ground that from an analytic cognitive perspective, which scrutinises the nature of reality, nothing—subject and object—is found to be ultimately real since all things are rationally reduced to spatial parts or temporal moments. Thus he proposes the view that both the subject and the object are conventionally intrinsically real as both are conventional truths, where as both are ultimately intrinsically unreal as both are empty of ultimate reality, hence emptiness alone is the ultimate reality.

Although BhÄ�vavevika is said to have founded the SvÄ�tantrika Madhyamaka, it is important to note that there exists two different subschools of the SvÄ�tantrika tradition:

SautrÄ�ntika SvÄ�tantrika Madhyamaka
YogÄ�cÄ�ra SvÄ�tantrika Madhyamaka

The two schools of the SvÄ�tantrika Madhyamaka t

Fintanquintus

26 Aug 14, 13:35

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