World War 2
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Everyone says that Japan, Germany and Italy were at fault and they were the ones who caused world war 2 and demanded that they apologise.
Britain was also at fault because it was they who encouraged Hitler to expand eastwards and then go attack Russia.
France tried to encircle Germany but Britain blocked her efforts to do so as Britain's agenda was to let Germany go east.
But don't expect english textbooks or historians to tell you this.
...Any analysis of the motivations of Britain in 1938-1939 is bound to be difficult because different people had different motives, motives changed in the course of time, the motives of the government were clearly not the same as the motives of the people, and in no country has secrecy and anonymity been carried so far or been so well preserved as in Britain. In general, motives become vaguer and less secret as we move our attention from the innermost circles of the government outward. As if we were looking at the layers of an onion, we may discern four points of view: (1) the anti-Bolsheviks at the center, (2) the "three-bloc-world" supporters close to the center, (3) the supporters of "appeasement," and (4) the "peace at any price" group in a peripheral position. The "anti-Bolsheviks," who were also anti-French, were extremely important from 1919 to 1926, but then decreased to little more than a lunatic fringe, rising again in numbers and influence after 1934 to dominate the real policy of the government in 1939. In the earlier period the chief figures in this group were Lord Curzon, Lord D'Abernon, and General Smuts. They did what they could to destroy reparations, permit German rearmament, and tear down what they called "French militarism."
This point of view was supported by the second group, which was known in those days as the Round Table Group, and came later to be called, somewhat inaccurately, the Cliveden Set, after the country estate of Lord and Lady Astor. It included Lord Milner, Leopold Amery, and Edward Grigg (Lord Altrincham), as well as Lord Lothian, Smuts, Lord Astor, Lord Brand (brother-in-law of Lady Astor and managing director of Lazard Brothers, the international bankers), Lionel Curtis, Geoffrey Dawson (editor of The Times), and their associates. This group wielded great influence because it controlled the Rhodes Trust, the Beit Trust, The Times of London, The Observer, the influential and highly anonymous quarterly review known as The Round Table (founded in 1910 with money supplied by Sir Abe Bailey and the Rhodes Trust, and with Lothian as editor), and it dominated the Royal Institute of International Affairs, called "Chatham House" (of which Sir Abe Bailey and the Astors were the chief financial supporters, while Lionel Curtis was the actual founder), the Carnegie United Kingdom Trust, and All Souls College, Oxford. This Round Table Group formed the core of the three-bloc-world supporters, and differed from the anti-Bolsheviks like D'Abernon in that they sought to contain the Soviet Union between a German-dominated Europe and an English-speaking bloc rather than to destroy it as the anti-Bolsheviks wanted. Relationships between the two groups were very close and friendly, and some people, like Smuts, were in both.
The anti-Bolsheviks, including D'Abernon, Smuts, Sir John Simon, and H. A. L. Fisher (Warden of All Souls College), were willing to go to any extreme to tear down France and build up Germany. Their point of view can be found in many places, and most emphatically in a letter of August 11, 1920, from D'Abernon to Sir Maurice (later Lord) Hankey, a prot้g้ of Lord Esher who wielded great influence in the inter-war period as secretary to the Cabinet and secretary to almost every international conference on reparations from Genoa (1922) to Lausanne (1932). D'Abernon advocated a secret alliance of Britain "with the German military leaders in cooperating against the Soviet." As ambassador of Great Britain in Berlin in 1920-1926, D'Abernon carried on this policy and blocked all efforts by the Disarmament Commission to disarm, or even inspect, Germany (according to Brigadier J. H. Morgan of the commission).
The point of view of this group was presented by General Smuts in a speech of October 23, 1923 (made after luncheon with H. A. L. Fisher). From these two groups came the Dawes Plan and the Locarno pacts. It was Smuts, according to Stresemann, who first suggested the Locarno policy, and it was D'Abernon who became its chief supporter. H. A. L. Fisher and John Simon in the House of Commons, and Lothian, Dawson, and their friends on The Round Table and on The Times prepared the ground among the British governing class for both the Dawes Plan and Locarno as early as 1923 (The Round Table for March 1923; the speeches of Fisher and Simon in the House of Commons on February 19, 1923, Fisher's speech of March 6th and Simon's speech of March 13th in the same place, The Round Table for June 1923; and Smuts's speech of October 23rd).
The more moderate Round Table group, including Lionel Curtis, Leopold Amery (who was the shadow of Lord Milner), Lord Lothian, Lord Brand, and Lord Astor, sought to weaken the League of Nations and destroy all possibility of collective security in order to strengthen Germany in respect to both France and the Soviet Union, and above all to free Britain from Europe in order to build up an "Atlantic bloc" of Great Britain, the British Dominions, and the United States. They prepared the way for this "Union" through the Rhodes Scholarship organization (of which Lord Milner was the head in 1905-1925 and Lord Lothian was secretary in 1925-1940), through the Round Table groups (which had been set up in the United States, India, and the British Dominions in T 910- 1917), through the Chatham House organization, which set up Royal Institutes of International Affairs in all the dominions and a Council on Foreign Relations in New York, as well as through "Unofficial Commonwealth Relations Conferences" held irregularly, and the Institutes of Pacific Relations set up in various countries as autonomous branches of the Royal Institutes of International Affairs. This influential group sought to change the League of Nations from an instrument of collective security to an international conference center for "nonpolitical" matters like drug control or international postal services, to rebuild Germany as a buffer against the Soviet Union and a counterpoise to France, and to build up an Atlantic bloc of Britain, the Dominions, the United States, and, if possible, the Scandinavian countries.
One of the effusions of this group was the project called Union Now, and later Union Now with Great Britain, propagated in the United States in 1938-1945 by Clarence Streit on behalf of Lord Lothian and the Rhodes Trust. Ultimately, the inner circle of this group arrived at the idea of the "three-bloc world." It was believed that this system could force Germany to keep the peace (after it absorbed Europe) because it would be squeezed between the Atlantic bloc and the Soviet Union, while the Soviet Union could be forced to keep the peace because it would be squeezed between Japan and Germany. This plan would work only if Germany and the Soviet Union could be brought into contact with each other by abandoning to Germany Austria, Czechoslovakia, and the Polish Corridor. This became the aim of both the anti-Bolsheviks and the three-bloc people from the early part of 1937 to the end of 1939 (or even early 1940). These two cooperated and dominated the government in that period. They split in the period 1939-1940, with the "three-bloc" people, like Amery, Lord Halifax, and Lord Lothian, becoming increasingly anti-German, while the anti-Bolshevik crowd, like Chamberlain, Horace Wilson, and John Simon, tried to adopt a policy based on a declared but unfought war against Germany combined with an undeclared fighting war against the Soviet Union. The split between these two groups appeared openly in public and led to Chamberlain's fall from office when Amery cried to Chamberlain, across the floor of the House of Commons, on May 10, 1940, "In the name of God, go!"
Outside these two groups, and much more numerous (but much more remote from the real instruments of government), were the appeasers and the "peace at any price" people. These were both used by the two inner groups to command public support for their quite different policies. Of the two the appeasers were much more important than the "peace at any price" people. The appeasers swallowed the steady propaganda (much of it emanating from Chatman House, The Times, the Round Table groups, or Rhodes circles) that the Germans had been deceived and brutally treated in 1919. For example, it was under pressure from seven persons, including General Smuts and H. A. L. Fisher, as well as Lord Milner himself, that Lloyd George made his belated demand on June 2, 1919, that the German reparations be reduced and the Rhineland occupation be cut from fifteen years to two. The memorandum from which Lloyd George read these demands was apparently drawn up by Philip Kerr (Lord Lothian), while the minutes of the Council of Four, from which we get the record of those demands, were taken down by Sir Maurice Hankey (as secretary to the Supreme Council, a position obtained through Lord Esher). It was Kerr (Lothian) who served as British member of the Committee of Five which drew up the answer to the Germans' protest of May, 1919. General Smuts was still refusing to sign the treaty because it was too severe as late as June 2 3, 1919.
As a result of these attacks and a barrage of similar attacks on the treaty which continued year after year, British public opinion acquired a guilty conscience about the Treaty of Versailles, and was quite unprepared to take any steps to enforce it by 1930. On this feeling, which owed so much to the British idea of sportsmanlike conduct toward a beaten opponent, was built the movement for appeasement. This movement had two basic assumptions: (a) that reparation must be made for Britain's treatment of Germany in 1919 and (b) that if Germany's most obvious demands, such as arms equality, remilitarization of the Rhineland, and perhaps union with Austria, were met, Germany would become satisfied and peaceful.
The trouble with this argument was that once Germany reached this point, it would be very difficult to prevent Germany from going further (such as taking the Sudetenland and the Polish Corridor). Accordingly, many of the appeasers, when this point was reached in March 1938 went over to the anti-Bolshevik or "three-bloc" point of view, while some even went into the "peace at any price" group. It is likely that Chamberlain, Sir John Simon, and Sir Samuel Hoare went by this road from appeasement to anti-Bolshevism. At any rate, few influential people were still in the appeasement group by 1939 in the sense that they believed that Germany could ever be satisfied. Once this was realized,
it seemed to many that the only solution was to bring Germany into contact with, or even collision with, the Soviet Union.
The "peace at any price" people were both few and lacking in influence in Britain, while the contrary, as we shall see, was true in France. However, in the period August 1935 to March 1939 and especially in September 1938, the government built upon the fears of this group by steadily exaggerating Germany's armed might and belittling their own, by calculated indiscretions (like the statement in September 1938 that there were no real antiaircraft defenses in London), by constant hammering at the danger of an overwhelming air attack without warning, by building ostentatious and quite useless air-raid trenches in the streets and parks of London, and by insisting through daily warnings that everyone must be fitted with a gas mask immediately (although the danger of a gas attack was nil).
In this way, the government put London into a panic in 1938 for the first time since 1804 or even 1678. And by this panic, Chamberlain was able to get the British people to accept the destruction of Czechoslovakia, wrapping it up in a piece of paper, marked "peace in our time," which he obtained from Hitler, as he confided to that ruthless dictator, "for British public opinion." Once this panic passed, Chamberlain found it impossible to get the British public to follow his program, although he himself never wavered, even in 1940. He worked on the appeasement and the "peace at any price" groups throughout 1939, but their numbers dwindled rapidly, and since he could not openly appeal for support on either the anti-Bolshevik or the "three-bloc" basis, he had to adopt the dangerous expedient of pretending to resist (in order to satisfy the British public) while really continuing to make every possible concession to Hitler which would bring Germany to a common frontier with the Soviet Union, all the while putting every pressure on Poland to negotiate and on Germany to refrain from using force in order to gain time to wear Poland down and in order to avoid the necessity of backing up by action his pretense of resistance to Germany. This policy went completely astray in the period from August 1939 to April 1940...http://real-world-news.org/bk-quigley/12.html#42
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How can Germany win the war?
If Hitler had crossed the channel to invade Britain in 1940 he would had won the war.
Mao: Hitler was then really terrific, having occupied almost the whole of Europe, excepting east of the Moscow-Leningrad-Stalingrad front. And not counting United Kingdom. He occupied North Africa as well.
However, he blundered: If after the Dunkirk evacuation his troops had immediately followed into the United Kingdom, the latter would have been at the end of its tether. A British prime minister told Premier Zhou Enlai in Geneva that the United Kingdom had no more troops at all then, and it was vulnerable everywhere. However, the Germans hesitated to drive forward just because of the English Channel.
http://english.pladaily.com.cn/special/mao/txt/w25.htm
Or had Hitler decide to back the ukrainian nationalists during the invasion of Soviet Union, he could had won the war with the USSR.
...As a consequence of the shift of emphasis to the south, German Army Group South completed a colossal envelopment east of Kiev (August 24-September 21). In a great bag 200 miles wide, the Germans captured 665,000 prisoners with 3,718 cannon and 884 tanks. Hitler called this "the greatest battle in the history of the world"; his chief of staff called it "the greatest strategic blunder of the Eastern Campaign."
At this point in the campaign a curious phenomenon appeared: large numbers of anti-Stalinist Russians began to surrender to the Nazis. Most of these were Ukrainians, and the majority were eager to fight with the Nazis against the Stalinist regime of the Soviet Union.If the Nazis had been willing to cooperate with this movement, and to treat these deserters in a decent fashion, it is extremely likely that the flood of Russian deserters would have become an overwhelming torrent and the Moscow regime would have collapsed. Instead, the Nazis, led by Hitler, resolutely refused to adopt the role of "Liberator of the Slavs," and instead insisted on playing the role of "Annihilator of the Slavs." The arrogance, sadism, and racism of the Nazi system soon presented itself in a form as hateful to the average Slav as Stalinism itself.
As soon as the conquering German armies seized Soviet territory, various Nazi and satellite organizations of exploitation, of enslavement, and of extermination moved in, led by the SS. Prisoners of war and civilians were rounded up by the millions and deported to German slave-labor camps where they were starved, frozen, and beaten into subhuman derelicts at the very time that they were expected to work, fifteen or more hours a day, on Nazi war production.
Those inhabitants of conquered areas who escaped deportation or imprisonment generally were deprived of most of their possessions, especially of their food stores and livestock. All industrial equipment which had not been removed by the retreating Soviet armies was stolen or destroyed by the Nazis.
The deserters who wished to fight with the Nazis against Stalin would have been welcomed by many German Army officers, but their use in this fashion was generally discouraged and frequently forbidden by the Nazi political leaders such as Hitler or Himmler.
In spite of this, some Russian units in the Nazi armies were formed, although generally they were used only for guard or garrison duties. The size of this movement of anti-Stalinist deserters can be judged from the fact that, in spite of the obstacles we have mentioned, the number of such deserters serving in the Nazi armed forces reached 900,000 in June 1944...
http://real-world-news.org/bk-quigley/14.html#54
How Hitler Lost the War
http://www.youtube.com/watch?
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Originally posted by Stevenson101:
I was pondering about what might have happened IF they have won. I never said they had much of a chance.
There you go, you ask for an opinion and you get thesis from Mr Chia>LOL -
A thesis from Mr Chai is much better than reading all the nonsense PAP supporters write to support their party
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How Germany could had won the war may be a thesis.
But Britain's agenda of instigating a war between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia is not a thesis.
It is a fact.
...And by this date, certain members of the Milner Group and of the British Conservative government had reached the fantastic idea that they could kill two birds with one stone by setting Germany and Russia against one another in Eastern Europe.
In this way they felt that the two enemies would stalemate one another, or that Germany would become satisfied with the oil of Rumania and the wheat of the Ukraine. It never occurred to anyone in a responsible position that Germany and Russia might make common cause, even temporarily, against the West. Even less did it occur to them that Russia might beat Germany and thus open all Central Europe to Bolshevism...
This idea of bringing Germany into a collision with Russia was not to be found, so far as the evidence shows, among any members of the inner circle of the Milner Group. Rather it was to be found among the personal associates of Neville Chamberlain...
http://www.yamaguchy.netfirms.com/cikkek/
Some of you may have doubts after long years of brainwashing by british propaganda and may not be willing to accept this fact, but the evidence is conclusive.
This view that Britain deliberately sought to set Germany against Russia is also not taught in our schools.
The view that is taught is british false propaganda; a complete falsehood.
Of course after years of hearing one version of events, suddenly I go and tell you that version is bullshit and another version is the truth, most would find it hard to adjust.
But there are many facts and sources to examine if people are interested to find out more.
Two weeks after Munich, Baldwin said in a conversation with Lord Hinchingbrooke: "Can't we turn Hitler East? Napoleon broke himself against the Russians. Hitler might do the same".
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanley
Munich secrets: declassified
http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20080929/
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Originally posted by Short Ninja:
There you go, you ask for an opinion and you get thesis from Mr Chia>LOL
I swear i didn't know! -
Originally posted by xunni:
A thesis from Mr Chai is much better than reading all the nonsense PAP supporters write to support their party
Is this the new rallying cry when people disagree with you ? -
Originally posted by Stevenson101:
Is this the new rallying cry when people disagree with you ?
hahaha -
Originally posted by Stevenson101:
Is this the new rallying cry when people disagree with you ?Opps I forget that you are 1 of those PAP supporters who likes to write craps :)
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I onli know that Japan wanted to conquer all South East Asia country and American tell them do not do, but they dun listen so The MEI GUO REN cut off the oil supply that can onli last japan for 18months? and American do not wan a world so the Japs decided to bomb the Pearl Harbor and eventually succeed sunking Arizona but failed as two of the American ships has go be4 they can bomb them. So this anger the MEI GUO REN to WW2.
correct mi if i wrong , ty -
Originally posted by xunni:
How can Germany win the war?
You expect 3 countries to fight against the whole world and win all of them?
Can, but not all at the same time.
The Germans pushed all the way to Moscow, but then Hitler made several key strategic errors, mainly splitting up forces to capture lots of different places (far from one another) at the same time, rather than concentrate his forces. And his generals just could not get him to change his mind most of the time.
Accounts of generals who commanded forces during the war can give one a clear picture, far better than textbooks these days.
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Originally posted by Bus&Soccer l0v3r (VO3x 1):
I onli know that Japan wanted to conquer all South East Asia country and American tell them do not do, but they dun listen so The MEI GUO REN cut off the oil supply that can onli last japan for 18months? and American do not wan a world so the Japs decided to bomb the Pearl Harbor and eventually succeed sunking Arizona but failed as two of the American ships has go be4 they can bomb them. So this anger the MEI GUO REN to WW2.
correct mi if i wrong , tyErm, me read somewhere that part of the reason that the MEI GUO REN's fleet was not totally destroyed was due to some of their ships and 3 carriers not reaching Pearl Harbor in time for the Japs to bomb them, due to bad weather.
Correct me if I'm wrong too, thanks ya. =D
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Originally posted by Nikar 3:
if i remember correctly, japan conquer china is because they always have bad blood with china way before even 19 century. these 2 countries always at loggerheads with one another and WW II is the breaking point for both.
however, during WW II, japan's main reason to invade china is due to greed.
they want china's natural resources (which is a LOT, btw).
as if that's not enough, japan also want natural resources of the SE Asian countries.
that's why.
Bad blood yeah, centuries ago Jap pirates keep coming and harrassing China. Until some great generals beefed up the Chinese armies and whack the Japs out of China.
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Originally posted by angel7030:
same goes to the german..attacking USSR was a grave mistake...greed alway start with winning and end with loosingYep, as well as maltreatment of peoples and mismanagement of resources.
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Originally posted by xunni:
Opps I forget that you are 1 of those PAP supporters who likes to write craps :)
No, actually i dislike the PAP, the same way i dislike most people really.But i don't use my dislike as a free pass to force my opinions and flame others.
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correct mi if i wrong , ty
There were some officers in the U.S navy who wanted to attack Japan first before Japan could strike them.
see:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McCollum_memo
The memo
0p-16-F-2 ON 17 October 1940
Memorandum for the Director
Subject: Estimate of the Situation in the Pacific and
Recommendations for Action by the United States.
1. The United States today finds herself confronted
by a hostile Germany and Italy in Europe and by an equally
hostile Japan in the Orient. Russia, the great land link between
these two groups of hostile powers, is at present neutral, but
in all probability favorably inclined towards the Axis powers,
and her favorable attitude towards these powers may be expected
to increase in direct proportion to increasing success in their
prosecution of the war in Europe. Germany and Italy have been
successful in war on the continent of Europe and all of Europe
is either under their military control or has been forced into
subservience. Only the British Empire is actively opposing by
war the growing world dominance of Germany and Italy and their
satellites.
2. The United States at first remained coolly aloof
from the conflict in Europe and there is considerable evidence
to support the view that Germany and Italy attempted by every
method within their power to foster a continuation of American
indifference to the outcome of the struggle in Europe. Paradoxically,
every success of German and Italian arms has led to further
increases in United States sympathy for and material support of
the British Empire, until at the present time the United States
government stands committed to a policy of rendering every
support short of war the changes rapidly increasing that
the United States will become a full fledged ally of the British
Empire in the very near future. The final failure of German
and Italian diplomacy to keep the United States in the role of
a disinterested spectator has forced them to adopt the policy of
developing threats to U.S. security in other spheres of the world,
notably by the threat of revolutions in South and Central America
by Axis-dominated groups and by the stimulation of Japan to further
aggressions and threats in the Far East in the hope that by these
mean the Unites States would become so confused in thought
and fearful of her own immediate security as to cause her to
become so preoccupied in purely defensive preparations as to
virtually preclude U.S. aid to Great Britain in any form. As a
result of this policy, Germany and Italy have lately concluded
a military alliance with Japan directed against the United States
If the published terms of this treaty and the pointed
utterances of German, Italian and Japanese leaders can be believed,
and there seems no ground on which to doubt either, the three
totalitarian powers agree to make war on the United States,
should she come to the assistance of England, or should she
attempt to forcibly interfere with Japan's aims in the Orient and,
[2]
furthermore, Germany and Italy expressly reserve the right to
determine whether American aid to Britain, short of war, is a
cause for war or not after they have succeeded in defeating
England. In other words, after England has been disposed of
her enemies will decide whether or not to immediately proceed
with an attack on the United States. Due to geographic conditions,
neither Germany nor Italy are in a position to offer any
material aid to Japan. Japan, on the contrary, can be of much
help to both Germany and Italy by threatening and possibly even
attacking British dominions and supply routes from Australia,
India and the Dutch East Indies, thus materially weakening
Britain's position in opposition to the Axis powers in Europe.
In exchange for this service, Japan receives a free hand to seize
all of Asia that she can find it possible to grab, with the
added promise that Germany and Italy will do all in their power
to keep U.S. attention so attracted as to prevent the United
States from taking positive aggressive action against Japan.
Here again we have another example of the Axis-Japanese
diplomacy which is aimed at keeping American power immobilized,
and by threats and alarms to so confuse American thought as to
preclude prompt decisive action by the United States in either
sphere of action. It cannot be emphasized to strongly that
the last thing desired by either the Axis powers in Europe
or by Japan in the Far East is prompt, warlike action by the
United States in either theatre of operations.
3. An examination of the situation in Europe leads
to the conclusion that there is little that we can do now,
immediately to help Britain that is not already being done.
We have no trained army to send to the assistance of England,
nor will we have for at least a year. We are now trying to
increase the flow of materials to England and to bolster the
defense of England in every practicable way and this aid will
undoubtedly be increased. On the other hand, there is little
that Germany or Italy can do against us as long as England
continues in the war and her navy maintains control of the
Atlantic. The one danger to our position lies in the possible
early defeat of the British Empire with the British Fleet falling
intact into the hands of the Axis powers. The possibility of
such an event occurring would be materially lessened were we
actually allied in war with the British or at the very least
were taking active measures to relieve the pressure on Britain
in other spheres of action. To sum up: the threat to our security
in the Atlantic remains small so long as the British Fleet
remains dominant in that ocean and friendly to the United States.
4. In the Pacific, Japan by virtue of her alliance
with Germany and Italy is a definite threat to the security
of the British Empire and once the British Empire is gone the
power of Japan-Germany and Italy is to be directed against the
United States. A powerful land attack by Germany and Italy
through the Balkans and North Africa against the Suez Canal
with a Japanese threat or attack on Singapore would have very
serious results for the British Empire. Could Japan be diverted
or neutralized, the fruits of a successful attack on the Suez
Canal could not be as far reaching and beneficial to the Axis
powers as if such a success was also accompanied by the virtual
elimination of British sea power from the Indian Ocean, thus
[3]
opening up a European supply route for Japan and a sea route for
Eastern raw materials to reach Germany and Italy, Japan must be
diverted if the British and American ( ) blockade of Europe
and possibly Japan (?) is to remain even partially in effect.
5. While as pointed out in Paragraph (3) there is
little that the United States can do to immediately retrieve
the situation in Europe, the United States is able to effectively
nullify Japanese aggressive action, and do it without lessening
U.S. material assistance to Great Britain.
6. An examination of Japan's present position as
opposed to the United States reveals a situation as follows:
Advantages Disadvantages
1. Geographically strong position 1. A million and a half men
of Japanese Islands. engaged in an exhausting war
on the Asiatic Continent.
2. A highly centralized strong 2. Domestic economy and food
capable government. supply severely straightened.
3. Rigid control of economy on 3. A serious lack of sources of
a war basis. raw materials for war. Notably
oil, iron and cotton.
4. A people inured to hardship 4. Totally cut off from supplies
and war. from Europe.
5. A powerful army. 5. Dependent upon distant overseas
routes for essential supplies.
6. A skillful navy about 2/3 6. Incapable of increasing
the strength of the U.S. Navy. manufacture and supply of war
materials without free access
to U.S. or European markets.
7. Some stocks of raw materials. 7. Major cities and industrial
centers extremely vulnerable
to air attack.
8. Weather until April rendering
direct sea operations in the
vicinity of Japan difficult.
7. In the Pacific the United States possesses a very strong
defensive position and a navy and naval air force at present
in that ocean capable of long distance offensive operation. There
are certain other factors which at the present time are strongly
in our favor, viz:
A. Philippine Islands still held by the United States.
B. Friendly and possibly allied government in control
of the Dutch East Indies.
C. British still hold Hong Kong and Singapore and
are favorable to us.
D. Important Chinese armies are still in the field
in China against Japan.
E. A small U.S. Naval Force capable of seriously
threatening Japan's southern supply routes
[4]
already in the theatre of operations.
F. A considerable Dutch naval force is in the
Orient that would be of value if allied to U.S.
8. A consideration of the foregoing leads to the
conclusion that prompt aggressive naval action against Japan by
the United States would render Japan incapable of affording any
help to Germany and Italy in their attack on England and that
Japan itself would be faced with a situation in which her navy
could be forced to fight on most unfavorable terms or accept
fairly early collapse of the country through the force of blockade.
A prompt and early declaration of war after entering into suitable
arrangements with England and Holland, would be most effective
in bringing about the early collapse of Japan and thus eliminating
our enemy in the pacific before Germany and Italy could strike
at us effectively. Furthermore, elimination of Japan must surely
strengthen Britain's position against Germany and Italy and, in
addition, such action would increase the confidence and support
of all nations who tend to be friendly towards us.
9. It is not believed that in the present state of
political opinion the United States government is capable of
declaring war against Japan without more ado; and it is barely
possible that vigorous action on our part might lead the
Japanese to modify their attitude. Therefore, the following
course of action is suggested:
A. Make an arrangement with Britain for the use of
British bases in the Pacific, particularly
Singapore.
B. Make an arrangement with Holland for the use of
base facilities and acquisition of supplies
in the Dutch East Indies.
C. Give all possible aid to the Chinese government
of Chiang-Kai-Shek.
D. Send a division of long range heavy cruisers to
the Orient, Philippines, or Singapore.
E. Send two divisions of submarines to the Orient.
F. Keep the main strength of the U.S. fleet now in
the Pacific in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands.
G. Insist that the Dutch refuse to grant Japanese
demands for undue economic concessions,
particularly oil.
H. Completely embargo all U.S. trade with Japan,
in collaboration with a similar embargo imposed
by the British Empire.
10. If by these means Japan could be led to commit an
overt act of war, so much the better. At all events we must be fully
prepared to accept the threat of war.
A. H. McCollum
CC-0p-16
0p-16-F
File
[5]
0p-16-F-2 ON1 7 October 1940
Summary
1. The United States is faced by a hostile combination of
powers in both the Atlantic and Pacific.
2. British naval control of the Atlantic prevents hostile
action against the United States in this area.
3. Japan's growing hostility presents an attempt to open sea
communications between Japan and the Mediterranean by an
attack on the British lines of communication in the
Indian Ocean.
4. Japan must be diverted if British opposition in Europe is
to remain effective.
5. The United States naval forces now in the Pacific are
capable of so containing and harassing Japan as to nullify
her assistance to Germany and Italy.
6. It is to the interest of the United States to eliminate
Japan's threat in the Pacific at the earliest opportunity
by taking prompt and aggressive action against Japan.
7. In the absence of United States ability to take the
political offensive, additional naval force should be
sent to the orient and agreements entered into with Holland
and England that would serve as an effective check against
Japanese encroachments in South-eastern Asia.
[6]
Comment by Captain Knox
It is unquestionably to out general interest
that Britain be not licked - just now she has a stalemate
and probably cant do better.We ought to make it certain
that she at least gets a stalemate. For this she will probably
need from us substantial further destroyers and air reinforcements
to England. We should not precipitate anything in the
Orient that should hamper our ability to do this - so long as
probability continues.
If England remains stable, Japan will be cautious
in the Orient. Hence our assistance to England in the Atlantic
is also protection to her and us in the Orient.
However, I concur in your courses of action
we must be ready on both sides and probably strong enough
to care for both.
D.W.K.
Re your #6: - no reason for battleships not
visiting west coast in bunches.http://whatreallyhappened.com/WRHARTICLES/McCollum/index.html
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Originally posted by Stimulatedfib:
Can, but not all at the same time.
The Germans pushed all the way to Moscow, but then Hitler made several key strategic errors, mainly splitting up forces to capture lots of different places (far from one another) at the same time, rather than concentrate his forces. And his generals just could not get him to change his mind most of the time.
Accounts of generals who commanded forces during the war can give one a clear picture, far better than textbooks these days.
If the whole world join force together to attack Germany at the same time, it will be defeated.
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Originally posted by Stevenson101:
No, actually i dislike the PAP, the same way i dislike most people really.But i don't use my dislike as a free pass to force my opinions and flame others.
Don't bluff
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Originally posted by Bus&Soccer l0v3r (VO3x 1):
I onli know that Japan wanted to conquer all South East Asia country and American tell them do not do, but they dun listen so The MEI GUO REN cut off the oil supply that can onli last japan for 18months? and American do not wan a world so the Japs decided to bomb the Pearl Harbor and eventually succeed sunking Arizona but failed as two of the American ships has go be4 they can bomb them. So this anger the MEI GUO REN to WW2.
correct mi if i wrong , tyI don't think so. Japan only wanted colonies but not conquer the entire South East Asia. Only when the war started than Japan wanted to conquer the entire South East Asia
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Originally posted by xunni:
I don't think so. Japan only wanted colonies but not conquer the entire South East Asia. Only when the war started than Japan wanted to conquer the entire South East Asia
They conquer Korean and forced them to speak Japs when they dun wan
Wad about China? Kill 30,000 people when they are innocent.. -
I don't think so. Japan only wanted colonies but not conquer the entire South East Asia. Only when the war started than Japan wanted to conquer the entire South East Asia
Here is an analysis of Japan's intentions:
By the beginning of 1941, the Japanese attack on China had bogged down and was in such imminent danger of collapse that something drastic had to be done. But there was no agreement within Japan as to what direction such drastic action should take.
A timid majority existed, even within the Japanese government itself, which would have been willing to withdraw from the Chinese "incident" if this could have been done without too great "loss of face." On the whole, this group was timid and ineffectual because of the danger of assassination by the extreme militarists and hyper-nationalist groups within Japan.
Moreover, it was impossible to reach any agreement with the Chinese Nationalist government which would allow Japan to retain its "face" by covering a real withdrawal from China with an apparent diplomatic triumph of some sort.
The advocates of an aggressive policy in Japan were divided among the insignificant group who still believed that an all-out assault on China could be brought to a successful conclusion and the more influential groups who would have sought to redeem the stalemate in China by shifting the offensive against either Soviet Siberia or the rich Anglo-Dutch possessions of Malaysia and Indonesia.
In the long run, the group which advocated a drive to the south was bound to prevail, because Malaysia and Indonesia were obviously weak and rich, while Soviet Siberia lacked those items (such as petroleum, rubber, or tin) which Japan most urgently needed, and it had demonstrated its power in the battles of 1938-1939. Germany, which originally encouraged the Japanese to move southward against British Malaysia and then, when it was too late, sought to redirect the Japanese blow against Siberia, played an insignificant role in Japan's policy.
The decision to move southward, where the defense was weaker and the prizes so much greater, was made in an ambiguous and halfhearted way in the summer of 1941. The critical turning point was probably during the last week in July...
....As a result of these pressures, Japan found itself in a position where its oil reserves would be exhausted in two years, its aluminum reserves in seven months. The chief of the General Staff of the Japanese Navy told the emperor that if Japan resorted to a war to break this blockade it would be very doubtful that it could win. The president of the Japanese Planning Board confirmed this gloomy opinion. The armed forces insisted that Japan had a choice between a slow decline to extinction under economic pressure or war which might allow it to break out of its predicament. The navy had little hope of victory in such a war, but agreed with this analysis.
It was also agreed that war, if it came, must begin before the middle of December, when weather conditions would become too adverse to permit amphibious belligerent operations; it was clear that economic pressure was too damaging to allow Japan to postpone such operations until the resumption of good weather in 1942.
Accordingly, the decision was made to make war in 1941, but to continue negotiations with the United States until late October. If an agreement could be reached by that date, the preparations for war could be suspended; otherwise the negotiations would be ended and the advance to open war continued. Matsuoka, the foreign minister, who was opposed to continuing the negotiations with the United States, was dropped from the Cabinet on July 16th; from that date on, the civilian portion of the Cabinet desperately sought to reach an agreement in Washington, while the military portion calmly prepared for war.
In the course of 1941, Japan's preparations for war were gradually expanded from a project to close the southern routes into China by an attack on Malaya, to an attack on the United States.
The decision to close the Burma Road by force meant that Japan must move into French Indochina and Siam, and cross British Malaya, after neutralizing the British naval base at Singapore. Such a movement had numerous disadvantages. It would mean war with Britain; it would leave the Japanese lines of communication southward open to a flank attack from American bases in the Philippines; it was doubtful if China could be defeated even when all Western supplies were cut off (after all, these supplies were so insignificant that in 1940 American arms and munitions to China were worth only $9 million); even a total defeat of China would leave Japan's material shortages acute, especially in respect to the greatest material need, petroleum products.
In view of these disadvantages, under which Japan would expend so much to gain so little, it seemed to many Japanese leaders that very considerable gains could he obtained with only a slight additional effort if an attack on the rich Netherlands Indies were combined with the attack on Malaya and the Burma Road.
Such an advance to the tin and bauxite of Malaya and to the oil of the Dutch Indies had every advantage over any alternative possibility, such as an attack on eastern Siberia, especially as the Japanese Army (but not the Navy) had a higher opinion of Soviet power than they had of Anglo-American strength.
Having given the attack on Malaya and Indonesia the preference over any possible attack on Siberia, the Japanese leaders accepted the fact that this would mean war with Britain and the United States. In this they were probably not wrong, although some Americans have claimed that America would not have gone to war if Japan had passed by the Philippines and left other American territories untouched on its road to the south.
It is certainly true that such actions would have touched off a violent controversy within the United States between the isolationists and the interventionists, but it seems almost certain that the policies of the Roosevelt Administration would have been carried out, and these policies included plans for war against Japan's southern movement even if American areas were not attacked.
In any case, judging American reactions in terms of their own, the Japanese decided that an American flank attack from an untouched Philippines on their extended communications to the southward would be too great a risk to run; accordingly, an attack on the Philippines to prevent this was included in the Japanese plans for their southern movement.
This decision led at once to the next step, the project to attack the American fleet at Pearl Harbor on the grounds that an inevitable war with the United States could be commenced most effectively with a surprise attack on the American Navy rather than by waiting for an intact American fleet to come to seek out the Japanese in their zones of active operations in the southwestern Pacific.
It must be recognized that one of the chief factors impelling the Japanese to make the attack on Pearl Harbor was that few Japanese (and these mostly in the army) had any hope that Japan could defeat the United States in any war carried to a decisive conclusion. Rather, it was hoped that, by crippling the American fleet at Pearl Harbor, Japan could conquer such a large area of the southwestern Pacific and southeastern Asia that peace could be negotiated on favorable terms. Here, once again, the Japanese misjudged American psychology...
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Originally posted by xunni:
If the whole world join force together to attack Germany at the same time, it will be defeated.
True. =)
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Originally posted by xunni:
Don't bluff
...How old are you? 16 ? -
Originally posted by Stevenson101:
...How old are you? 16 ?Older than you. And I got the guts to admit it. You are even a disgrace to PAP supporters. At least the PAP supporters here may write craps but they dare to admit that they are PAP supporters.
You don't even dare to admit
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TS YOU GOT A FUCKING PROBLEM WITH THE JAPANESE!?