SAF dunking death case
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How can atrocities be considered morality? Look at what Pope Urban II said about the Crusades - as far as he was concerned, the Crusaders were acting according to Universal Morality, backed up by Saint Bernard's, "to kill a pagan is to win glory, for it gives glory to Christ".Originally posted by Icemoon:How can atrocities even be considered morality? In the first place, why are they "atrocities" if you are clearly in no positon to say so? Maybe we should call them "blessings" instead.
Yes! Go forth and kill all pagans for they do not believe in the One True Christ! It's all right - we got the go-ahead by the Pope, so we're covered with the big guy upstairs.
Whoops - somebody forgot to forward that memo to the Jews in Speyer, Verdun, Treves, Mainz, Trier, Cologne and Metz - it appears that they took it the wrong way.
Would you call the trail of death and destruction left by the Crusaders, under their claim of morality, a blessing?!
Get over it - there's no such thing as universal morality simply because morality is a code of behaviour that can be reduced down to the individual level.
Before you start any claptrap about the events of 1096 not applying in 2005, take a look around - hell, it's even been made easy for you because people have described GWB's "War on Terror" the new Crusade.
I reiterate my point - don't go into the field of morality because each and every person can turn that vague idea to his own ends. -
Actually, in all the excitement, I'll admit that I am remiss in not asking the obvious:
What set of "exceptionless moral norms" is this? Can you please provide a list? What evidence is there that every person subscribes to these norms?
For anybody arguing for a universal morality, the very least you could do is define it. -
1) "There isn't evidence to support that the trainers went out of their way to make it slightly riskier for the two. It's their intent that makes it an accident or not. What did they do that were out of the norm? Or special in the case that led the death. "
Response:
The evidence is to be had in the form of the fact that the actions which they performed upon the two trainees were in the nature of the case likely to cause the death of anyone upon whom they might have been performed; and this is a fact that has already been attested by experts.
As regards the question of intent, I have already conceded that the trainers did not intend to kill the men who died as the result of the actions which the trainers did in fact perform upon them; but that does not mean that they could not have intended that the lives of these men should be put at risk by their decision to make them subject to these actions; for if they cannot but have known that the actions to which they should have subjected these men had served to put the lives of these men at risk (particularly if it can be established as well that they knew themselves to be the more strenuously subjecting these men to these actions than they might previously have subjected other men to similar actions), then it cannot but follow that by deciding to make these men subject to these actions, they had deliberately intended to risk the lives of these men.
2) ItÂ’s an utter red herring to suggest that soldiers could be justified in killing opposing soldiers in a war; and to suggest that neither the waging of a war (which would involve the decision the kill soldiers on the opposing side) nor the choice to be a soldier need amount to a sin; for I never said otherwise, and what these men did to their trainees can hardly be cited as an instance of a personÂ’s resorting to killing force so as to subdue an aggressor.
I donÂ’t deny that the trainers in question had a duty to train their trainees; but my point is that they had a duty also to ensure that in carrying out their duty to train their trainees, they did not subject their trainees to actions that in the nature of the case were not able to be performed upon anyone safely (that is, actions that were of such a character that their risk could not be checked by the application or observance of feasible safety protocols).
‘Dunking’ someone’s head into a trough of water, several times in a rapid succession, is arguably an action which inherently cannot be checked by the application of any feasible safety protocol; for given the rapidity with which the ‘dunking’ is supposed to be performed (and given the fact that asphyxiation when it occurs, occurs in degrees, so that it would be difficult to identify determinately a point beyond which the progressive asphyxiation of a person would result in his death), there can be no telling therefore when the person being ‘dunked’ may not begin to asphyxiate and when therefore, such a person may not have reached a point, where, though he might have already begun to asphyxiate, he should yet be unable to communicate his unwillingness to be ‘dunked’ to the person or persons ‘dunking’ him.
3) The fact that the defendants may have felt that they were ‘following a procedure that was necessary for the performance of whatever exercise which they may have seen themselves as having a duty to perform’ does not imply that the defendants were unable to realise that the actions which they were performing upon the two trainees, were inherently of such a character that no feasible safety protocol would have been able to check the risk that they would have posed to the lives of the two trainees (and that this might have been the reason why the aforesaid procedure was omitted from the relevant manual); thus while the defendants need not be supposed to have intended to kill (which was why they were not tried for murder), they must be supposed however to have intended to cause risk of death in a certain particular fashion (which was why they were in fact tried for manslaughter).
My point therefore is that whatever it is that they did do which led to them being tried for manslaughter is in fact ‘unjust and cruel’; and this point isn’t undermined unless one were to grant that it can only ever be ‘unjust and cruel’ to commit murder but not something else which (so to speak) stops short of murder.
4) Given, then, that whatever it is that the defendants may have done in this regard is a crime that militates against the common good (that is, a crime that had been directed against someone in his capacity first and foremost as a human being), it would have to follow therefore that the crime in question would have to be tried by a court that has universal jurisdiction over all classes of persons who share a common humanity; this consideration to my mind would be the ultimate reason why a military tribunal, which has in principle jurisdiction over only a certain class of persons, should not have been convened to try a crime of this character.
I donÂ’t deny that a military tribunal could have dispensed a sentence just as harsh as a court with universal jurisdiction, but because of such a tribunalÂ’s limited jurisdiction, the best result to be hoped for in the event of the passing of such a sentence by such a court, would be that justice would be done (but not indeed that it would be manifestly seen to be done, in view of the character of the offence in question); thus the passing of the sentence by such a tribunal (even if it comes to be felt to be commensurate with the gravity of the relevant offence), could still be seen as a state of affairs that implies that soldiers need not be made subject (in respect of grave offences that they may have committed against the common good) to laws that would otherwise be applicable universally.
As to the argument that soldiers would be more competent to try other soldiers in respect of alleged offences (committed by the latter in their capacity as soldiers) against the common good, I’d like to say that while military expertise would be requisite to resolving questions about matters of fact that may arise in the course of a trial (as for instance, the question of what military objective the ‘dunking’ of soldiers might have been calculated to achieve), such expertise would yet be irrelevant to deciding whether the ‘dunking’ in question (after it has been established by expert testimony that it is inherently ‘unsafe’ and that its risk can in no way be checked by the application of any feasible safety protocol) is lawful (from the point of view of certain universally applicable laws); in any case, the lack of expertise that a judge may have in this regard, could be compensated for by expert testimony that could be admitted in the course of a trial, in the same way that a judge’s lack of medical expertise could be compensated for by his exposure to and appraisal of the relevant expert testimony; but what to my mind is fundamental (and must be fundamentally upheld) is the principle that certain classes of offences ought to be tried (and be seen to be tried) by courts that have in principle universal jurisdiction over all classes of men.
I think that I have said all I can to highlight the differences between my position and that of my opponents (and to argue for what I feel is the greater strength of my own position); I do not think that I can say any more in this regard for our respective positions seem to me to differ in respect of certain of their respective fundamental assumptions.
With this response of mine, I hereby signal my departure from this debate.
Ben
Ps. Ged, I'd like to take you on now, re: your comments about morality, but I wonder whether it would be best if I did this in a different thread. I'll probably therefore be posting a response to you on that isssue in a separate thread. I believe that this issue is absolutely fundamental; and of paramount importance. -
This, my friend, would call for the opening of 'a can of worms' as you once described the matter.Originally posted by Gedanken:Actually, in all the excitement, I'll admit that I am remiss in not asking the obvious:
What set of "exceptionless moral norms" is this? Can you please provide a list? What evidence is there that every person subscribes to these norms?
For anybody arguing for a universal morality, the very least you could do is define it.
Well, I am open to trying my hand at it; but perhaps in a different thread.
Suffice it to say(for the present), the existence of these norms need not imply that 'every person' would need to have subscribed to them.
Ben -
Good idea, MrBach - start a new thread and you can count on me being there! At the very least it gives me a good reason to revisit philosophy, which I haven't touched in ages.
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Double-post.