I think it is possible even though the chinese greatly outnumber them.
The mongols under Genghis Khan and the manchus are good examples.
The manchus were estimated to have only about 200 000 troops under them when they conquered China and set up the Qing dynasty.
The mongols under Genghis Khan were also estimated to be only able to send up to a maximum of 200 000 troops only but they also managed to conquer Chian and set up the Yuan dynasty.
So if Japan had concetrated its army on just attacking China and treated the chinese well to win them over they could have conquered China.
Like Genghis Khan had this policy than any cities that surrendered to the mongols without fighting them he will not kill any of them. But for those cities that fight with the mongols, once the mongols have conquered the city they will massacre the people.
So this policy actually made it easier for him to conquer them and reduced the casualities his army may suffer and also help him win the hearts of the people which he conquered.
So if Japan had come out with such policies, they could actually conquer the whole of China
It won't work....
China fell to the Mongols not because they didn't have the troops, they had a weak, corrupt government that didn't care about anything....
Even if Japan did what you suggested, they will face serious logistical & supply problem....who will help to oversee the slaughtering operation?
A significant part of their army will be tied down to such things, cutting down their effectiveness and efficiency. What's more, troop morale will go down, as soldiers are not murderers. Not all soldiers are as brutal as portrayed in history textbooks.
Read up more on war history, TS
Conquer? never..... liberate? maybe
liberate china from the Qing dynasty....set up a capitalist society in China.....
Originally posted by Jianye:
It won't work....
China fell to the Mongols not because they didn't have the troops, they had a weak, corrupt government that didn't care about anything....
Even if Japan did what you suggested, they will face serious logistical & supply problem....who will help to oversee the slaughtering operation?
A significant part of their army will be tied down to such things, cutting down their effectiveness and efficiency. What's more, troop morale will go down, as soldiers are not murderers. Not all soldiers are as brutal as portrayed in history textbooks.
Read up more on war history, TS
during world war 2 the china government was also weak and corrupted and divided too.
They won't face logistical and supply problem as there were already planes and ships at that time.
You need to read up more on the situation during world war 2 before you comment
china should conquer japan instead....
now back to your question.
if japan are to conquer whole china.. you think the european are fake one ar.
they will sit there and do nothing?
they will join the fun or sabo each other in their conquest of china (provided china is still fragmented) lol
Could Japan conquer China in World War 2
Don't think so, they didn't have enough troops or fuel to carry on a long war.
9. Why is the War of Resistance Against Japan a protracted war? Why will the final victory be China's? What is the basis for these statements?
The war between China and Japan is not just any war, it is specifically a war of life and death between semi-colonial and semi-feudal China and imperialist Japan, fought in the Nineteen Thirties. Herein lies the basis of the whole problem. The two sides in the war have many contrasting features, which will be considered in turn below.
10. The Japanese side. First, Japan is a powerful imperialist country, which ranks first in the East in military, economic and political-organizational power, and is one of the five or six foremost imperialist countries of the world. These are the basic factors in Japan's war of aggression. The inevitability of the war and the impossibility of quick victory for China are due to Japan's imperialist system and her great military, economic and political-organizational power.
Secondly, however, the imperialist character of Japan's social economy determines the imperialist character of her war, a war that is retrogressive and barbarous. In the Nineteen Thirties, the internal and external contradictions of Japanese imperialism have driven her not only to embark on an adventurist war unparalleled in scale but also to approach her final collapse. In terms of social development, Japan is no longer a thriving country; the war will not lead to the prosperity sought by her ruling classes but to the very reverse, the doom of Japanese imperialism.
This is what we mean by the retrogressive nature of Japan's war. It is this reactionary quality, coupled with the military-feudal character of Japanese imperialism, that gives rise to the peculiar barbarity of Japan's war. All of which will arouse to the utmost the class antagonisms within Japan, the antagonism between the Japanese and the Chinese nations, and the antagonism between Japan and most other countries of the world. The reactionary and barbarous character of Japan's war constitutes the primary reason for her inevitable defeat.
Thirdly, Japan's war is conducted on the basis of her great military, economic and political-organizational power, but at the same time it rests on an inadequate natural endowment. Japan's military, economic and political-organizational power is great but quantitatively inadequate. Japan is a comparatively small country, deficient in manpower and in military, financial and material resources, and she cannot stand a long war. Japan's rulers are endeavouring to resolve this difficulty through war, but again they will get the very reverse of what they desire; that is to say, the war they have launched to resolve this difficulty will eventually aggravate it and even exhaust Japan's original resources.
Fourthly and lastly, while Japan can get international support from the fascist countries, the international opposition she is bound to encounter will be greater than her international support. This opposition will gradually grow and eventually not only cancel out the support but even bear down upon Japan herself. Such is the law that an unjust cause finds meagre support, and such is the consequence of the very nature of Japan's war. To sum up, Japan's advantage lies in her great capacity to wage war, and her disadvantages lie in the reactionary and barbarous nature of her war, in the inadequacy of her manpower and material resources, and in her meagre international support. These are the characteristics on the Japanese side.
11. The Chinese side. First, we are a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country. The Opium War, the Taiping Revolution, the Reform Movement of 1898, the Revolution of 1911 and the Northern Expedition --the revolutionary or reform movements which aimed at extricating China from her semi-colonial and semi-feudal state--all met with serious setbacks, and China remains a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country. We are still a weak country and manifestly inferior to the enemy in military, economic and political-organizational power. Here again one can find the basis for the inevitability of the war and the impossibility of quick victory for China.
Secondly, however, China's liberation movement, with its cumulative development over the last hundred years, is now different from that of any previous period. Although the domestic and foreign forces opposing it have caused it serious setbacks, at the same time they have tempered the Chinese people. Although China today is not so strong as Japan militarily, economically, politically and culturally, yet there are factors in China more progressive than in any other period of her history. The Communist Party of China and the army under its leadership represent these progressive factors. It is on the basis of this progress that China's present war of liberation can be protracted and can achieve final victory. By contrast with Japanese imperialism, which is declining, China is a country rising like the morning sun. China's war is progressive, hence its just character. Because it is a just war, it is capable of arousing the nation to unity, of evoking the sympathy of the people in Japan and of winning the support of most countries in the world.
Thirdly, and again by contrast with Japan, China is a very big country with vast territory, rich resources, a large population and plenty of soldiers, and is capable of sustaining a long war. Fourthly and lastly, there is broad international support for China stemming from the progressive and just character of her war, which is again exactly the reverse of the meagre support for Japan's unjust cause. To sum up, China's disadvantage lies in her military weakness, and her advantages lie in the progressive and just character of her war, her great size and her abundant international support. These are China's characteristics.
12. Thus it can be seen that Japan has great military, economic and political-organizational power, but that her war is reactionary and barbarous, her manpower and material resources are inadequate, and she is in an unfavourable position internationally.
China, on the contrary, has less military, economic and political-organizational power, but she is in her era of progress, her war is progressive and just, she is moreover a big country, a factor which enables her to sustain a protracted war, and she will be supported by most countries. The above are the basic, mutually contradictory characteristics of the Sino-Japanese war. They have determined and are determining all the political policies and military strategies and tactics of the two sides; they have determined and are determining the protracted character of the war and its outcome, namely, that the final victory will go to China and not to Japan.
The war is a contest between these characteristics. They will change in the course of the war, each according to its own nature; and from this everything else will follow. These characteristics exist objectively and are not invented to deceive people; they constitute all the basic elements of the war, and are not incomplete fragments; they permeate all major and minor problems on both sides and all stages of the war, and they are not matters of no consequence. If anyone forgets these characteristics in studying the Sino-Japanese war, he will surely go wrong; and even though some of his ideas win credence for a time and may seem right, they will inevitably be proved wrong by the course of the war. On the basis of these characteristics we shall now proceed to explain the problems to be dealt with.
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/
By the beginning of 1941, the Japanese attack on China had bogged down and was in such imminent danger of collapse that something drastic had to be done. But there was no agreement within Japan as to what direction such drastic action should take.
A timid majority existed, even within the Japanese government itself, which would have been willing to withdraw from the Chinese "incident" if this could have been done without too great "loss of face." On the whole, this group was timid and ineffectual because of the danger of assassination by the extreme militarists and hyper-nationalist groups within Japan.
Moreover, it was impossible to reach any agreement with the Chinese Nationalist government which would allow Japan to retain its "face" by covering a real withdrawal from China with an apparent diplomatic triumph of some sort.
The advocates of an aggressive policy in Japan were divided among the insignificant group who still believed that an all-out assault on China could be brought to a successful conclusion and the more influential groups who would have sought to redeem the stalemate in China by shifting the offensive against either Soviet Siberia or the rich Anglo-Dutch possessions of Malaysia and Indonesia.
In the long run, the group which advocated a drive to the south was bound to prevail, because Malaysia and Indonesia were obviously weak and rich, while Soviet Siberia lacked those items (such as petroleum, rubber, or tin) which Japan most urgently needed, and it had demonstrated its power in the battles of 1938-1939.
Germany, which originally encouraged the Japanese to move southward against British Malaysia and then, when it was too late, sought to redirect the Japanese blow against Siberia, played an insignificant role in Japan's policy.
The decision to move southward, where the defense was weaker and the prizes so much greater, was made in an ambiguous and halfhearted way in the summer of 1941. The critical turning point was probably during the last week in July...
http://real-world-news.org/bk-quigley/15.htm
So actually it can be seen that the Japanese digged their own grave by invading China in 1937.
Anyway, Japan was defeated by AMerica and not by China as what you seem to suggest
china will nuke the hell out of japan
hard la..
China so big..
if nt wrong, Jap @ tat time also having internal prob(not having enuff food for their ppl)..
there4 their atk in Asia is asap de..
so if they were to conquer whole of China..
they would be internally & externally strained..
For once I support that China could overcome this (scenario).
Remember how they fought the Americans in the Korean War? Just humans would be enough. Thousands and thousands of them, fearless to anything, can defeat anything in the path...
like wad my geog teacher said, if each china man take 1 stick and fight against the japanese like the japanese loyalty to the japan, japan wont able to conquer.
Originally posted by Ah Chia:Don't think so, they didn't have enough troops or fuel to carry on a long war.
THE BASIS OF THE PROBLEM
9. Why is the War of Resistance Against Japan a protracted war? Why will the final victory be China's? What is the basis for these statements?
The war between China and Japan is not just any war, it is specifically a war of life and death between semi-colonial and semi-feudal China and imperialist Japan, fought in the Nineteen Thirties. Herein lies the basis of the whole problem. The two sides in the war have many contrasting features, which will be considered in turn below.
10. The Japanese side. First, Japan is a powerful imperialist country, which ranks first in the East in military, economic and political-organizational power, and is one of the five or six foremost imperialist countries of the world. These are the basic factors in Japan's war of aggression. The inevitability of the war and the impossibility of quick victory for China are due to Japan's imperialist system and her great military, economic and political-organizational power.
Secondly, however, the imperialist character of Japan's social economy determines the imperialist character of her war, a war that is retrogressive and barbarous. In the Nineteen Thirties, the internal and external contradictions of Japanese imperialism have driven her not only to embark on an adventurist war unparalleled in scale but also to approach her final collapse. In terms of social development, Japan is no longer a thriving country; the war will not lead to the prosperity sought by her ruling classes but to the very reverse, the doom of Japanese imperialism.
This is what we mean by the retrogressive nature of Japan's war. It is this reactionary quality, coupled with the military-feudal character of Japanese imperialism, that gives rise to the peculiar barbarity of Japan's war. All of which will arouse to the utmost the class antagonisms within Japan, the antagonism between the Japanese and the Chinese nations, and the antagonism between Japan and most other countries of the world. The reactionary and barbarous character of Japan's war constitutes the primary reason for her inevitable defeat.
Thirdly, Japan's war is conducted on the basis of her great military, economic and political-organizational power, but at the same time it rests on an inadequate natural endowment. Japan's military, economic and political-organizational power is great but quantitatively inadequate. Japan is a comparatively small country, deficient in manpower and in military, financial and material resources, and she cannot stand a long war. Japan's rulers are endeavouring to resolve this difficulty through war, but again they will get the very reverse of what they desire; that is to say, the war they have launched to resolve this difficulty will eventually aggravate it and even exhaust Japan's original resources.
Fourthly and lastly, while Japan can get international support from the fascist countries, the international opposition she is bound to encounter will be greater than her international support. This opposition will gradually grow and eventually not only cancel out the support but even bear down upon Japan herself. Such is the law that an unjust cause finds meagre support, and such is the consequence of the very nature of Japan's war. To sum up, Japan's advantage lies in her great capacity to wage war, and her disadvantages lie in the reactionary and barbarous nature of her war, in the inadequacy of her manpower and material resources, and in her meagre international support. These are the characteristics on the Japanese side.
11. The Chinese side. First, we are a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country. The Opium War, the Taiping Revolution, the Reform Movement of 1898, the Revolution of 1911 and the Northern Expedition --the revolutionary or reform movements which aimed at extricating China from her semi-colonial and semi-feudal state--all met with serious setbacks, and China remains a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country. We are still a weak country and manifestly inferior to the enemy in military, economic and political-organizational power. Here again one can find the basis for the inevitability of the war and the impossibility of quick victory for China.
Secondly, however, China's liberation movement, with its cumulative development over the last hundred years, is now different from that of any previous period. Although the domestic and foreign forces opposing it have caused it serious setbacks, at the same time they have tempered the Chinese people. Although China today is not so strong as Japan militarily, economically, politically and culturally, yet there are factors in China more progressive than in any other period of her history. The Communist Party of China and the army under its leadership represent these progressive factors. It is on the basis of this progress that China's present war of liberation can be protracted and can achieve final victory. By contrast with Japanese imperialism, which is declining, China is a country rising like the morning sun. China's war is progressive, hence its just character. Because it is a just war, it is capable of arousing the nation to unity, of evoking the sympathy of the people in Japan and of winning the support of most countries in the world.
Thirdly, and again by contrast with Japan, China is a very big country with vast territory, rich resources, a large population and plenty of soldiers, and is capable of sustaining a long war. Fourthly and lastly, there is broad international support for China stemming from the progressive and just character of her war, which is again exactly the reverse of the meagre support for Japan's unjust cause. To sum up, China's disadvantage lies in her military weakness, and her advantages lie in the progressive and just character of her war, her great size and her abundant international support. These are China's characteristics.
12. Thus it can be seen that Japan has great military, economic and political-organizational power, but that her war is reactionary and barbarous, her manpower and material resources are inadequate, and she is in an unfavourable position internationally.
China, on the contrary, has less military, economic and political-organizational power, but she is in her era of progress, her war is progressive and just, she is moreover a big country, a factor which enables her to sustain a protracted war, and she will be supported by most countries. The above are the basic, mutually contradictory characteristics of the Sino-Japanese war. They have determined and are determining all the political policies and military strategies and tactics of the two sides; they have determined and are determining the protracted character of the war and its outcome, namely, that the final victory will go to China and not to Japan.
The war is a contest between these characteristics. They will change in the course of the war, each according to its own nature; and from this everything else will follow. These characteristics exist objectively and are not invented to deceive people; they constitute all the basic elements of the war, and are not incomplete fragments; they permeate all major and minor problems on both sides and all stages of the war, and they are not matters of no consequence. If anyone forgets these characteristics in studying the Sino-Japanese war, he will surely go wrong; and even though some of his ideas win credence for a time and may seem right, they will inevitably be proved wrong by the course of the war. On the basis of these characteristics we shall now proceed to explain the problems to be dealt with.
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/
CCP propanganda, no mention were made at all on Kuomingtang's role in the war.
Doesn't matter if Japan conquered China anyhow, they would probably be speaking Chinese and adopting Chinese habits within the century.
CCP propanganda, no mention were made at all on Kuomingtang's role in the war.
See:
Originally posted by Ah Chia:
I was refering to the link from http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/. So cannot expect truth much from a marxism website. The article protrayed a China ruled by CCP doing all the main fighting.
No use making assumption when the war is over... There is no ifs in the world
when can we see the americans conquer china?