Property development
1. Japanese developers have targeted Queensland and in particular the Gold Coast and this is in close comparison to that of Hawaii in the 1970s.
2. United States law enforcement agencies now admit that they should have devoted more time investigating the so called legitimate developers. Queensland gained intelligence indicates that the following companies and associates have been involved in suspect business dealings.
Daikyo Kanko Company Ltd has been regularly reported as having Boryokudan associations. They are by far the largest developers on the Gold Coast. This bureau has not investigated Daikyo on the Gold Coast, however lengthy inquiries were made concerning Daikyo in the Cairns area.
Daikyo Cairns was the subject of an intelligence report to the C.J.C. Indications of official corruption with members of the Mulgrave Shire Council and intimidation of owners of tourist shops.
Shinko Australia P/L, intelligence indicates an involvement with the Boryokudan in the Sanctuary Cove area.
Current intelligence indicates that Interdevelop Company Limited has invested considerable sums of money on the Gold Coast for Japanese businessmen.
xxxxxx born 010237 a resident of Japan who is the xxxxxx of this company has been reported as being a Boryokudan member.
xxxxxx born 221265 who speaks fluent Japanese is one of the directors of Interdevelop and a number of other companies owned by xxxxxx.
3. The Japanese investors use Australians as Directors of companies, no doubt to disguise foreign ownership. To date a large number of companies have been identified on the Gold Coast as having Japanese interests. SEE ANNEXURE A note#140
4. With the large number of companies, with Japanese financial backing, on the Gold Coast, particularly in the hospitality industry, the way is open for the Boryokudan to legitimise tourist enterprises to cover their main sources of revenue - drugs, prostitution, gambling and extortion.
Recent confirmed Boryokudan visits
1. xxxxxx born 221229 in company with a number of other Japanese visited the Gold Coast during December 1990 and January 1991. He has also made a number of other visits to the Gold Coast.
An informant who is a personal confident to xxxxxx has identified him as being a high ranking Boryokudan member and should be treated with respect.
During xxxxxx previous visit to the xxxxxx Sheraton Mirage two suitcases arrived prior to his arrival. Hotel staff believed that one of the suitcases contained a large sum of money. When he did arrive a large sum of money was placed in a safety deposit box. When xxxxxx departed the two suit cases were left at the hotel for collection. Hotel staff believed that the suitcases were delivered and collected by a representative of Daikyo.
Also during this visit all bookings were made and paid for by xxxxxx (Daikyo).
During xxxxxx visit in December 90 and January 91 he also placed a sum of money believed to be approximately $1 million in a safety deposit box at the Sheraton Mirage. When he left in January 91 the hotel gave him permission to leave the money in the safety deposit box.
2. xxxxxx born 060965 arrived in Cairns in December 1990 in possession of 70 million yen (A$700,000.00) claiming he was a process worker/chef.
There is no real evidence that would suggest that xxxxxx is a member of the Boryokudan other than that he was arrogant and domineering in his manner.
The following day xxxxxx collected xxxxxx born 030566 from the international airport. xxxxxx address book was photocopied and several names in the address book have been identified as persons involved in the importation of illicit drugs.
And following this day xxxxxx (a known Boryokudan member) and his minders arrived at the Cairns international airport. They travelled to Darwin and were observed at the Darwin Casino. This party then travelled to the Gold Coast and stayed at Conrad Jupiters Casino. The inference is that the Boryokudan use couriers to transfer money from Japan for laundering in Australia.
Money laundering
1. The NPA have stated that there is no legislation to counteract money laundering within Japan. As previously mentioned there also is no control over moneys leaving Japan.
2. The Australian Customs Service do not refuse entry to persons with large amounts of money entering this country. xxxxxx is a typical example in that he entered Australia via Cairns in possession of 70 million yen and ACS officers simply recorded particulars of the money.
3. Conrad Jupiters Casino in fact entices Japanese to come to Australia, bringing with them large sums of money.
4. Intelligence suggests it is a recognised practice for Japanese Nationals to launder money within this country.
6.11 Clearly some of the items in this ABCI report are not of great weight, at least when taken isolation, as the Queensland Premier, Mr Goss, pointed out. note#141 Also the report has to be read for what it is - intelligence and allegations based on a variety of sources of varying quality and reliability, rather than information proven in court proceedings. Subsequent investigations failed to confirm some of the suggestions in the report, such as the suggestion that yakuza were involved in the commission arrangements by which tour guides brought Japanese tour groups to particular shops and tourist venues and intimidation of local businesses. Claims relating to casinos, and to money laundering generally are examined in paragraph 6.31 below.
6.12 In 1992, there were further claims that the Japanese company, Daikyo, had yakuza associations. note#142 Daikyo was at one stage a shareholder in Jupiters Casino on the Gold Coast and was part of a consortium interested in bidding for a licence to operate a casino in Brisbane. It also has other tourism-related interests in Queensland. The claims were strongly denied by Daikyo. The Queensland Premier said that the yakuza links to Daikyo were not established. note#143 Also in 1992, the AFP was reported to be investigating several yakuza-related claims, including one that the yakuza were seeking permits to build and operate casinos in Australia and another alleging yakuza involvement in a northern New South Wales property development. note#144
6.13 In 1993 it emerged that Mr Masaru Takumi, second in charge of the Yamaguchi-gumi yakuza group, was a frequent visitor to Australia and a company he owned had bought a penthouse on the Gold Coast. The Minister for Immigration subsequently cancelled Mr Takumi's visitor's visa on the basis of his admitted membership of the Yamaguchi-gumi. note#145 In the publicity surrounding this case a newspaper reported that a Japanese businessman had lost a large sum to another Japanese businessman on the Gold Coast in 1992 in a 'shonky business deal'. The businessman said he had no difficulty hiring 'a local yakuza enforcer' to get his money back. note#146
6.14 Some yakuza members have been deported from Australia because they failed to disclose their criminal records when applying for visitor visas. In some cases these visitors have apparently had large sums of cash in their possession. For example, according to a media report a group of three deported in November 1991 had more than $500,000 in Australian currency in their possession, which they were allowed to take with them because Australian officials could not prove that they had obtained it illegally. note#147 The AFP's Annual Report 1991-92, p. 22 stated:
Several Japanese Yakuza members and gang leaders have been identified as having visited Australia. A number of Yakuza members were detected violating immigration laws - mainly through failing to declare their past criminal records when applying for visas - and in co-operation with the Department of Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs, AFP officers 'supervised' their departure from Australia.
6.15 In May 1991 Mr Sueharu Suzuki was deported for failure to disclose his criminal convictions when applying for his entry visa. He apparently admitted that he was a former yakuza member. note#148 It seems he had visited Queensland for two years before his arrest and had, through companies, purchased properties in several parts of the State, one of which he said he was planning to develop into a rural retreat for the staff of his car dealership in Tokyo. note#149
6.16 In 1991, a yakuza visitor was successfully prosecuted under the Cash Transaction Reports Act 1988 for failing to declare that he was carrying more than $5,000 when attempting to leave Australia via Brisbane Airport for Japan. The person involved, Mr Chun Yong, was a Korean national said to be the leader of a yakuza gang called the Toa Yuai Jigyo Kumiai, and he had an extensive criminal record. He was reported to have had $155,000 in his possession when he arrived, and was attempting to leave with $68,000 in yen and Australian dollars. note#150
6.17 The Australian Federal Police Annual Report 1992-93, p. 29 stated that inquiries into Japanese organised crime in Australia indicated that an Australian and a Japanese national were allegedly involved in a fraudulent migration scheme to qualify Japanese investors under the Business Migration Scheme. A total of $8 million was apparently lost by several Japanese businessmen in the scheme. However, the annual report makes no explicit reference to any yakuza involvement. There are other cases where a Japanese living in Australia has allegedly attempted to defraud visiting Japanese, but there has apparently been no evidence of any yakuza involvement in these cases.
6.18 On 21 March 1994 the Australian Financial Review reported:
Japan's organised crime syndicates are moving into Australian industry and targeting legitimate companies as a crackdown on the gangs at home sends them looking for new opportunities abroad.
The Federal Police have recently opened five separate and substantial investigations into yakuza investment and crime in Australia. Four of these involve attempts to either invest in, or extort money from, legitimate businesses and business people operating in Australia.
There are indications that a Japanese syndicate is attempting to buy into an established Australian export industry to provide the conduit and cover for a major international drug trans-shipment route. ...
From what the Australian authorities have been able to uncover of the gangs' activities, they are now investigating:
- An attempt by a syndicate to make a sizeable corporate investment in an established Australian industry which exports to Japan, apparently with the intention of using the trade to ship drugs into the Japanese market;
- Intimidation and extortion of Japanese companies and business-people operating in Australia;
- Japanese gangs' moves to enter the construction industry in Australia, including sophisticated efforts to extort information about bidding for particular projects;
- Signs of systematic defrauding of Japanese individuals and businesses in Australia;
- Evidence of an emerging partnership in Australia between some yakuza groups and Hong Kong-based Triad gangs. ... note#151
6.19 In June 1992 seven Japanese, ostensibly tourists, were arrested on arrival at Melbourne airport from Malaysia when their luggage was found to contain 12 kilograms of heroin. Five of them, and a Malaysian national, were subsequently convicted and sentenced to terms totalling 105 years of imprisonment. One of those convicted was the leader of the tourist group, Yoshio Katsuno, who was sentenced to 25 years' imprisonment. One media report identified him as a 'former member' of the yakuza. note#152 Another said that Katsuno 'had been identified as a mid-level member of a Tokyo cell' of the yakuza. note#153 However, there was no suggestion that the yakuza had organised the importation. Rather the reports seems to suggest an ethnic-Chinese group based in Malaysia was the organiser. One media report described the case as 'the only known arrest which involved elements of ... the Yakuza in a South East Asian drug syndicate'. note#154
6.20 Finally in this collation of reports of yakuza activity in Australia, the Queensland Criminal Justice Commission has reportedly investigated claims that recruitment of Australians to work in Japan may be connected with yakuza-linked organised prostitution in Japan. note#155 According to a media story based on a leaked CJC report, 'A member of the political staff of the Australian embassy in Japan has confirmed Australian women are being recruited for the Japanese sex industry after their passports were taken by Yakuza members'. note#156
How Real is the Threat from the Yakuza?
6.21 A fair summary of the above would be that there is clear evidence of recreational visits by yakuza gang members, some of which have involved false statements about criminal antecedents in order to obtain the necessary visa, and at least one of which involved a breach of cash reporting law. There is evidence of some relatively minor real estate investments by yakuza-related companies, but these investments are not in themselves illegal. There are many other claims and allegations, as the preceding paragraphs have indicated, but there appears to be no hard direct evidence of illegal activity by yakuza gangs in Australia. note#157
6.22 In August 1990 the Director of Intelligence at the Queensland Criminal Justice Commission, Mr Jack Morris, was asked what evidence it had that yakuza principals had infiltrated Queensland and were involved in organised criminal activities. He responded by saying that 'we really have no hard evidence that would point to it, except that some overt or open source people have told us that they have seen them, and that they have visited different areas of the State, and I'm talking about a very small number [that] have been observed'. note#158 The Queensland Tourism Minister, Mr Gibbs, said in 1991: 'I am concerned about the fantasy that some people have suddenly developed about the Yakuza. If the Yakuza operate in this State ... nobody ... would support more thoroughly than myself a full investigation ... I understand that there is no proof that that is happening. There is suspicion of it, but there is no proof.' note#159
6.23 In 1992, the Committee raised a current media report note#160 about yakuza infiltration into Australia with the National Crime Authority. The response included a note of caution from Authority Member Malcolm Gray, QC:
One of the problems about this area is that a lot of it is anecdotal. Indeed, if you read that article it is really more anecdotal than based on any specific instance. The mere fact that a person is Japanese and that he buys property does not make him a member of the Yakuza or imply that there is a Yakuza takeover of property, particularly in Queensland.
I just make that as an observation because it is a little bit like Chinese and Triads, or Italians and the Mafia. There is a tendency to associate the ethnic group with the criminal element within that ethnic group without necessarily there being any justification for doing so.
Mr Cusack [a Member of the Authority] - The AFP had a report on the Yakuza. At that stage, although they were still investigating it, the AFP could show no link between people buying property on the Gold Coast and the Yakuza, as was being alleged. There are members of the Yakuza who are coming into Australia, they can show that, but as regards any links, so far that has not been achieved.
Senator JONES - There have been a number of reports, and not just this one, about the purchase of property. There have also been a number of reports in relation to the Yakuza and child prostitution. note#161 Those sorts of reports have been coming through too.
Mr Sherman - It is something we cannot take for granted. I agree with everything Mr Gray has said and we will keep an eye on it. ... note#162
6.24 In written answers in October 1992 to questions asked in the Senate, the then Minister for Justice, Senator Tate, said that the AFP was not aware of any evidence which would support the suggestion that the Queensland tourist industry was being used to launder profits from Japanese criminal activity. Nor did the AFP have any evidence to support the claim that the yakuza's penetration of the Queensland property market could be well above 25 per cent. note#163
6.25 A media report in May 1993 noted: 'Australia's law enforcement agencies believe that the Yakuza have not moved into Australia in a big way. They believe that most identified Yakuza who visit are here for a holiday and nothing else.' note#164 Two criminologists, Paul Wilson and Phil Dickie, expressed the view in a paper published in 1993 that there was:
no compelling evidence of widespread Japanese involvement in traditional criminal activities in Queensland; however, there is a legitimate concern over the potential for illegally sourced incoming investment flows to produce local and regional economic and social distortions. It appears that what law enforcement agencies and governments need to do in relation to the Yakusa 'threat' is to be more sure of where money for such things as tourism development come from. note#165
6.26 The section of the Report of the Review of Commonwealth Law Enforcement Arrangements dealing specifically with the yakuza suggests that yakuza groups are not currently operating here. The Report notes that historically in Japan the yakuza were to some degree a tolerated part of society and comments:
4.79 Since 1991, however, there has been a major government push against these groups. Armed with new anti-gang laws, Japanese authorities have been mounting successful operations against Yakuza groups and their leaders. While law enforcement agencies have known of recreational visits to Australia by Yakuza members for much of the past decade, the Japanese Government initiative may eventually cause Yakuza members to try to establish themselves in this country. Yakuza groups may see Australia as a place where they could recoup some of the profits lost in Japan.
4.80 A number of AFP investigations have revealed the presence in Australia of Yakuza members.
4.81 As with the Colombian syndicates, the resources available to the Yakuza groups would make them difficult for Australian law enforcement agencies to counteract if they established a presence here. (emphasis added)
6.27 The absence of a large, geographically-concentrated, Japanese community in Australia makes it less easy for yakuza to prey on Japanese here, in the way that Vietnamese and Chinese criminals have been said to prey on their (larger) respective ethnic communities in Australia. In addition, the close interest taken in yakuza visitors by Australian law enforcement agencies, and the attendant media publicity, may have discouraged visiting yakuza from seeing Australia as anything more than a holiday destination.
6.28 It has been pointed out that most yakuza cannot speak English, and that this provides a considerable barrier to their gaining a foothold in Australia. note#166 On the other hand, the language barrier also poses difficulties for Australian law enforcement agencies trying to investigate alleged yakuza activities: the use of standard techniques for investigating organised criminal activity, such as undercover investigators, infiltration techniques and telecommunication interception and electronic eavesdropping, all become more difficult.
6.29 The view was noted above that the economic slow-down in Japan, combined with the boryokudan countermeasures law, would push the yakuza overseas to places such as Australia. However, another view is that the chance of a concerted push by yakuza gangs into Australia has dropped sharply as a result of the changed economic climate in Japan. note#167 If the main interest of the yakuza in Australia to date has been the investment and laundering of profits, there is some logic is believing that the interest would decline as yakuza profits in Japan declined. If the number of media reports about alleged yakuza activities in Australia is any guide, there has been a marked reduction in the last year or so.
6.30 There are no reported cases in Australia of violence by yakuza groups, or of yakuza-organised drug trafficking into Australia. Nor have there been any reported prosecutions for yakuza-related extortion or any reports identifying specific companies on the receiving end of the sort of corporate blackmail which has been a noted feature of yakuza activity in Japan. note#168 There have been no proven cases of corruption of politicians or public office holders in Australia by yakuza. Apart from the false visa application cases and the failure to declare cash at the customs barrier, there have not been any media reports of arrests or convictions of yakuza members in Australia. There is manifestly a close media interest in anything relating to the yakuza that occurs in Australia. It is fair to assume from this, that had there been any arrests or prosecutions in cases with clear or even peripheral yakuza involvement, they would have received publicity.
6.31 Claims that yakuza members were visiting Australian casinos in the early 1990s to launder money must be read in the light of the NCA's 1991 investigation into money laundering generally. This found 'no known cases whereby casinos were used to conceal the origin of criminal funds'. note#169 The popular view that legal casinos provide a ready means to launder money is simply not correct. note#170 Monitoring of Mr Masaru Takumi (referred to in paragraph 6.13 above) revealed no evidence of his participation in casino gambling that could lead to money laundering. It did reveal that his wife had lost about $10,000 at Jupiters Casino. note#171
6.32 The NCA's investigation also noted the claims that real estate was used to launder the proceeds of overseas crimes. On this point, the study found: 'There are, however, only a very few confirmed cases which document the laundering or investment of proceeds of crime generated overseas in Australia'. note#172 The study did note, however, the need for better information on the proceeds of crime that might be entering Australia. note#173
6.33 It was also said in 1991 that there was no logical reason why yakuza members would want to come to Australia to try to launder money, given that there were at the time no restrictions on money exchanges in Japan. note#174 The relative sophistication of Australian measures for the detection of money laundering must surely lessen Australia's attractiveness for this purpose. The presence of strong Australian legislation against money laundering makes it risky for overseas criminal groups to use this country. There are still many other countries in which money laundering is not a crime, or where few measures are in place to detect it.
6.34 Although not involving the yakuza, the Law and Chun case illustrates the risk of confiscation for those investing the proceeds of overseas criminal activity in Australia. note#175 Law Kin Man is alleged to have made profits of at least US$100 million in the late 1980s by smuggling heroin from south east Asia into the United States. He is currently in custody there awaiting trial, after having been arrested in Hong Kong in 1989 and extradited to the United States in 1992. His profits from the United States were moved to Hong Kong. From Hong Kong, some A$23 million was sent to Australia and invested in real estate by Law's wife, Deborah Chun, at his direction. She had been an Australian resident since 1983. On receiving information from the Hong Kong authorities, the NCA had taken an interest in her activities and discovered the real estate purchases. Action under the Proceeds of Crime Act 1987 was taken against Chun and the family company she controlled. Both pleaded guilty. In September 1983, the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) obtained forfeiture orders in relation to $1,440,025 in cash and real estate valued at $4,050,000. In addition, the DPP obtained pecuniary penalty orders against Chun and her company totalling over $10 million. As at 30 June 1994, some $8.9 million had been recovered and paid into the Confiscated Assets Trust Fund.
6.35 The success in the Law and Chun case was attributable in considerable measure to the close cooperation between Australian, Hong Kong and United States authorities. However, close international cooperation is not always possible, and the absence of any proven cases of investment of yakuza money in Australia does not mean that no cases have occurred. Australian investigators have difficulty in verifying the source of funds coming from Japan so as to determine if they are the proceeds of crime. United States investigators have experienced similar difficulties, as a recent report noted:
Despite the fact that Japanese organized crime groups are believed to have invested hundreds of millions of dollars of profits from their criminal enterprises in U.S. real estate during the past decade, U.S. law enforcement authorities have had almost no success in dealing with this problem. The reasons are twofold: First, U.S. officials face almost insurmountable difficulties in tracing the source of Japanese funds used to purchase U.S. properties; second even if such information is obtained, loopholes in current U.S. law on money laundering make successful prosecution unlikely. note#176
6.36 Apart from the inherent difficulties in following money trails in foreign countries, Japanese privacy law limits the ability of its police to provide information on Japanese citizens to foreign law enforcement agencies. It seems that in at least two instances yakuza members or associates have sued the National Police Agency for releasing information to United States officials. note#177 Information may only be provided if there is a suspicion that a specific crime has been committed. Moreover, the crime must involve an act that, if committed in Japan, would be illegal under Japanese law. note#178 As noted above, yakuza membership per se is not a crime in Japan. Because Japanese money laundering law covers only the profits of drug trafficking, Japanese agencies will only cooperate in trying to identify a source of suspect funds in drug trafficking cases. As noted above, much of the yakuza gangs' income comes from non-drug activities.
(continue to section 7)