Apache operations over Karbala
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By Robert Hewson
A force of around 32 AH-64D 'Longbow' Apache attack helicopters were sent on a deep strike mission in the vicinity of Karbala on the night of 23-24 March.
The Apaches entered the so-called 'Red Zone', in advance of ground units of the 3rd Infantry Division, where Centcom planners believed that between eight and 10 Iraqi divisions were formed up in a defensive ring around Baghdad. Karbala is about 113km southwest of Baghdad and the attack occurred around the nearby village of Abu Mustafe, north of Hillah.
The Apaches were on a textbook mission: a co-ordinated strike during the hours of darkness to sweep away Iraqi mechanised forces and prepare the ground for the US advance. The intention would have been to engage vehicle and infrastructure targets at a safe stand-off distance, relying chiefly on the Apache's long-range Hellfire missiles. Instead the Apache force became engaged in a dangerous melee during which the helicopters were checked by unprecedented (and certainly unexpected) ground fire. The unit was unable to undertake a speedy withdrawal from that fire and suffered heavy damage without making a serious impact on the Iraqi armour.
While no crews were seriously injured, 31 of the 32 Apaches sustained combat damage, some of it serious. A crash on landing destroyed one of the aircraft after it had returned to base. Another AH-64D came down in enemy territory and its crew was captured and held until the end of the conflict.
Even though commanders in the field knew exactly where the lost aircraft was, it was not destroyed to keep it out of enemy hands as it should have been.
The good performance of Apache units in the deep strike role during Operation 'Desert Storm' in 1991 must have been in the minds of those who planned the Karbala mission. However, the successes of 'Desert Storm' have not been repeated. The 24 AH-64A Apaches sent to Albania in preparation for operations over Kosovo during Operation 'Allied Force' in 1999 were not deployed because of fears of their vulnerability. During fighting in Afghanistan in 2001, eight Apaches that were launched on a mission in support of Operation 'Anaconda' sustained serious damage from enemy ground fire.
Official US reports of the Karbala action emphasise a significant level of Iraqi preparedness. Reportedly, Iraqi agents were monitoring the Apaches at their forward aircraft refuelling point and called warnings of their departure on cellular phones.
Another issue for Army Apaches is their tendency to come to the hover and stop before shooting. This is largely a function of the laser-guided Hellfire which needs an uninterrupted line-of-sight between the designator and the target.
The experience of the Apache crews at Karbala stands in contrast to the US Marine Corps AH-1W SuperCobras. The Marine Cobras were used intensively in the close support role in what was always a high-risk environment. None were lost to enemy action and they were highly praised by the US and British Commanders who tasked them. The Cobras, armed with Hellfires as well as TOW missiles, never stayed still over Iraq – in fact they speeded up.
The US Army's OH-58D Kiowa Warriors had a similar approach. As one experienced pilot said: "It is all about training and adapting to your environment. You'll never catch me hovering. If you want to stay alive, you've got to keep moving."
http://www.janes.com/defence/land_forces/news/jir/jir030626_1_n.shtml -
Apache Flaws Stem from Doctrine and Tactics
By Maj. Wade Hasle, USMC
EditorÂ’s Note: The following is a letter sent to the editor of Rotor & Wing magazine in response to a column that appeared in a previous issue. The original column is not available online, but this letter was and is worth sharing. The author, a Marine aviator, offers his views on the differences in performance between Marine Corps AH-1Ws and Army AH-64s.
Accolades to Giovanni de Briganti for his column, “Iraq: Apaches in Question – Again.” Having studied the topic of the operational effectiveness of the AH-64 Apache and AH-1W Super Cobra for a number of years, I have a few insights that can enlighten the debate.
First and foremost, the AH-64 is a very capable platform. Mr. De BrigantiÂ’s statements to the contrary, Apache weaknesses and potential failures need to be placed in a proper context. That context is in comparison to AmericaÂ’s other attack helicopter, the AH-1W Super Cobra. He was on the right track when he compared mishap rates, pilot proficiency and training between the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps, but the answer is much more complex.
This poignant and otherwise overlooked comparison is the first I have ever seen in public print. Finally, we might have an open forum on the subject.
One for one, the Apache has a better forward-looking infrared (flir), greater fuel capacity and increased maneuverability, and basically brings more ordnance to the fight when compared to the Super Cobra. Apaches also possess an advantage in crashworthy seats and landing gear. U.S. Marine AH-1Ws may not measure up as well on paper, but maintain strong advantages in other areas.
The Apache received a lot of bad press over the years, starting with Task Force Hawk. None of the information I have read, heard or discussed with those present then ever put the Apache at fault. To understand why there have been problems, one must not look at the aircraft but Army policies, doctrine and training.
It took months to get Task Force Hawk into theater. Delays had to do with the relatively large size, transportation and force protection of Task Force Hawk. Once in Albania, the crews began training in a demanding mountain environment with which they were not familiar. Coupling this unfamiliarity with training at night and with unfamiliar night vision goggles (NVGs) made it even tougher. Two resulting crashes on which the media focused were not because of aircraft weaknesses, but a lack of proper preparation and training time for the Apache crews.
In contrast, the AH-1W crews are extremely familiar with and rely only on NVGs for night operations. NVGs are better than IR imagery in tricky maritime environments. (The ApacheÂ’s back seat flir monocle would not work from the deck of a ship in inclement weather.) This reliance on NVGs allows the AH-1W crews to see identical perspectives from identical devices. Having both pilots on NVGs can be a crew coordination advantage not enjoyed by a crew of Apache pilots using two different systems (flir and NVGs).
The NVG experience of the Marine crews would definitely have helped Task Force Hawk crews. Also, training is always a two-way street. The Marines would have gained valuable lessons from the soldiers.
Another question should be raised. Why wasnÂ’t the Aviation Combat Element of the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable), which carried a detachment of AH-1Ws and UH-1Ns, [permitted] to train alongside Task Force Hawk? Ultimately, it was the lack of ground forces engaged in combat and not the crashes that prevented the use of both AH-64s and AH-1Ws. It would have been a hard fight for both attack helicopter variants, if we had actually used them.
In Operation Iraqi Freedom, the media focused on the ApachesÂ’ large amount of battle damage. Apaches are the scapegoats of a weak doctrine. The Army exercises Apache units as maneuver elements in a deep air support: air interdiction (DAS:AI) role. AH-1W crews train for DAS:AI missions but the likelihood of actual execution is relatively remote. Instead, the AH-1WÂ’s primary mission is that of close air support (CAS).
Marines tend to reduce a target using combined arms, an approach in which the AH-1W is only one element of a larger supporting picture. Targets are caught between simultaneous direct and indirect fire from both air and ground. Combined arms keep the enemy pinned down and incapable of returning fire upon attacking aircraft.
The Marines do not possess the assets to employ 30 attack helicopters in a fashion similar to Army forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom at Karbala Gap, nor would the Corps with its present doctrine. Sending Apaches “alone and unafraid” on a DAS:AI mission to engage the enemy is not wise.
Returning with more than 90 percent of the aircraft battle-damaged, with only one lost, is more of a testament to the aircraft and crewsÂ’ strength than weakness. If this report is indeed true (as I can only ascertain information from public media sources, as Mr. de Briganti does), failure lies not with the aircraft, but with doctrine and employment of them. The Army needs to revisit potential roles of its attack helicopters. The Apache was not nor will it ever be a single point of failure.
Mr. de Briganti poses the question of training and proficiency differences between the Super Cobra and Apache crews. As a whole, Army warrant officers have more flight hours than Marine commissioned officers. The Army historically has had a lower mishap rate than the Marines. So a lack of Apache pilot proficiency isn't the answer. The answer, I do believe, lies within the training. The differences in the servicesÂ’ approach to training are huge and varied, but a few points are worth mentioning.
Differences begin with the crews. Marines train to operate and fly from either seat in the AH-1W. Army policy dictates that AH-64A Apache crews train in one seat. There are dozens of pilots in the Army that have ratings in both seats, but not the 100 percent level Marines can claim. From a MarineÂ’s perspective, this seating advantage rounds out the pilotÂ’s skill and experience level. As I understand it, the AH-64D has a common cockpit. This might allow future seating flexibility, if the Army chooses to use it.
There is a huge rift in tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). The Army tends to focus on hover fire. This seems to be a result of a few factors. First, the Apache has the power to hover with 16 Hellfire missiles. Second, hovering is easier for ordnance-delivery training. Third, Army ranges are overly strict with live-fire procedures, keeping maneuver space to a minimum.
Marine AH-1W tactics, techniques and procedures focus on running fire as much as, if not more than, hover fire. This is not to say that Marine tactics, techniques, and procedures are superior. Rather, the constant movement of AH-1Ws is due to other potential missions that include CAS, DAS, Forward Air Controller (Airborne), Escort, and Air-to-Air. Having these abilities forces Marine AH-1Ws to move about the battlefield in response to support requirements. Also, AH-1Ws are employed as divisions of four using fixed-wing-like maneuvers rather than large flights firing abreast. All of this helps improve their survivability.
Apache crews appear to be learning the virtues of running fire. Reports from Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan and even Operation Iraqi Freedom attest to the rule that speed is life. We must face the facts. Any helicopter is obsolete on the modern battlefield if used unwisely. A $20-million Apache is no different.
Probably the largest impact on the perceived difference described by Mr. de Briganti between AH-64 and AH-1W combat results can be attributed to the MarinesÂ’ training and readiness syllabus. It raises an inexperienced pilot from initial instruction through five distinct levels of training to that of an instructor. Each event has completely defined lessons, briefing requirements and execution standards. It is thorough, with room for flexibility, and uses a building-block approach toward flight leadership. Compared to the ArmyÂ’s essential task training (as explained to me by many Apache pilots), the Marines clearly have the upper hand.
What does the answer boil down to? It lies not with the Apache, but with a lack of proper Army doctrine and realistic tactics, techniques and procedures. My objective is not to preach Marine superiority, but to provide a different slant. The Army has many strengths, including a promising integrated simulation plan for pilots and realistic force-on-force training. These are programs from which the Corps can learn.
Apache pilots are extremely dedicated warriors. This letter is not to denigrate their efforts in any way. We have much to gain from each other.
Each service will learn from the war on terrorism, but only those who apply what is learned will win.
Maj. Wade Hasle, USMC is AH-1Z Operational Test Director at NAS Patuxent River, Md -
excellent article. . . too bad the army won't learn from it cos the writer is marine. . . hopefully singapore doesn't fall prey to the trappins of the US army. . .
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Agree. This will be the first time the expensive high tech apaches will be introduced to the SEA theatre. Hope the operators will use it cunninglyOriginally posted by laser51088:excellent article. . . too bad the army won't learn from it cos the writer is marine. . . hopefully singapore doesn't fall prey to the trappins of the US army. . . -
Just presuming here, but I doubt we'll be using the Apaches like the US Army, we have too few to consider using them en masse like the Yanks. To put things into perspective, more Apaches were involved in the Karbala raid than we have ordered
Precisely what was the US Army thinking anyway when they threw them against prepared armoured units backed by a hornets nest of AAA/SAMs? Its not like they had surprise on their side or were facing an army in disarray or retreat like 1991. A helicopter is a flimsy machine, armoured or not, it was a miracle 31 out of 32 amanged to RTB even if a couple crash-landed. -
The yanks tend to get too over confident of their machines, and sometimes push the limits of their operation envelopes too much
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Basically the Apache is so good that the US army went dumb and didn't take into account obvious tatics that all fighting forces use and simply sent them in as if some computer game force on force to beat the enemy. Plain stupid, just anyhow chiong and wack. On a disarrayed targets, for example, beaten and confused malaysians it might work, but if you are coming up against a hornets nest you need to have better ideas then rushing in hoping your technology will save you. In which case the yanks are very lucky it did.
Basically they should have used support Kiaowas and zapped aa units first, distrupt communications and the like. Not just go in and see how many things we can plink. -
General: Deep-Strike, Urban Tactics For Attack Helicopters May Need Review
By Stephen Trimble
July 30, 2003
QUANTICO, Va. -- No U.S. Marine Corps attack helicopters was shot down during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), but the fleet was so heavily damaged in combat that service officials are expressing doubt about two fundamental wartime roles for rotor-wing aircraft, a senior commander said July 29.
Echoing recent concerns by some U.S. Army officials, Maj. Gen. James F. Amos, commander of the 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing, said current tactics that allow attack helicopter crews to penetrate deep behind enemy lines on long-range strike missions and hover above cities to provide close air support are ill-advised.
Although the crews piloting 58 AH-1 Cobras and UH-1 Hueys fought bravely, their relatively low-speed and low-altitude flights may have provided an easy target for Iraqi gunners, said Amos, addressing a seminar on here.
"I didn't have any shot out of the sky -- like blown up out of the sky," Amos said, "but I had 49 of them shot up and I ended up with various states of depot-level repair. I'm telling you we can't afford that."
Amos blamed the heavy toll on current tactics that permit attack helicopters to rove far into enemy territory, sometimes dozens of miles in advance of friendly ground units.
"The bad news is that we've developed a set of tactics - and it's our fault -- that takes our tactical attack rotary aviation out to the leading edge of the normal maneuver elements," Amos said, "and, then, out there even more forward than that, and leave them alone out there where the enemy is."
Amos cited the case of a Cobra pilot who was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross (DFC) during the war for launching attacks 45 miles inside enemy territory.
"I wasn't sure if I should have given him a DFC or given him a letter of reprimand," he said, half-jokingly. "I'm not saying they shouldn't be out there, but if they're going to be out there, we've got to at least have the advantage, and right now we're floating around out there with Delta corridor tactics."
Another example of bad tactics is using attack helicopters for urban close air support.
During the war, the Marines recognized that the Iraqis had heeded the lessons of previous urban battles, such as Mogadishu, that posed heavy risks for helicopters, he said. Just before the allied assault on Baghdad in early-April, the Marines restricted attack helicopters from the battlespace, he said.
The Marines also discovered a critical need for a battle damage assessment system during the campaign, Amos said. The service cobbled together a system based on the AV-8B Harrier's Advanced Targeting Forward-Looking Infra-Red (AT-FLIR) pod data and aerial imagery, he said.
The makeshift system provided a 70 percent solution for the problem, but the marines want something better.
"We're going to have to come up with something that says, 'We've killed this many tanks, and that many vehicles,'" Amos said.
http://www.aviationnow.com/avnow/news/channel_aerospacedaily_story.jsp?id=news/urb07303.xml -
AH-64 Apache's Deep Strike Role Under Army Review, Keane Says
By Stephen Trimble
August 6, 2003
U.S. Army leaders have ordered warfighting experts to perform a fresh review of currently sanctioned tactics that allow AH-64 Apache attack helicopters to penetrate deep behind enemy lines.
"We are taking a look at aviation doctrine and if it still makes sense to us," Gen. John M. Keane, vice chief of staff of the Army, said Aug. 5 at a Defense Writer's Group breakfast.
Deep-strike missions are one of the fundamental combat roles of the military's attack helicopters, both the AH-64 and the U.S. Marine Corps AH-1 Cobra.
Keane said the review was called for after Apache units staged a series of successful raids deep into enemy territory during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), but sustained heavy damage, including one helicopter that was shot down in a late March battle. In the same clash, 31 of 35 Apaches were damaged in a pre-dawn assault on a Republican Guard division.
It is not clear how the tactics review, which is being performed by the U.S. Training and Doctrine Command, could influence an ongoing debate about fully funding a proposed Block 3 modernization plant for the AH-64D Longbow fleet.
Keane's remarks came a week after Maj. Gen. James F. Amos, commander of the 3rd Marine Air Wing in OIF, questioned using attack helicopters for deep strike and close air support roles (DAILY, July 30).
"The bad news is that we've developed a set of tactics - and it's our fault - that takes our tactical attack rotary aviation out to the leading edge of the normal maneuver elements," Amos said, "and, then, out there even more forward than that, and leave them alone out there where the enemy is."
Two weeks into the campaign, both services banned the attack helicopter fleets from staging unsupported raids.
In the Army's case, Keane said, AH-64 units were bundled into makeshift strike packages with OH-58 Kiowa Warrior scouts and fixed-wing aircraft providing close air support.
Repair bids
Although the Army altered its tactics, Keane denied that the AH-64 performed below expectations. The 35 Apache crews in the late-March raid, for example, expected to encounter a dug-in force of Iraqi Republican Guards but instead found a dispersed enemy organized for anti-helicopter ambush, Keane said.
The Iraqis, despite the element of surprise, "did not defeat that organization," Keane said.
One night later, Keane added, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) staged a deep-strike raid using Apaches that proved far less costly.
Meanwhile, the U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command is seeking bids from contractors to repair 53 AH-64A Apaches that are "combat and/or environmentally damaged," according to an acquisition notice posted Aug. 1.
http://aviationnow.com/avnow/news/channel_aerospacedaily_story.jsp?id=news/apa08063.xml